A clean slate approach to secure wireless networking by Ponniah, Jonathan
c© 2013 Jonathan J. Ponniah
A CLEAN SLATE APPROACH TO SECURE WIRELESS NETWORKING
BY
JONATHAN J. PONNIAH
DISSERTATION
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Electrical and Computer Engineering
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2013
Urbana, Illinois
Doctoral Committee:
Professor P. R. Kumar, Chair
Professor Rayadurgam Srikant
Professor Nitin Vaidya
Associate Professor Yih-Chun Hu
ABSTRACT
Traditionally, wireless network protocols have been developed for perfor-
mance. Subsequently, as attacks are identified, patches or defenses have
been developed. This has led to an “arms race,” where one is never con-
fident about what other vulnerabilities may be exposed in the future. We
seek to reverse this process. We identify a set of axioms describing a model,
under which we develop a secure utility optimized network. Our results rest
on the axioms, and can be attacked only to the extent that the axioms can
be challenged. We present a complete suite of protocols, taking a wireless
network all the way from startup to optimality. These protocols are not just
individually secure; they are holistically secure, that is, there are no gaps
between them that can be attacked.
The approach considers a group of wireless nodes some of which are “good,”
and the rest, “bad.” The good nodes seek to form a functioning wireless net-
work, operating at a high level of utility. The bad nodes know the identities
of the good nodes but not conversely. Moreover, unlike their good counter-
parts, the bad nodes are capable of full centralized cooperation and collusion.
On the other hand, the good nodes arrive on the scene unsynchronized, un-
coordinated and ignorant of the others’ intentions.
We introduce a distributed protocol suite that enables the good nodes
to proceed all the way from birth to a min-max utility optimal network,
where the minimization is over all bad behaviors of the bad nodes, and the
maximization is over all protocols followed by the good nodes. That is, the
good nodes form a functioning, reliable network from startup, in the face
of any sustained cooperative attack mounted by the bad nodes. We show
that the protocol overhead occupies an arbitrarily small fraction of the total
operating lifetime. We prove that our protocol realizes a nearly optimal level
of utility.
Our protocol supersedes a considerable amount of previous work that deals
ii
with several classes of attacks such as the following: man-in-the-middle,
wormholes, dropping packets, Byzantine behaviors, disruption of timing events,
presenting false topologies, etc. More importantly, this protocol suite obvi-
ates the need to identify all of the other types attacks that can potentially
be carried out by colluding malicious nodes, for there are many. Instead,
under this protocol, the malicious nodes cannot reduce the utility of the net-
work any further than they could by either just jamming and/or cooperating
with the protocol. At a broader level, our approach presents a model-based
approach to secure protocol development, as an alternative to an arms race
type of approach.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a clean-slate system theoretic ap-
proach to security of ad hoc multi-hop wireless networks. Traditionally,
protocols in this area have been developed for performance, not security.
Subsequently, they have evolved as an arms race, i.e., a sequence of attacks
interlaced by protocol patches responding to specific attacks, but without
any provable holistic guarantees. Our goal is to provide a model-based, sys-
tem theoretic approach to this field, which results in a complete protocol
suite that is not only provably secure, but also provably attains min-max
performance.
Our focus is on ad-hoc, multi-hop, wireless networks. These are a class of
wireless networks distinguished by their ability to form and configure them-
selves without any external assistance or pre-existing wireless infrastructure;
hence the name “ad hoc.” Packets in these networks are relayed from one
node to another in order to reach their destinations; hence the name “multi-
hop.” These networks can be used in a diverse variety of situations. Peace-
time applications include disaster scenarios such as Hurricane Katrina [1],
vehicular networks [2], or any other scenario where a group of nodes with
wireless capabilities wish to form a spontaneous network.
Since these networks lack a centralized controller, all the decisions on op-
erating the network are made by the nodes themselves. Some examples
include which packet a node should transmit, when to transmit it, and at
what power level, as well as when to generate packets for acknowledgment
or control, such as request-to-send (RTS) or clear-to-send (CTS), etc. Typi-
cally these decisions are distributed, and are made by each node based on the
limited information available to them. To create such networks and operate
them therefore requires a number of protocols constituting a protocol suite.
The protocols in such a suite have traditionally been organized into cate-
gories such as routing protocols, medium access protocols, power control pro-
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tocols, auto-configuration protocols etc. Medium access protocols, such as
ALOHA or IEEE 802.11 [3] aim to resolve contention for the shared wireless
medium and thus provide nodes with the ability to access the medium. The
protocol IEEE 802.11 for example, can be configured in an ad-hoc mode for
use in such wireless networks. In this mode the nodes employ an RTS-CTS-
DATA-ACK handshake to avoid packet collisions between nearby transmis-
sions. Power control protocols decide the power levels at which packets are
broadcast [4]. Routing protocols determine the multi-hop path that packets
must follow in order to reach their destinations [5]. Transport protocols reg-
ulate the rate at which packets are injected into the network to avoid causing
excessive congestion, as well as provide end-to-end acknowledgments so that
dropped packets are resent [6]. These protocols operate at different layers
of the OSI stack, and interact with each other in intended, or, sometimes,
unintended ways.
Of all the categories mentioned, the set of routing protocols is the largest.
Routing protocols can be further classified as pro-active [7] or on-demand
[8]. Pro-active routing protocols use control packets to discover and main-
tain routes between source-destination pairs. The resulting overhead can be
costly in environments where the network topology (and hence the source-
destination routes) frequently change. On-demand protocols avoid this over-
head by only attempting to discover a route when it is needed, a strategy that
is advantageous in mobile networks and networks with time-varying links.
Routing protocols can also be classified as distance-vector based [9] or link-
state based [7]. Distance-vector routing protocols maintain at each node the
minimum number of hops needed to reach each of the remaining nodes in the
network, and the corresponding “next” node on a minimum-hop path. These
hop counts represent the cost-to-go in a dynamic programming problem.
The distributed Bellman-Ford algorithm or some variant is used to update
the distance-vector of each node after it receives the distance vectors of its
neighbors. Link-state protocols, on the other hand, require each node to
maintain the graph of the network, that is the state of all links in the entire
network. The link states are updated whenever new information is received
from a neighbor.
Protocols for power control [10], [11], [4] are likely to have a cross-layer
effect on network operation. For example, power levels affect the medium
access layer, because high-powered transmissions interfere with neighboring
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transmissions and lead to packet collisions. High-powered transmissions also
create links between nodes that are far apart, thus enabling shorter routes in
the network, directly affecting the network layer. The quantity and quality
of these routes determine the amount of congestion in the network, which
also affect the transport layer. The COMPOW protocol [11] is an example
of a power-control protocol that operates on multiple layers of the OSI stack.
Protocols, in the form of scheduling policies, can also be chosen to maxi-
mize the network utility, where utility is a measure of the benefit the system
derives when the nodes operate at certain rates. Network utility maximiza-
tion was first developed by Kelly [12], [13], [14] for wireline networks, and
later generalized to static wireless networks with multipath routing by Lin,
Shroff, and Srikant [15], [16], and [17], following the work of Tassiulas and
Ephemides on throughput optimality [18].
This diverse collection of protocols illustrates the complexity in forming a
functioning network out of a collection of distributed wireless nodes. Yet, we
still have not even considered the operating challenges of networks infiltrated
with malicious nodes. The protocols described so far assume that all of the
nodes in the network are “good.” That is, that all the nodes in the network
faithfully follow the published protocol. However, the network may consist
of “bad” nodes that do not share the same obligation, but instead attempt
to sabotage the protocol by any available means, in collusion with the other
bad nodes. Moreover, since the entire operation is composed of numerous
interdependent subtasks, a bad node can potentially cause disproportionate
damage to the network.
The efforts to protect the network against such threats have made wireless
security a research area in its own right. Some of the “canonical” attacks
that have been identified include the Wormhole [19], which occurs when a
bad node surreptitiously sets up a link between unsuspecting and otherwise
unconnected nodes in the network. If this link remains consistent and sta-
ble, then no harm is done. However, the bad node may then seek to route
as much of the traffic as possible through the compromised link under its
control, and attempt to destabilize the network by inducing congestion or
redirecting traffic in suboptimal ways. Another attack called SYBIL occurs
when a collection of bad nodes adopt multiple forged identities, populating
the network with pseudonymous entities and using them to gain influence
in the network operation [20]. The “rushing” attack [21] occurs when an
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attacker floods the network with route requests to maximize the number of
routes that travel through it and no other node. Route requests that may
arrive later via different routes are naively dropped by the receiving nodes
that have already processed the route requests from the attacker. As a result,
a malicious node ends up with control over a large fraction of the network
traffic. The “partial deafness” attack against 802.11 [22] occurs when an
attacker artificially reduces its link quality to draw more network resources.
Other attacks include the routing loop attack in which an attacker generates
forged routing packets causing data packets to cycle endlessly, the routing
black hole attack in which an attacker drops all packets it receives, and the
network partition attack in which an attacker injects forged routing packets
to prevent one set of nodes from reaching another [23]. All these attacks are
examples of a Denial of Service (DoS) attacks where a bad node is able to
exercise a disproportionate level of influence over the network operation.
In response to each attack, a corresponding fix or software patch has been
proposed. For example, temporal and geographical packet leashes [19, 24]
prevent wormhole attacks; network discovery chains prevent rushing attacks;
and queue regulation at the access point prevents partial deafness attacks.
The routing loop attack, the routing black hole attack, and the network
partition attack are all countered in the Ariadne protocol [23] by the joint
use of routing chains, encryption, and packet leashes. Some protocols such
as Watchdog and Pathrater [25] try to preempt any attacks by maintaining a
blacklist that tracks malicious behavior, but the effort backfires if an attacker
maligns a good node, causing other good nodes to add that node to their
blacklists.
The perpetual back-and-forth between discovering attacks and building
defenses is partially due to the fact that the dominating factor in the de-
sign of first generation wireless protocols was performance, and security was
an afterthought. In addition, wireless protocols are often built on the un-
derlying architecture of previous generations, especially of those that are in
widespread use. Given the original bias for performance, the result has been
a process in which protocols are hardened on an attack by attack basis. Even
after a protocol has been hardened to a specific attack, there may be other
attacks that have yet to be uncovered. Hence, at no point in this process
is it possible to authoritatively claim that a protocol is secure. Instead, one
only has a perpetual arms race between attacks and fixes.
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The purpose of this thesis is to create a theoretical framework for the
design of secure wireless protocols. It is important to emphasize that by
security, we are not referring to privacy or “equivocation” in the Shannon [26]
sense of protecting a message from an eavesdropper, but to the integrity and
reliability of the network itself. There is another sense in which our work is
different from an information-theoretic approach. We employ cryptography,
which relies on the computation complexity of decoding, even though that
paradigm is not information-theoretically secure. We would like to establish
fundamental limits on what can and cannot be done, and replace the arms-
race driven system with one that offers more direction and certainty to the
design process. More precisely, we would like to establish a model-based
approach to secure wireless protocols, in which a specific attack is viewed as
a “policy,” a mapping from observations to actions that is consistent with the
model assumptions. Our goal is create a protocol that can provide guarantees
against all policies that can be carried out by a group of attackers, and not
just a protocol that is secure against an individual policy. Of course, we also
need an appropriate notion of performance, such as throughput, since without
it a network can be perfectly secured by shutting down all communication.
Our goal therefore is to design a protocol that is completely secure and
optimized for performance, while ensuring that security is not compromised;
an approach exactly opposite to the one in use today. Given this motivation,
we do not adopt the protocols in place already. Rather, we start with a clean
slate and design a fresh new protocol suite. We hope that the result that
emerges from this line of inquiry can provide some guidance and insight into
the architectures of the future. At the least, our results can be regarded as an
existence theorem on optimal performance in a certifiably secure framework.
A key objective in such a program of research is to establish a model of
the system that can support such a theory of wireless security. We will
address the problem by considering the behavior of adversarial nodes in the
context of utility maximization. In this framework, the good nodes seek to
maximize the overall utility of the network, measured by some function of
the operating rate vector, whereas the bad nodes employ whatever strategy
minimizes this utility. We have, in game-theory parlance, a zero-sum game
between protocols and attackers.
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1.1 Outline of Model and Results
The description of the system model can be organized into five categories:
network utility, attacker capabilities, the physical model, encryption, and
clocks. We will discuss each of these categories in turn, starting with network
utility.
Suppose that the network is composed of good nodes that follow the es-
tablished protocol, and bad nodes that may not. Furthermore, suppose that
the bad nodes, unlike the good nodes, know a priori which nodes among
them are bad and can fully coordinate their activities. We will allow the
bad nodes to act in any way that minimizes the network utility. They might
for instance, advertise a wrong topology, drop packets that need to be re-
layed, refrain from acknowledging packets that are received, jam while others
transmit, or any combination of the above. In some cases, a bad node may
even choose to conform to the protocol, if doing so causes more damage to
the network utility than other malicious actions (and we will show in the
sequel how cooperation can hurt!). Collectively, these activities can be said
to constitute “Byzantine” behavior [27]. In short, the bad nodes can choose
any cooperative causal policy that minimizes network utility.
Concerning the physical limitations of the network we will assume that
each node, good or bad, has a maximum transmission power level. We will
also assume that nodes can transmit to each other at a finite set of rates that
depend on other transmissions that are currently being made, thus modeling,
for example, an SNR determined rate with a finite set of modulation schemes.
In addition, we will assume that any transmissions at rates below the SNR
determined rate are error-free. That is, the success of a transmission is
deterministic not probabilistic, which is an admittedly limiting assumption.
It is convenient to consider the notion of a “concurrent transmission set,”
as well as the notion of a “resulting rate vector.” The first point to note
is that the wireless medium is a shared medium. That is, interference can
occur at a receiver due to the transmission of nearby nodes. We will model
this phenomena by supposing that at any given instant, a subset of nodes
can transmit, with each node choosing a modulation rate, power level, and
other such choices as may be available to it. We will call this a “concurrent
transmission set.” The remaining non-transmitting nodes can listen to the
wireless medium. Depending on their proximities to transmitters, they may
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be able to decode certain transmissions. We will describe what they can suc-
cessfully decode by a “rate vector,” which is a vector where each component
specifies the rate at which a node can decode another node. Some of these
components may be zero, as for example happens when it is not listening if
it is a half-duplex node, or if a transmission from another node is too weak
in comparison to the sum of all other interferences and noise, i.e., its signal-
to-interference-ratio is too low. We will denote this vector by x, just as we
have done earlier for the vector of source-destination throughputs realized by
the protocol, since both have the same dimension.
We will suppose that the graph formed out of those edges where two nodes
can directly communicate at the lowest rate modulation scheme even when
all other nodes are jamming, i.e., transmitting noise at the maximum power
level, is connected.
We will assume the complete set of cryptographic capabilities. That is, we
will suppose that each node has a private key and a public key. Information
that is encrypted by a private key can only be decoded with the public
key. An encrypted packet cannot be forged, altered or tampered with. The
encryption incurs a fraction of the overhead, which must be accounted for
when computing optimality.
The final category, clocks, merits additional explanation because the no-
tion of time is not frequently used in wireless network protocols. Most of
the work in scheduling for utility maximization and security is either event
driven or assumes universal access to a centralized reference clock. In prac-
tice however, wireless nodes have only their local clocks which are subject
to skew and offset. Incorporating these features into a clock model has sev-
eral implications. First of all, unsynchronized transmissions can result in
primary conflicts that fail, since half-duplex nodes cannot transmit and re-
ceive simultaneously. Secondly, clocks also affect the length of the operating
lifetime, commonly assumed to be infinite. Since timing data can only be
exchanged and transmitted in packets of finite length, either the operating
lifetime must be finite or the clocks must reset. Both options present their
own set of difficulties. The former prevents the network from reaping any
asymptotic benefits and the latter opens the network to replay attacks by way
of rebroadcasting stale packets that have embedded and signed timestamps.
Finally, unsynchronized clocks create security problems for the network, the
most significant being that any two nodes separated by more than one hop
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must synchronize through intermediaries. If one or more of these intermedi-
aries are malicious, the timing data they provide may be false or inconsistent.
Even more insidiously, a bad node could malign a good node by rendering
it impossible for the network to infer which node is lying. We will devote
Chapter 4 to resolving this problem. It turns out that the bad nodes are
able to inject a certain amount of uncertainty into the clock estimates of the
good nodes, even if the good nodes form a connected subcomponent.
Returning to the clock model, we assume that each node has an affine
clock. That is, it ticks at a constant multiple (known as the skew) of some
standard reference clock. The relative skew between two nodes is the ratio
of their respective skews. We will assume that the relative skew between
any pair of two good nodes is uniformly bounded away from zero, and from
above by a constant known to all nodes a priori. At startup, we will assume
that the clocks are not synchronized, and that each clock has a finite lifetime
after which it resets. Moreover, the nodes must start up within a bounded
time of each other. We will later relax this assumption in Chapter 6 to admit
unbounded startup times; doing so introduces major challenges.
It may be recalled that each concurrent transmission set realizes a cer-
tain rate-vector, where each component corresponds to a single link, and so
we can call this a vector of link rates. By time sharing between concurrent
transmission sets, one can obtain a weighted average of rate vectors, i.e., a
weighted average of the link rates, where the weighted averaging is over the
proportion of time that the system allocates to each concurrent transmis-
sion set. As emphasized above, these are the results of direct links between
neighboring nodes. By employing routing and forwarding packets, one can
obtain a vector of throughputs between all the possible end-points; where
each component in the vector now denotes an end-to-end rate. This results
in a throughput vector x. We will only consider throughput vectors that are
achievable by protocols that time-share over concurrent transmission sets.
Such a throughput vector in turn provides a utility U(x). We will assume
that this utility function is monotone in the components of x, and that it is
continuous. Subsequently we will restrict the vector x to only contain those
nodes that are not in a separate connected component from the good nodes.
We now consider the game where the bad nodes wish to minimize this util-
ity over all the Byzantine behaviors, while the good nodes wish to maximize
it. Suppose that the bad nodes decide to “disable” one or more concurrent
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transmission sets in order to reduce the set of feasible throughput vectors.
A concurrent transmission set is disabled by definition, if any destination
node in the set does not receive a scheduled packet. There are many reasons
why such a packet failed to arrive: the bad nodes could have jammed, re-
fused to transmit, or deployed more sophisticated attacks. We will lump all
these possibilities under the rubric of Byzantine attacks. We assign a label
“non-functional” to each such disabled concurrent transmission set. Let N
denote the set of concurrent transmission sets labeled “non-functional.” To
obtain an upper bound on utility, suppose that the bad nodes even reveal
which concurrent transmission sets have been disabled. Then the network
can operate over a time-sharing over the concurrent transmission sets that
have not been disabled. For each rate vector of such a concurrent transmis-
sion set pii, let γi denote the proportion of time allocated to pii, where γi ≥ 0
and
∑
i 6∈N
γi = 1. The vector γ represents a time-share of the non-disabled
concurrent transmission sets. Therefore, from this the vector of link level
rates z can be determined using the formula z =
∑
i 6∈N
γipii.
Suppose now that yp denotes the throughput carried by a source-destination
path, and let yp denote the set of throughputs that can be carried over the
various source-destination paths. (Note that a single source-destination pair
(si, di) may be served by several paths with the same end-points). For each
link (n,m), {yp} must satisfy
∑
p:(n,m)∈p
yp = zn,m for all p. That is, the sum
of throughput rates that use link (n,m) cannot exceed the capacity of the
link. The total throughput xsi,di for the source-destination pair (si, di) is
xsi,di =
∑
p:p∈(si,di)
yp. The disabling of certain concurrent transmission sets
may split the graph into several components. However, all the good nodes
will be in the same component, by the assumption made earlier that the good
nodes are connected even under worst case jamming. Consider the source-
destination pairs restricted to this component. Let us maximize the utility
realized by these source-destination pairs over the choice of yp satisfying the
above constraints induced by γ and denote the maximum by U(N, γ); it is
a function of the labeling of concurrent transmission sets N , and the time-
share vector γ. The good nodes do not know who the bad nodes are, except
those that are not a part of this component. So U(N, γ) denotes the utility
perceived to be accrued by the nodes that appear to be good. Now let us
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consider:
min
bad nodes labeling of
concurrent transmission sets
N
max
good nodes time-sharing
of concurrent transmission sets
γ
U(N, γ). (1.1)
The reason that (1.1) is an upper bound is because it corresponds to a situa-
tion where the bad nodes first announce which concurrent transmission sets
are disabled and with that knowledge, the good nodes optimally time share
over the rest of the non-disabled concurrent transmission sets.
We will show that there is a protocol under which the good nodes have a
common perception of the utility being accrued by the nodes that appear to
be conforming that is greater than:
(1− ) min
bad nodes labeling of
concurrent transmission sets
N
max
good nodes time-sharing
of concurrent transmission sets
γ
U(N, γ),
where  > 0 be arbitrarily small. That is, the good nodes all know the
throughputs that they are getting, and the remainder of the throughputs
appear to be as reported by the bad nodes. Clearly no higher value of
perceived utility than (1.1) is guaranteeable.
The utility in (1.1) reveals several important properties. First, the bad
nodes are unable to benefit from having a priori knowledge of the protocol.
Second, the bad nodes are effectively limited to jamming and/or cooperat-
ing in a concurrent transmission set. These two strategies when carried out
consistently are impossible to stop. However, the protocol is unable to force
the bad nodes to choose the same strategy across all concurrent transmission
sets. Rather, a bad node has the option to jam or cooperate in each con-
current transmission set, and in some cases, do both simultaneously. Third,
the protocol achieves (1.1) for any utility function U(x) (as noted earlier, the
utility function is assumed to be monotone increasing in each throughput,
and continuous).
In view of the properties discussed so far, the utility in (1.1) has the “flavor”
of optimality; it is able to bring a collection of nodes from primordial birth
to a fully functioning network operating at the perceived utility in (1.1),
regardless of what the attackers do. That is, the protocol is immune to all
attacks that are consistent with the model.
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A counterpoint to the model-based framework is that the protocol can still
be attacked by challenging the model assumptions. For example, the results
no longer hold if receptions are probabilistic, or encryption can be broken.
However, now the design process has shifted so that protocols are tailored
to models not specific attacks. We argue that this is a more coherent and
sound basis for protocol design.
In the second part of this thesis, the model is extended to allow unbounded
birth times. The biggest complication from this extension is the formation
of multiple sub-components, each consisting of nodes born simultaneously or
within a certain bounded time of each other. To accommodate this change we
need to include additional functionality in the protocol that enables adjacent
components to merge. Furthermore, the protocol must also ensure that this
additional functionality is itself robust against malicious efforts to undermine
it. Since the birth times are unbounded but the operating lifetime is fixed,
the performance of the network can only be sensibly evaluated from the most
recent birth time of a good node. We develop a protocol that forms a fully
functioning network, and over the operating lifetime of the network from the
birth time of the last good node, achieves the utility in (1.1).
Our approach to wireless security weaves together holistically several tra-
ditionally independent topics: scheduling, network utility maximization, pro-
tocol security, and clock synchronization, and further does so in a guaranteed
security context with performance measured by a utility function. In the con-
text of secure wireless protocol design, these topics are deeply interrelated,
but are usually treated separately. Such separate treatment can leave open
vulnerabilities that cross the boundaries of separation. For instance, an at-
tacker can damage network utility by targeting clock synchronization and
disrupting coordinated action. An attacker might also be able to disrupt the
network by generating false data or not cooperating with the schedule. This
thesis is a holistic approach to protocol development for wireless networks
that by considering the problem in its entirety provides guaranteed security
within the model considered.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we give an
overview of the protocol for a specific type of model in which the birth times
of the nodes are bounded. We give an intuitive proof for why the protocol is
able to achieve the results that are claimed. In Chapter 3 we introduce an
orthogonal MAC scheme that enables two unsynchronized half-duplex nodes
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to exchange messages within a bounded time. The orthogonal MAC code
is used by the protocol in the initial stages of network formation, when the
nodes are newly born and trying to discover their neighborhood. In Chapter
4, we investigate the problem of clock synchronization in a network infiltrated
with hostile nodes. The presence of attackers injects some uncertainty into
the accuracy of clock parameters. We quantify this uncertainty. In Chapter
5 we examine the case in which the nodes are all born within a bounded
time. We describe the protocol, and show that it achieves the utility in (1.1).
In Chapter 6 we repeat the process for the case in which the nodes have
unbounded birth times. Chapter 7 offers some directions for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROTOCOL
The wireless ad-hoc network requires a complex execution of many inter-
dependent tasks in order to operate successfully. These “moving parts” offer
hidden malicious nodes lots of different ways in which to disrupt the network.
When seen in this light, the claims of this thesis may appear sweeping. To
wit, we claim that there exists a protocol which over the operating lifetime,
achieves an effective rate vector that is min-max optimal regardless of the
attacks carried out by malicious nodes. Moreover, the malicious nodes can
do no better than jam and/or cooperate in each concurrent transmission set.
In this chapter we attempt to provide an intuitive understanding of why
and how our protocol justifies these claims. First, it is important to clarify
the type of attacks that are the focus of this thesis. We are not offering
new ways to preserve the privacy of data packets in the tradition of Shan-
non. Throughout this thesis we will assume perfect encryption. Rather, our
concern is with the operation of the network; whether it can reliably trans-
port data while there are colluding malicious nodes participating in all of the
complex interactions that make the network “work.”
Given this scenario, the preceding claims provoke some natural questions.
For instance, how can the network behave as a cohesive unit if there are
bad nodes that cooperate only sporadically? What if these bad nodes defer
their bad behavior until much later in the network operation? How does
the network know at any moment which nodes are participating and which
nodes are misbehaving? Another set of questions pertains to the activity
of the bad nodes. We claim that the bad nodes are effectively limited to
jamming and/or cooperating, even if they have the ability to carry out far
more sophisticated attacks. We make the claim for a model of the good
and bad capabilities of the nodes without attempting to characterize the full
portfolio of attacks that are available to the colluding bad nodes. How do we
justify this claim? These questions will be at the forefront of our discussion
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of the protocol operation.
2.1 The Main Ideas
There are several ideas that underpin our approach. First, we limit our anal-
ysis to throughput vectors that can be achieved by time-sharing concurrent
transmission (CT) sets, that is, a set of nodes that transmit simultaneously at
a specific throughput vector. This rate region is smaller than the information
theoretic capacity region, but using it makes the problem more tractable.
Next, given a schedule we note that any “attack,” no matter how complex
or sophisticated, has only one of the two following effects on a CT set: either
it disables the CT set or it does not. Since there are a finite number of CT
sets, all of which are known, the full portfolio of attacker strategies affects
the network in a way that can be completely characterized, even if some of
the strategies in the portfolio are unknown.
Moreover, any CT set that requires the cooperation of a bad node will
always be disabled if the bad node does not so cooperate. So without loss
of generality, we will reduce the portfolio of attacker strategies to those that
disable or enable CT sets by jamming or cooperating respectively.
Third, we note that a disabled CT set in a schedule will always be detected
by the node that fails to receive a scheduled packet. If alerted by this node,
the network can delete the disabled CT set from the collection of feasible CT
sets considered in the future, and then choose a new schedule.
The iterative pruning of CT sets is a key feature of the protocol. Since
there are only a finite number of CT sets, the number of disabled CT sets
must be finite.
Suppose that after each iteration the network chooses a schedule that
achieves the utility-optimal rate vector over the non-disabled (or feasible)
CT sets. Given a sufficiently long operating period, the colluding bad nodes
must eventually settle on a collection of disabled CT sets that represent
steady-state behavior. Let Θ be that set. Let C denote the set of all possi-
ble concurrent transmission sets. The effective operating rate vector of the
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Figure 2.1: An example of an attacker that can jam and cooperate with a
concurrent transmission set.
network is:
max
protocols
that time-share
over C\Θ
U(x). (2.1)
However, Θ can be equivalently represented as the set of actions in which
an attacker jams and/or cooperates with each CT set. It might not be clear
how an attacker can both jam and cooperate in the same CT set. Consider
Figure 2.1 composed of the source destination pairs (A, C) and (B, D) while
A and C are bad nodes and B and D are good. Now while node A jams, node
B can claim to have received all the scheduled packets, since by assumption,
the attackers fully cooperate. Hence node A effectively jams and cooperates
within the CT set. Therefore, the effective rate vector in (2.1) satisfies:
min
bad nodes disable
a concurrent
transmission set
max
all protocols
that time-share
over concurrent
transmission sets
U(x). (2.2)
Note that the network arrives at this rate vector without ever having to
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identify which nodes are good or bad. Instead, the network assumes that
any node contained in a feasible CT set must be good. This assumption may
not always be true, but it is falsified at most a finite number of times. Each
time, the assumption is false the corresponding CT set fails, is then detected,
removed from the feasible set, and never used again.
When averaged over a sufficiently large number of iterations, the rate loss
incurred by erroneously assuming cooperation can be made arbitrarily small.
To recapitulate, the achievable rate vector ensures that bad nodes are effec-
tively limited to jamming and/or cooperating with the protocol, and gain no
advantage by knowing the protocol a priori.
2.2 The Problem of Forging Consensus
The discussion so far has treated the “network” as though it were a single
cohesive unit, able to act in a coordinated manner, consistently detect and
identify disabled concurrent transmission sets, and uniformly decide on a
schedule after each iteration. In reality, the network is composed of good
and bad nodes. The good nodes are not initially synchronized; in fact they
are a distributed system. Moreover, they do not know a priori which nodes
are good or bad. On the other hand, the bad nodes do know which nodes are
good or bad, and in addition are capable of fully cooperating with each other,
i.e., they are a centralized system. Therefore all actions and decisions of the
good nodes occur in a distributed system and must be made by exchanging
and passing messages. The challenge is that bad nodes might selectively drop
messages to influence the outcome of any decisions. Since the good nodes
do not know which nodes are good or bad, they also do not know if their
messages are received or not. This problem was first proposed in a paper as
the Byzantine Generals Dilemma, which we will briefly describe now.
Consider an army encamped against an enemy city. The army, represent-
ing the Byzantine Empire, is divided into several divisions and arrayed on
opposing sides of the city. However, some of the divisions are led by treach-
erous generals. (Historically, the leadership of the Byzantine Empire, which
succeeded the Roman Empire, had a reputation for constant infighting and
backstabbing.) The loyal generals wish to decide on a common plan of action,
but they can only communicate by messenger. Suppose that in this arrange-
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ment, two loyal generals A and B are separated by a traitor. General A sends
a message to General B requesting a joint attack. However, General A does
not know whether the message arrived or was intercepted. Suppose General
B receives the message and responds with an acknowledgment. Now General
B does not know whether his acknowledgment was received, and General A
does not know whether General B knows that his acknowledgment was re-
ceived. This recursive sequence of uncertainties carries on ad infinitum. A
fundamental result of this problem is that the loyal Byzantine generals will
never be able to decide on a common plan without an additional assumption;
namely, that the subgraph of loyal Byzantine generals is connected. It is not
obvious that this assumption is sufficient for the loyal Byzantine generals to
arrive at a consensus. The traitors might be able pass themselves off as loyal
and smear loyal generals as traitors. The solution to this problem is called
the Byzantine General’s Algorithm (BGA).
In the BGA, each user first broadcasts a message containing the infor-
mation it wishes to disseminate to all the other users in its neighborhood.
Next, each user broadcasts the messages from its neighbors’ neighbors to its
neighbors. This process is repeated n times over until each user has received
a message that has made k +m hops, where k is the number of good nodes
and m is the number of bad nodes that have behaved like good nodes, while
n is the total number of all nodes. It can be shown that after n rounds, the
good users will have the same set of messages if the subgraph of good users is
connected. Therefore, since they all obtain the same information, the good
nodes can make the same decision.
Another important caveat to the BGA is that the users must be syn-
chronous. In the network model we use, the good nodes do not have access
to a centralized reference clock. Instead, the good nodes have local clocks
that are relatively affine and the relative clock parameters (the skew and
offset) are unknown a priori. The protocol includes a series of steps that
allow the good nodes to learn their relative clock parameters, designate a
clock as a reference, and estimate the reading of the designated reference
clock. Clearly after this process is complete, the network is effectively syn-
chronized. But getting to this point requires the good nodes to arrive at
a common view of the network topology and the relative clock parameters.
Therefore we have a “chicken-or-egg” circular dependency where the BGA is
needed to synchronize the network, but a synchronized network is needed to
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execute the BGA. To resolve it, we make use of two features of the network
model: a bounded relative clock skew between any pair of good nodes, and
bounded birth times for all nodes. Invoking these two properties, we can
assign (increasingly larger) time intervals of known size to each stage of the
BGA and guarantee that the transmissions in one stage will not overlap with
the transmissions in another stage.
An additional challenge the network must overcome prior to clock synchro-
nization is uncoordinated communication between half-duplex nodes. Any
pair of half-duplex good nodes seeking to exchange messages without a com-
mon schedule or reference clock must do so with the expectation that an
attempted transmission may result in a primary conflict. Recall that a pri-
mary conflict occurs when a source node attempts to transmit a packet to
a destination node that is also in transmit mode; the transmitted packet
fails to arrive. To guarantee communication between a source and destina-
tion node, we construct an orthogonal MAC code that dictates when a node
should transmit or receive according to its local clock. The code works as
long as the local clocks are relatively affine, even if they are unsynchronized.
In Chapter 3 we describe the construction of the orthogonal MAC code in
detail.
Using the orthogonal MAC code, the protocol is able to carry out a coor-
dinated execution of the BGA prior to clock synchronization, but with the
overhead of multiple retransmissions and large dead times separating trans-
mission intervals. We use an implementation of the Byzantine General’s
algorithm called the Exponential Information Gathering (EIG) algorithm.
2.3 The Problem of Inconsistency
The BGA enables the good nodes to obtain a common view of the topology
and the relative clock parameters (RCPs), even if there are malicious nodes
participating in the network. However, a common view is not enough for
the good nodes to establish an accurate estimate of a designated reference
clock. The data must also be consistent. Before expanding on this point, we
need to introduce some definitions. Given two nodes i and j, let t denote the
reading on node j’s continuous time clock, and let τ ij(t) denote the reading of
node i’s continuous time clock with respect to t. Let aij denote the relative
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Figure 2.2: A chain network of nodes where the relative skew between
adjacent nodes is known.
skew between node i and j. We will assume for simplicity and the purpose
of this example that all relative offsets are zero. That is, τ ij(t) = aijt. Now
consider the chain of nodes 1, . . . , n in Figure 2.2. The adjacent nodes in the
chain are able to measure their relative skews by exchanging timing packets.
Moreover, let us designate node n as the reference node. In order for the
chain network to behave as a coordinated unit, all nodes must estimate node
n’s clock with respect to their own. That is, each node k, for k = 1, . . . , n−2,
must determine τnk (t), where τ
n
k (t) = an,kt. Since nodes k and n do not share
a direct link, their relative skew an,k cannot be measured via an exchange of
timing packets. Instead, node k can compute an,k using the relative skews of
adjacent nodes:
an,k =
n∏
j=k+1
ak,k−1.
Now we can explain how a common view of the topology and the relative
skews between adjacent nodes does not prevent a bad node from injecting
uncertainty into the data. Consider the network of Figure 2.3 where nodes 1,
2, and 3 are good nodes, but node 4 is a bad node. The good nodes share a
common view of the topology and the relative skews between adjacent nodes.
That is, all good nodes know the relative skews (a2,1, a3,2, a3,4, a3,1). However,
since nodes 1 and 3 do not share a direct link the relative skew a3,1 cannot
be directly measured via an exchange of packets. Instead, the network must
compute a3,1 using the known relative skews. However, in Figure 2.3 there
are two paths between nodes 1 and 3. Therefore we must have a3,1 = a3,2a2,1
along the top path and a3,1 = a4,1a4,3 along the bottom path. Suppose that
the estimate along path 123 does not agree with the estimate along 143. That
is, a3,2a2,1 6= a3,4a4,1. Clearly, the discord implies that at least one of the two
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Figure 2.3: A bad node can inject uncertainty about the relative clock
parameters even if the subgraph of good nodes is connected.
paths contains a bad node, and the bad node has falsified the relative skew
on an incident link. This problem still remains unresolved even with the a
priori knowledge that nodes 1 and 3 are connected by a path of good nodes,
for none of the good nodes know which of the two connecting paths is good.
This simple network in illustrates a broader point about general networks in
which the subgraph of good nodes is connected: a bad node can still generate
uncertainty about the RCPs between a pair of good nodes.
We address this problem in Chapter 4, where we quantify the maximum
amount of uncertainty that a group of colluding bad nodes can surreptitiously
insert into the RCPs between a pair of good nodes within a fixed operating
lifetime. Notice that the bad nodes must remain “undercover;” any overt
malicious activity will simply tip the good nodes to eliminate the bad end-to-
end paths from consideration (we note that we only eliminate that path, not
its subpaths). We also impose fixed operating lifetimes because practically
speaking, timestamps are finite in size; clocks cannot run forever without
resetting. (This point will be discussed in greater detail in Section 2.4 when
we formally describe the network model.)
The reader may wonder how quantifying the uncertainty in the RCPs helps
the network behave as a coordinated unit. Given the precise measure of this
uncertainty, we can determine the extent to which good nodes reference clock
estimates will diverge over the network operating lifetime. Then we separate
all scheduled transmission intervals by a dead-time that accommodates this
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divergence. Hence the good nodes in the network, having a common sched-
ule and consistent estimates of a designated reference clock, will act in a
coordinated manner and can be treated as a unified entity.
In this chapter we have provided an intuitive understanding into how a net-
work of good and bad nodes can simultaneously operate at a min-max utility
optimal rate vector through the iterative pruning of concurrent transmission
sets, and restrict the portfolio of attacker strategies to either jamming and/or
cooperating. We have also argued why a disparate collection of good and bad
nodes can behave as a coordinated unit in the first place. We will now dis-
cuss some aspects of the network model, before and subsequently terminate
the chapter with an in depth look of the individual phases that compose the
protocol.
2.4 The Model
The model-based approach to secure protocol design is one in which a pro-
tocol is tailored to a specific model of the network instead of individual
attacks. The central dogma of this thesis is that a model-based approach of-
fers a more sound and coherent framework for protocol design than an arms
race between patches and attacks. In this section, we formally describe the
model and provide an explanation for some selected features. As mentioned
in the introduction, the network model can be divided into five categories:
the model for network utility (U), the physical model (P), node capabilities
(N), clock behavior (CL), and cryptographic capabilities (CR).
There is already a significant body of literature that addresses the topic of
utility maximization in communication networks. In addition, much of the
research published in the area of distributed systems is focused on networks
composed of good and bad nodes. However, to the best of our knowledge,
this thesis contains the first attempt, in the context of security, to model
the dynamics of such a network formation and operation as a zero-sum game
between good and bad nodes. Suppose that the ith good source destination
pair (si, di) obtains a throughput rate xsi,di . We assume that (U1) there
exists a utility function U(x), and the total utility to the network derived by
serving all N good pairs is U(xs1,d1 , . . . , xsN ,dN ). However, since the network
does not know which nodes are good or bad, each node evaluates the utility
21
over all N “conforming” node pairs, where a node is defined as conforming
if it is represented in a feasible concurrent transmission set.
We now describe the physical model in more detail. We assume that: (P1)
there are n immobile nodes, (P2) the n wireless nodes exist in a bounded
domain, with the distance between every pair of nodes exceeding a mini-
mum distance dmin > 0, and power path loss decreasing monotonically with
distance. Furthermore, (P3) the receivers of the good nodes are subject to
noise, and the maximum achievable data rate is a monotonically decreasing
function of the SINR. This function could possibly be the Shannon formula
B
2
log (1 + SINR) where B denotes bandwidth, or any other monotonically
decreasing function of SINR. We assume: (P4) the wireless nodes have a
maximum power constraint. In addition: (P5) the good nodes have a finite
number of modulation schemes, and (P6) any transmissions at rates below
the SINR-determined rate are error free. The lowest rate for which all nodes
have a modulation scheme, referred to as the base communication rate, oc-
curs at SINRthreshold. We also assume that (P7) the subgraph of good nodes
is connected in the following graph: there is an edge between each pair of
good nodes (i, j) for which SINRi,j and SINRj,i, respectively, both exceed
SINRthreshold when all nodes, except j or i, respectively, transmit at max
power.
A noteworthy feature of the physical model is that packets receptions are
deterministic; a packet transmitted at a rate below the SINR-based rate is
guaranteed to arrive as long as no primary conflicts occur. In the wireless
medium, probabilistic receptions model the system dynamics more realisti-
cally, but we will defer that model for future work.
We now move on to the set of model assumptions that describe the capa-
bilities and behaviors of the good nodes and the bad nodes. We assume that:
(N1) the network is composed of good nodes that conform to the protocol,
and bad nodes that may undermine it. Moreover: (N2) the good nodes are
half-duplex; they cannot transmit and receive simultaneously. On the other
hand, the bad nodes have no constraints on their ability to jointly transmit
and receive. We also assume that: (N3) the bad nodes are able to fully
coordinate their actions and fully aware of their collective states (equivalent
to unlimited bandwidth between all pairs of bad nodes). The bad nodes thus
also know the identities of the good and bad nodes a priori. In addition, the
bad nodes can execute any causal cooperative policy that undermines the
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network. We assume that: (N4) the good nodes are all initially powered off,
and that they all turn on within U0 time units of the first good node that
turns on.
The next set of assumptions characterizes the clock model. As mentioned
in the introduction, clocks are not typically used in wireless protocols, where
all coordinated activity is event based. However, distributed clock synchro-
nization with hostile nodes is a well-studied topic in distributed systems.
Most of the assumptions of our model are consistent with the literature. We
assume that: (CL1) each good node initializes its own clock to zero when it
turns on, and (CL2) each good node i has a local continuous-time clock τ i(t)
that is affine with respect to the time t ≥ 0. That is, τ i(t) = ait+ bi where ai
and bi denote the skew and offset respectively of node i’s local clock. With-
out loss of generality for timekeeping in the statements and proofs we will
assume that: (CL3) the time t above and in (N4) is equal to the clock of the
first good node to turn on. We denote the relative skew and offset between
nodes i and j by aij and bij respectively, where aij :=
ai
aj
and bij := bi−aijbj.
We also denote by τ ij(s) = aijs + bij the time at node i’s continuous-time
clock with respect to the time s at node j’s continuous-time clock. We as-
sume that: (CL4) the relative clock skew aij between any two nodes i and
j is bounded by 0 < aij ≤ amax. It can be shown as a corollary of (N4),
(CL1) and (CL4) that: (CL5) the offset is bounded by |bij| ≤ amaxU0, since
τ i(U0) ≥ 0. We assume that: (CL6) the good nodes do not know their skew
parameters a priori.
Finally we describe the cryptographic aspects of the model. We assume
that: (CR1) each node is assigned a public key and a private key. The
private key is never revealed by a good node to any node, and information
encrypted by a private key can only be decoded with the corresponding public
key. However, possession of this key does not enable an attacker to forge,
alter, or tamper with an encrypted packet generated with the corresponding
private key. We assume that: (CR2) each node possesses the public key of
a central authority. Furthermore: (CR3) each node possesses an identity
certificate; a signed message from the central authority containing node i’s
public key and ID number. The certificate binds node i’s public key to its
identity. Finally, we assume that: (CR4) each node possesses a list of all
the other node IDs in the network.
An encryption scheme is information theoretically secure if the cipher text
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Figure 2.4: The protocol state diagram for the bounded-birth time model.
provides no information to an attacker about the message without the key.
It was shown by Shannon [26] that the one-time pad is the only scheme
that achieves this level of security. Our model reflects the reality that other
encryption schemes achieve a high enough level of secrecy, based on being
currently regarded as computationally complex, to justify treating encrypted
messages as private. Moreover, the focus of this thesis is not on preserving
secrecy but on ensuring a stable and reliable network in the face of malicious
behavior by participating nodes, though of course the ability to authenticate
or sign depends on the security of the cryptography.
2.5 The Protocol Phases
In this last section we discuss in more detail the individual phases that com-
pose the protocol. At the onset of this chapter, we argued that the network
could operate in a reliable and utility-optimal manner through the itera-
tive pruning of concurrent transmission sets. The protocol state diagram in
Figure 2.4 briefly summarizes how this task is implemented.
The protocol suite is composed of five phases: the neighbor discovery
phase, the network discovery phase, the scheduling phase, the data trans-
fer phase, and the verification phase. The first two phases form a tentative
network out of a collection of unsynchronized half-duplex nodes, infiltrated
with colluding attackers. At the conclusion of the network discovery phase,
the good nodes have a common topological view and a consistent estimate
of a reference clock. The last three phases are where the iterative pruning
of CT sets occurs. The network (now behaving as a coordinated unit) cycles
through these phases, constantly pruning failed CTs, until steady state is
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reached. In the scheduling phase, the network determines a schedule based
on the most recently updated set of feasible CT sets. This schedule is imple-
mented in the data transfer phase. Wherever malicious activity prevents a
scheduled packet from arriving, the corresponding CT set is disabled in the
verification phase. This process is then repeated a sufficiently large number
of times.
2.5.1 The Neighbor Discovery Phase
The neighbor discovery phase is the initial step in the larger process of dis-
covering all the nodes and synchronizing all the clocks. It starts with each
node identifying its immediate neighbors and computing the corresponding
clock parameters. In the first move, each node attempts a handshake with a
neighbor by broadcasting a probe packet and waiting for an acknowledgment.
Each node then attempts to estimate its neighbor’s clock parameters via an
exchange of timing packets.
However these initial tentative steps are complicated by the fact that they
occur prior to synchronization and the nodes have a half-duplex constraint.
Moreover, the nodes begin this phase at different times because they start-
up at different times. As a result, any communication between two nodes
is uncoordinated and susceptible to mutual packet collisions. To circumvent
this problem we design an orthogonal MAC code that guarantees successful
two-way communication between any adjacent nodes, provided the relative
clock skew is bounded. The construction of the orthogonal MAC code is
provided in Chapter 3.
Another synchronization related problem is that some nodes may complete
these steps faster than their neighbors, in fact, so much faster that the slower
neighbors may fail to complete handshakes with their speedier compatriots.
In response we allocate increasingly large time intervals for each step so that
even in the worst case, with maximum skew drift and delay, the steps can be
completed in the time allotted.
Although the clock skews, delays and offsets are real-valued quantities,
the arrival times can only be measured in discrete-time, thus subjecting the
computed skew to some quantization error. This error is a fundamental
problem since it cannot be eliminated and will ultimately cause the clock
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estimates to drift apart as time elapses. Moreover, we can expect malicious
nodes to exploit this drift and undermine network coordination. The only
option available is to reduce the skew error and separate the timing packets
by a large number of clock counts ka. However, we show that it is possible
with a joint selection of ka and the network lifetime Tlife, to completely
account for the skew drift without jeopardizing the goal of  optimality.
A fundamental result of [28], [29] shows that only the sum of the offset
and delay (but not their individual values) can be determined by exchanging
timing packets. However, unlike the skew error, these quantities do not
cause the clock estimates to diverge indefinitely. Rather, the induced error
is bounded.
In the upcoming network discovery phase, the clock estimates obtained be-
tween adjacent nodes will be used to form clock estimates between arbitrary
nodes. We encounter a special vulnerability that enables malicious nodes
to distort these multi-hop clock estimates by manipulating the one-hop skew
computations. We force each node to vouch for the skew estimates made with
its neighbors by signing a link certificate containing the packets exchanged
during this phase. Any node that generates timing data not consistent with
its declared skews, at any point in the protocol, is self-evidently malicious.
2.5.2 The Network Discovery Phase
In the network discovery phase, each node discovers the topology of the net-
work by obtaining the link certificates of its neighbors, its neighbors’ neigh-
bors, and so forth. However, yet again, the network encounters the familiar
obstacle of unsynchronized nodes, uncoordinated transmissions, and some
nodes completing steps faster than others. Moreover, unlike the previous
phase, the interactions in each step of the network discovery phase must
occur in the same time interval at all nodes, regardless of how poorly syn-
chronized the clocks are. To solve this problem, we allocate increasingly large
intervals to each step, and force all transmissions associated with that step
to begin well into the interval and use the orthogonal MAC code.
Another major challenge is that malicious nodes may selectively drop pack-
ets, preventing the good nodes from having a common view of the topology.
We solve this problem using the Byzantine General’s algorithm [30]. The al-
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gorithm ensures a packet between any pair of nodes goes through every path
between these nodes. We show that since the good nodes form a connected
component, they will form a common topological view.
Upon completion of the algorithm, each node is able to infer the topology
of the network and estimate the clock of any other node by taking the skew
product along the path. However, a problem occurs if there are multiple paths
to a node, and the skew products along each path differ by more than the
maximum skew error. Such a node belongs to an inconsistent cycle, defined
as a cycle in which the skew product differs from unity by more than the
maximum skew error. In such an inconsistent cycle, at least one malicious
node advertises a false clock to one of its neighbors (but not the other).
The neighbors could even be colluding in this endeavor. Unfortunately, it
is impossible to determine who is lying and who is telling the truth from
the clock skew parameters alone. As a result, it is necessary to remove at
least one link in the cycle with a bad endpoint so that every pair of nodes
will have a unique path and consistent clock estimates. Consistent estimates
are mandatory to ensure that all nodes are operating by roughly the same
reference time.
We propose a consistency check to identify at least one bad link in the
cycle. First the nodes wait for a long period of time, during which the gap
between the actual time and the estimated time diverges. Then a designated
node in the cycle, called the leader, initiates a timing packet that traverses
the cycle. Each node is forced to satisfy the delay condition; it is required to
forward the packet within one clock count of receiving it. We show that since
the false clock estimate has diverged so extensively from the actual clock, at
least one of the malicious nodes will not be able to both simultaneously
generate timestamps consistent with its declared skew as well as meet the
delay condition. This test is performed on every inconsistent cycle. If an
inconsistent cycle manages to pass the consistency check, then by deduction
the cycle leader must be a malicious node.
The consistency check is performed prior to synchronization and all the
related issues (uncoordinated nodes, completion of protocol steps at different
times) are still in play. We choose increasing time intervals for each step of
the consistency check and show that all nodes, fast or slow, properly complete
the test.
The core idea of the consistency check is that excessive skew error will,
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after a sufficiently large amount of time, force the clock estimate to diverge
from the actual clock by a detectable amount. Smaller skew errors require
much larger wait-times. A key obstacle is achieving two competing goals: the
wait-time must be small enough to occupy a negligible fraction of the total
operating lifetime; and the skew error must be small enough to minimize the
clock drift over the total operating lifetime.
After the inconsistent cycles have been tested, the network disseminates
the timing data using the Byzantine General’s algorithm. The problem of
unsynchronized clocks is still in force, so we allocate increasing intervals of
time to each step and use the orthogonal MAC code for transmissions.
After the algorithm has finished, the nodes have a common view of the
timing data and can remove the malicious links from each inconsistent cycle.
At the conclusion of this phase, all the nodes in the network have a common
topological view, and a common estimate of all clocks. For the remainder of
the protocol, the network effectively operates by a common reference clock.
2.5.3 The Scheduling Phase
The purpose of the scheduling phase is to obtain a schedule over the set
of feasible concurrent transmission sets, whose corresponding effective end-
to-end rate vector maximizes the utility function. The schedule specifies
the concurrent transmission sets, the intervals in which they occur, and the
number of data packets to be transmitted in each interval.
The main problem in the scheduling phase is accounting for the diver-
gence in the estimates of the reference clock due to the uncertainty injected
into the relative clock parameters by the bad nodes. Clearly the concurrent
transmission sets must be separated by some bands to prevent any overlap.
However, choosing a large band exacerbates the clock divergence in future
transmission intervals thus causing overlap, while choosing a small band may
not prevent the immediate overlap caused by existing clock divergence. We
explicitly compute a suitable dead-time band in Chapter 4.
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2.5.4 The Data Transfer Phase
The purpose of the data transfer phase is to carry out the schedule chosen
in the previous phase.
The main challenge to this phase comes from “sleeper cells” of malicious
nodes that have stayed undetected by cooperating with the protocol. At
any point in the data transfer phase, these nodes may suddenly sabotage
a concurrent transmission set by either jamming or dropping packets. To
counter this problem, each node keeps a record of any packet that failed to
arrive as scheduled. This information (or a subset of it) will be disseminated
to the rest of the network during the verification phase and never used again.
Moreover, we show that these types of attacks can only occur a finite number
of times, since there are a finite number of concurrent transmission sets and
each set can only be disabled once.
2.5.5 The Verification Phase
The purpose of the verification phase is to inform the network of concurrent
transmission sets that failed to transmit all of the packets assigned in the
schedule. As in the data transfer phase, some malicious nodes may choose
not to cooperate with the protocol and prevent the network from obtaining
a common view of the CT sets. The network uses the Byzantine General’s
algorithm to ensure that any knowledge of these failed sets is shared by all
the good nodes.
Two other issues need to be addressed as well. First, the transmission
intervals are separated by a dead-time D to account for the divergence in the
estimates of a reference clock. Second, the list of packets that failed to arrive
during the data transfer phase may be prohibitively and unpredictably large
to transmit. Instead we propose the following solution: let each node dissem-
inate the smallest ID in the list of failed packets. Then the network observes
the scheduled path of this packet and removes the concurrent transmission
set where it first failed.
In the next chapter we will provide a detailed description of the orthogonal
MAC code that plays such an important role in the neighbor and network
discovery phases.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ORTHOGONAL MAC CODE
The distributed real-time operation of wireless networks requires the interac-
tion of many protocols, each of which addresses a unique functional require-
ment for the network to work reliably. In this chapter, we examine one of
the most basic requirements; the ability of adjacent nodes to communicate
with each other prior to clock synchronization.
The orthogonal MAC protocol that provides the above functionality is an
essential component of the larger protocol suite with a more comprehensive
goal. Given a set of nodes, some of which are malicious, how can the good
nodes form an operating and indeed optimized wireless network? In order
to even begin to achieve this larger goal, the nodes must first have the fun-
damental capability to communicate with each other, even before knowing
each others clock skew rates, and do so within a bounded time.
Wireless transceivers are generally half-duplex; they cannot transmit and
receive at the same time due to the physical limitations of the circuitry in
their receivers. There is recent work on developing full duplex radios, but en-
dowing a network of only half-duplex nodes to achieve communication capa-
bility allows a larger class of networks to operate reliably. Hence, we consider
nodes with radios where simultaneous transmissions by a transmitter and its
intended recipient effectively result in “primary conflicts,” a reference to the
loss of any messages that arrive while the recipient itself is in “transmit”
mode not “receive” mode. A communication scheme that attempts to solve
this problem is the orthogonal MAC Gold code [31]. This protocol provides
each node with a unique square-pulse waveform, where a pulse defines a time
interval in which the node should be in transmit mode. The Gold code has
the property that any two waveforms share a non-overlapping pulse during
which any transmitted messages will arrive collision-free. However, orthog-
onal MAC codes are designed under the assumption that the local clocks
in the network run at the same speed, even if they are not synchronized.
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This assumption is not satisfied in practice because distributed clocks are
generally subject to skew and offset. Clock skew has the effect of stretching
or compressing transmitted signals, a distortion that invalidates the non-
overlapping pulse property of the Gold code. The same can be said of any
family of waveforms periodic with respect to a single pulse; under compres-
sion or stretching the pulses of one waveform can be made to overlap with
the pulses of another waveform. In this chapter, we solve this problem by de-
signing an orthogonal MAC code based on a family of two-pulse waveforms,
in which the spacing between the two pulses in each period is sufficiently
asymmetric to ensure that any two linearly distorted waveforms will share a
non-overlapping pulse.
A network that lacks a coordinated scheme for communication will likely
end up with multiple nodes transmitting messages simultaneously. The above
strategy works well to resolve primary conflicts, it does nothing to address a
different sort of conflict called “secondary conflict” that occurs when two or
more nodes attempt to simultaneously communicate with the same intended
recipient. This secondary conflict is also often called a “packet collision.”
Several protocols have been developed to avoid this from happening in un-
synchronized networks. For example ALOHA random access [32], directs a
wireless node to back off for an exponentially distributed amount of time
whenever a collision is detected, and retransmit after this time has expired.
However, the probability of repeat collisions within a bounded time-interval,
though small, is still nonzero and this uncertainty complicates the design of
wireless networks that require guaranteed success.
We overcome the secondary conflict too by dividing the time, as measured
by the local clock of each node, into slots, and assigning these slots for com-
municating to other nodes. A node may only transmit a given message during
the time-slot assigned to the corresponding destination. Furthermore, within
a time-slot a message can only be transmitted during the windows defined
by the orthogonal MAC code pulses. Similarly, any given message must be
received during the time-slot assigned to the corresponding source, and out-
side of the transmission windows defined by the orthogonal MAC code pulses.
The orthogonal MAC code presented in this chapter ensures that within a
bounded time, any source-destination pair will share a non-overlapping pulse
during which the source and destination will be paying attention to each
other. We will choose the sizes of the slots, the spacing between the pulses,
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and the periods of the waveforms, to meet these requirements for any set of
clock skews whose ratios are bounded.
The orthogonal MAC code is part of a larger protocol suite that enables
a distributed network of wireless unsynchronized nodes to form a fully func-
tioning wireless network operating at a near optimal rate vector, even under
sustained and coordinated attack by malicious nodes hidden amongst them.
The protocol consists of five phases: the neighbor discovery phase, the
network discovery phase, the scheduling phase, the data transfer phase, and
the verification phase. Good nodes, by definition, follow the protocol, and
bad nodes attempt to undermine it. Initially, all nodes are powered off, but
within a bounded time, all good nodes are guaranteed to have powered on.
Each node i ∈ {1, . . . , n} enters the neighbor discovery phase immediately
after startup, the first move in a broader attempt to obtain a common topo-
logical view among the good nodes and consistent estimates of the relative
clock parameters. Having no knowledge of the topology, node i advertises its
presence to the nodes in its neighborhood by broadcasting a probe packet.
Between transmissions, node i listens for similar broadcasts and responds to
any received probe packet by broadcasting an acknowledgment to the sender.
This step, when successfully completed, is referred to as a handshake, and it
is followed by an exchange of timing packets and mutually authenticated link
certificates. The latter contain the relative clock parameters derived from the
timing packet measurements.
Two conditions must be satisfied in order for a pair of half-duplex neighbors
to complete a handshake: first, a transmitted probe packet must arrive while
a neighbor is in receive mode; second, an acknowledgment must be returned
while the sender of the probe packet is in receive mode. The chief obstacle
to meeting these conditions, is that both nodes are unsynchronized; all their
attempts at transmission could result in mutual collisions. The orthogonal
MAC code we present in this chapter is designed to resolve this problem by
ensuring that at least one attempt to transmit a message of size W within
a fixed time interval will make it through collision-free. As a result, the
handshake, the step which precedes all others during the process of forming
a network, can be completed within a bounded interval of time. We note
that the orthogonal MAC code is also used to carry out the remaining steps
in the neighbor discovery phase since similar conditions apply to these steps
as well. When the neighbor discovery phase is completed, each node is aware
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of the IDs and relative clock parameters of its neighboring nodes.
The next stage of the protocol occurs during the network discovery phase,
in which the nodes disseminate their lists of neighbors among themselves
and infer a common topological view. However, the behavior of the bad
nodes in the network complicates matters. Bad nodes may choose to not
cooperate with the protocol, spread false information, or carry out other
malicious acts. The protocol uses the Byzantine General’s algorithm and a
skew consistency test to ensure that the good nodes share the same view of
the network topology and have consistent estimates of all the relative clock
parameters. Each of these steps are subject to the same conditions as the
handshake, and are carried out using the orthogonal MAC code. At the
conclusion of the network discovery phase, the nodes are able to schedule
their actions based on a sufficiently accurate estimate of a common reference
clock. The orthogonal MAC code is no longer needed since the network is
able to operate synchronously and schedule collision free transmissions.
Node i then iteratively cycles through the scheduling, data transfer, and
verification phases repeatedly, gradually eliminating infeasible concurrent
transmission sets until an optimal feasible rate vector is obtained. An im-
portant achievement of the protocol is that the rate loss due to overhead,
such as the time spent in the neighbor and network discovery phases, can be
made arbitrarily small by choosing the duration of each phase appropriately.
This result is due to the fact that the length of the orthogonal MAC code is
bounded.
This chapter is focused on the specific problem of uncoordinated com-
munication between half-duplex nodes during the initial stages of network
formation, a critical component of the overall protocol suite.
3.1 Construction of the Orthogonal MAC Code
Consider a collection of n wireless nodes. Each node i is equipped with a
local clock τ i(t) that is affine with respect to some global reference clock t.
That is, τ i(t) = ait + bi where the parameters ai and bi denote the clock
skew and offset respectively. Let aij > 0 and bij denote the relative skew
and relative offset of node i with respect to node j, where aij :=
ai
aj
and
bij := bi−aijbj. Let τ ij(t) denote node i’s clock with respect to node j’s clock
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Figure 3.1: A graph of M
(i)
1 (t). Note that M
(i)
2 (t) = M
(n−i+1)
1 (t).
t:
τ ij(t) := aijt+ bij.
We will assume that aij ≤ amax for all nodes i and j. The orthogonal MAC
code for each node i is composed of two fundamental two-pulse waveforms
M
(i)
1 (t) and M
(i)
2 (t), which are designed to work when the relative skew ex-
pands (aij ≤ 1) or contracts (aij > 1), respectively, the transmitted signals
received at node j. The periods of the waveforms M
(i)
1 (t) and M
(i)
2 (t) are
denoted by T
(i)
0 and T
(n−i+1)
0 respectively, where T
(i)
0 is defined below:
T0 := 32Wna
2
max, (3.1)
T
(i)
0 := iT0. (3.2)
The waveforms M
(i)
1 (t) and M
(i)
2 (t) contain two-pulses of width W that
are separated by a distance unique to node i. We call the first pulse of the
waveform the primary pulse, and the second pulse, the secondary pulse. We
use the parameter ci to define the position of the secondary pulse in the
waveform, where:
ci :=
1
amax(5n− i) .
34
1t
1
t
1
t
)(),(1 ts
ji
2,1iT2,1max2 iTna
2,1)1(iT
2,1)1(max2 iTna
2,1)2( iT
)()1,(1 ts
ji
)(),1(1 ts
ji
)()1,1(1 ts
ji
)(),2(1 ts
ji
)()1,2(1 ts
ji
Figure 3.2: A graph of s
(i,j)
1 (t). Note that for fixed i, the set of functions
{s(i,j)1 (t), s(i,j)2 (t), j = 1, . . . , n} partition the space t. The functions
{s(i+1,j)1 (t), s(i+1,j)2 (t), j = 1, . . . , n} are each constructed to overlap with the
set of functions {s(i,j)1 (t), s(i,j)2 (t), j = 1, . . . , n}.
The waveforms M
(i)
1 (t) and M
(i)
2 (t) are defined below (see Figure 3.1):
M
(i)
1 (t) =

1 0 ≤ t mod T (i)0 < W
0 W ≤ t mod T (i)0 < ciT (i)0
1 ciT
(i)
0 ≤ t mod T (i)0 < ciT (i)0 +W
0 ciT
(i)
0 +W ≤ t mod T (i)0 < T (i)0 ,
M
(i)
2 (t) =

1 0 ≤ t mod T (n−i+1)0 < W
0 W ≤ t mod T (n−i+1)0 < cn−i+1T (n−i+1)0
1 cn−i+1T
(n−i+1)
0 ≤ t mod T (n−i+1)0
< cn−i+1T
(n−i+1)
0 +W
0 cn−i+1T
(n−i+1)
0 +W ≤ t mod T (n−i+1)0 < T (n−i+1)0 .
(3.3)
In addition, the orthogonal MAC code at each node divides the time as
measured by its local clock, into recipient-specific slots assigned for commu-
nication by it to every other node. The duration of the time-slots assigned
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by node i is denoted by Ti,2,
T0,2 := 2(dnamaxe+ 2)T (n)0 , (3.4)
Ti,2 := 2amaxnTi−1,2. (3.5)
In each time slot, node i either uses the signal M
(i)
1 (t) or M
(i)
2 (t). We use
the functions s
(i,j)
1 (t) and s
(i,j)
2 (t) to define a time-slot associated with the
signal M
(i)
1 (t) or M
(i)
2 (t) respectively, that has been assigned by node i to
node j. The functions s
(i,j)
1 (t) and s
(i,j)
2 (t) are defined below (see Figure 3.2):
s
(i,j)
1 (t) =

1 (j − 2)Ti−1,2 ≤ t mod 2(n− 1)Ti−1,2
< (j − 1)Ti−1,2, i < j
1 (j − 1)Ti−1,2 ≤ t mod 2(n− 1)Ti−1,2
< jTi−1,2, i > j
0 else,
(3.6)
s
(i,j)
2 (t) =

1 (n− 1)Ti−1,2 + (j − 2)Ti−1,2 ≤ t mod 2(n− 1)Ti−1,2
< (n− 1)Ti−1,2 + (j − 1)Ti−1,2, i < j
1 (n− 1)Ti−1,2 + (j − 1)Ti−1,2 ≤ t mod 2(n− 1)Ti−1,2
< (n− 1)Ti−1,2 + jTi−1,2, i > j
0 else.
(3.7)
Now suppose that node i wishes to transmit a message of size W to
node j during the interval [ts, ts + TMAC(W )), where TMAC(W ) := Tn,2 and
τ ji (ts) > 0. To accomplish this task, node i transmits its message during
the time intervals of size W , where both s
(i,j)
k (t) = 1 and M
(i)
k (t) = 1. The
function s
(i,j)
k (t), when equal to 1, indicates that node i is “paying attention”
to node j. That is, node i is either transmitting or listening to node j. The
function M
(i)
k (t), when equal to 1 or 0, determines whether or not node i
is transmitting or listening. Taken together, both functions determine when
node i is transmitting to node j. Therefore, to be precise, node i transmits
its message to node j during every interval [t1, t1 +W ) ⊂ [ts, ts +TMAC(W ))
that satisfies one of the following condition for all t ∈ [t1, t1 +W ) and some
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Figure 3.3: The interval [tw, tw +W ) satisfies both conditions that are
necessary for node i to successfully transmit a message of size W to node j.
For all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ), M (i)1 (t)s(i,j)1 (t) = 1 and
M
(i)
1 (τ
j
i (t))s
(i,j)
1 (τ
j
i (t)) + s
(i,j)
1 (τ
j
i (t)) = 1.
k ∈ {1, 2}:
M
(i)
1 (t)s
(i,j)
1 (t) = 1. (3.8)
Suppose that node j wishes to receive this message of size W from node
i during the interval [τ ji (ts), τ
j
i (ts) + TMAC(W )), where TMAC(W ) := Tn,2.
Node j listens for this message during the time intervals where s
(j,i)
k (t) = 1
and M
(j)
k (t) = 0. As before, the function s
(j,i)
k (t), when equal to 1, indicates
that node j is “paying attention” to node i. That is, node j is either trans-
mitting or listening to node i. Similarly, the function M
(j)
k (t), when equal
to 1 or 0, determines whether or not node j is transmitting or listening.
Taken together, both functions determine when node j is listening to node i.
Therefore to be precise, node j listens for the message during every interval
[t1, t2) ⊂ [τ ji (ts), τ ji (ts) + TMAC(W )) that satisfies the following condition for
all t ∈ [t1, t2) and some k ∈ {1, 2}:
M
(i)
1 (t)s
(i,j)
1 (t) + s
(i,j)
1 (t) = 1. (3.9)
The described process is depicted in Figure 3.3. The following theorem shows
that node j will indeed successfully receive the message.
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Theorem 3.1.1. Suppose node i transmits a message of size W to node
j using the orthogonal MAC code described above. Node j is guaranteed
to successfully receive the message transmitted from node i. That is, there
exists an interval [tw, tw + W ) that satisfies the following conditions for all
t ∈ [tw, tw +W ) and some k ∈ {1, 2}:
(i) M
(i)
k (t)s
(i,j)
k (t) = 1,
(ii) M
(j)
k (τ
j
i (t))s
(j,i)
k (τ
j
i (t)) + s
(j,i)
k (τ
j
i (t)) = 1.
It can be shown that the duration of the orthogonal MAC code satisfies
TMAC(W ) ≤ cW where c := (2namax)9n. That is, the duration of the orthog-
onal MAC code is doubly exponential in the number of nodes. Clearly, this
level of efficiency is quite poor. However, as mentioned previously the or-
thogonal MAC code is designed as part of a larger protocol suite that allows
a collection of distributed nodes to form a fully functioning network oper-
ating at an optimal rate vector. Since the parameters n and amax are fixed
constants, the effect of the orthogonal MAC code on the protocol overhead
can be mitigated by choosing a sufficiently long data transfer phase which,
in large networks, might require very large time scales. In theory at least,
we do not pay a penalty for the relatively poor efficiency of the orthogonal
MAC code, but this property will likely require further improvement before
the code can be practically implemented.
3.2 Analysis of the Orthogonal MAC Code
Construction
In order to prove that node j can indeed successfully transmit a message to
node i, we first need to show that there exists an interval of time in which the
two nodes are paying attention to each other; the slot allocated to node i by
node j overlaps the slot allocated to node j by node i. Then, we need to show
that somewhere in the intersection of these two time-slots there is a pulse
generated by one of the fundamental waveforms {M (j)k (t), k = 1, 2} that does
not collide with a pulse generated by the corresponding waveform M
(i)
k (τ
i
j(t))
(shown in Figure 3.3). To do this, we locate the first primary pulse generated
by M
(j)
k (t) that occurs in the intersection of the time slots. If this pulse is
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collision-free, the proof is done. If not, there are two cases to consider. In the
first case, the pulse overlaps with a primary pulse generated by M
(i)
k (τ
i
j(t)).
In the second case, the pulse overlaps with a secondary pulse generated by
M
(i)
k (τ
i
j(t)). In each case, we need to show that a non-overlapping pulse
generated by node j exists somewhere in the intersection of the two time-
slots.
Suppose i > j and aij ≤ 1. We use four lemmas to show that node j
can transmit a message to node i. Lemma 3.2.1 shows that there exists
an interval in which both nodes pay attention to each other. Lemma 3.2.2
shows that within this interval under case one (mentioned above), there exists
a pulse in M
(j)
1 (t) that does not overlap with a pulse in M
(i)
1 (t). Lemma 3.2.3
shows the same result for case two (mentioned above). Lemma 3.2.4 ties all
three lemmas together to show that node j can indeed successfully transmit
a message of length W to node i.
Now suppose that i > j and aij > 1. We can repeat the above process
to show, this time, that node i can transmit a message of length W to node
j using the signals M
(i)
2 (t) and M
(j)
2 (t). The proof follows by noting that
n − j + 1 > n − i + 1, aji ≤ 1, M (i)2 (t) := M (n−i+1)1 (t) and M (j)2 (t) :=
M
(n−j+1)
1 (t), and applying the previous four lemmas.
Similarly, we can prove that node i is able to transmit a message of length
W to node j when aij ≤ 1 using the signals M (i)1 (t) and M (j)1 (t). Then,
repeating the same procedure as before, we can prove that node j can trans-
mit a message of length W to node i when aij > 1 using the signals M
(i)
2 (t)
and M
(j)
2 (t). We thereby obtain Theorem 3.2.1 that shows that node j can
transmit a non-overlapping pulse to node i and Theorem 3.2.2 that shows
that node i can do the same to node j. Putting both theorems together gives
us the final proof of Theorem 3.1.1.
Consider two nodes i and j, where i > j and aij ≤ 1. In the following
lemma we show that for any pair of nodes i and j, there exists an interval
of time, [tj, tj + Tj−1,2) with respect to node j’s clock, in which nodes i and
j can communicate with each other using the signals M
(i)
1 (t) and M
(j)
1 (t)
respectively.
Lemma 3.2.1. Without loss of generality assume i > j. There exists an
interval [tj, tj + Tj−1,2) with respect to node j’s clock in which nodes i and
j are scheduled to communicate with each other using the signals M
(i)
1 (t)
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and M
(j)
1 (t) respectively. That is, given t1 such that τ
i
j(t1) ≥ 0, the interval
[tj, tj + Tj−1,2) satisfies the following conditions:
[tj, tj + Tj−1,2) ⊂ [t1, t1 + Tn,2), (3.10)
τ ij([tj, tj + Tj−1,2)) ⊂ [τ ij(t1), τ ij(t1) + Tn,2), (3.11)
s
(i,j)
1 (τ
i
j(t)) = 1, ∀t ∈ [tj, tj + Tj−1,2), (3.12)
s
(j,i)
1 (t) = 1, ∀t ∈ [tj, tj + Tj−1,2). (3.13)
Proof. First we show that there exists an interval [ti, ti+Ti−1,2) ⊂ [τ ij(t1), τ ij(t1)+
Tn,2) with respect to node i’s clock in which node i pays attention to node j.
That is, s
(i,j)
1 (τ
(i,j)(t)) = 1 for all t ∈ τ ji ([ti, ti + Ti−1,2)).
Since 0 ≤ τ ij(t1) mod 2(n− 1)Ti−1,2 < 2(n− 1)Ti−1,2, there exists some ta,
0 ≤ ta < 2(n−1)Ti−1,2 such that (τ ij(t1)+ta) mod 2(n−1)Ti−1,2 = (j−1)Ti−1,2
if 2 ≤ j ≤ n. Let ti := τ ij(t1) + ta. It follows from the definition in (3.6)
that node i is paying attention to node j during the interval [ti, ti + Ti−1,2)).
Moreover, we have:
ti + Ti−1,2 = τ ij(t1) + ta + Ti−1,2
< τ ij(t1) + 2(n− 1)Ti−1,2 + Ti−1,2 (3.14)
< τ ij(t1) + 2nTi−1,2
≤ τ ij(t1) + Ti,2 (3.15)
≤ τ ij(t1) + Tn,2, (3.16)
where (3.14) follows from the fact that ta < 2(n−1)Ti−1,2, and (3.15) follows
from the definition of Ti,2. Therefore it follows from (3.16) that the interval
[ti, ti +Ti−1,2) is contained in one complete run of the orthogonal MAC code.
That is, [ti, ti + Ti−1,2) ⊂ [τ ij(t1), τ ij(t1) + Tn,2).
Next we show that there exists a subinterval [tj, tj + Tj−1,2), with respect
to node j’s clock, of [ti, ti + Ti−1,2), in which node j pays attention to node
i. That is, τ ij([tj, tj + Tj−1,2)) ⊂ [ti, ti + Ti−1,2) and sj,i1 (t) = 1 for all t ∈
[tj, tj + Tj−1,2).
Now since 0 ≤ τ ji (ti) mod 2(n − 1)Tj−1,2 < 2(n − 1)Tj−1,2, there exists
some tb, 0 ≤ tb < 2(n− 1)Tj−1,2 such that (τ ji (ti) + tb) mod 2(n− 1)Tj−1,2 =
(i−2)Tj−1,2 if 2 ≤ i ≤ n. Let tj := τ ji (ti)+tb. It follows from the definition of
(3.6) that node j pays attention to node i during the interval [tj, tj +Tj−1,2).
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Now we show that the interval [tj, tj+Tj−1,2) with respect to node j’s clock
is indeed a subinterval of [ti, ti + Ti−1,2) with respect to node i’s clock. That
is τ ij([tj, tj + Tj−1,2)) ⊂ [ti, ti + Ti−1,2). First, we show that τ ij(tj) ≥ ti:
τ ij(tj) = τ
i
j(τ
j
i (ti) + tb) (3.17)
= ti + aijtb
≥ ti, (3.18)
where (3.17) follows from the definition of tj. Next, we show that τ
i
j(tj +
Tj−1,2) < ti + Ti−1,2:
τ ij(tj + Tj−1,2) = τ
i
j(τ
j
i (ti) + tb + Tj−1,2) (3.19)
= ti + aijtb + aijTj−1,2
≤ ti + amaxtb + amaxTj−1,2 (3.20)
< ti + amax2(n− 1)Tj−1,2 + amaxTj−1,2 (3.21)
= ti + amax2nTj−1,2 (3.22)
= ti + Tj,2 (3.23)
≤ ti + Ti−1,2, (3.24)
where (3.19) follows from the definition of tj, (3.20) follows from the fact that
tb < 2(n − 1)Tj−1,2, and (3.23) follows from the definition of Tj,2. It follows
from (3.18) and (3.24) that τ ij([tj, tj+Tj−1,2)) ⊂ [ti, ti+Ti−1,2). It also follows
from (3.16) that τ ij([tj, tj+Tj−1,2)) ⊂ [τ ij(t1), τ ij(t1)+Tn,2). Therefore node i’s
clock is positive (in other words, node i has powered on) during the interval
τ ij([tj, tj + Tj−1,2)). Now we show that node j’s clock is positive during the
interval [tj, tj + Tj−1,2). We show that tj ≥ t1:
tj = τ
j
i (ti) + tb (3.25)
≥ τ ji (ti) (3.26)
≥ τ ji (τ ij(t1) + ta) (3.27)
= t1 + τ
j
i (ta)
≥ t1, (3.28)
where (3.25) follows from the definition of tj, (3.26) follows from the fact
that tb > 0, (3.27) follows from the definition of ti, and (3.28) follows from
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the fact that ta > 0. Next we show that tj + Tj−1,2 < t1 + Tn,2:
tj + Tj−1,2 = τ
j
i (ti) + tb + Tj−1,2 (3.29)
= τ ji (τ
i
j(t1) + ta) + tb + Tj−1,2 (3.30)
= t1 + ajita + tb + Tj−1,2
< t1 + aji2(n− 1)Ti−1,2 + 2(n− 1)Tj−1,2 + Tj−1,2 (3.31)
< t1 + aji2(n− 1)Ti−1,2 + amax2nTj−1,2
< t1 + aji2(n− 1)Ti−1,2 + Tj,2 (3.32)
< t1 + aji2(n− 1)Ti−1,2 + Ti−1,2 (3.33)
< t1 + amax2nTi−1,2
= t1 + Ti,2 (3.34)
≤ t1 + Tn,2, (3.35)
where (3.29) follows from the definition of tj, (3.30) follows from the definition
of ti, (3.31) follows from the fact that ta < 2(n − 1)Ti−1,2 and tb < 2(n −
1)Tj−1,2, (3.32) follows from the definition of Tj−1,2, (3.33) follows from the
fact that i > j, and (3.34) follows from the definition of Ti,2.
It follows from (3.28) and (3.35) that the interval [tj, tj + Tj−1,2) occurs
in one iteration of the orthogonal MAC code. That is, [tj, tj + Tj−1,2) ⊂
[t1, t1 + Tn,2). Therefore conditions (3.10)-(3.13) are satisfied for the interval
[tj, tj + Tj−1,2).
Now we will consider separately the two cases mentioned earlier. First, we
consider case one in which a primary pulse generated by node j collides with
a primary pulse generated by node i. We show that there exists a pulse of
length W generated by node j that does not collide with node i.
Lemma 3.2.2. Assume i > j and aij ≤ 1. Let I2 := [t2, t2+W ) be a primary
pulse of M
(j)
1 (t) with respect to node j’s clock and let I3 := [t3, t3 + W ) be
a primary pulse of M
(i)
1 (t) with respect to node i’s clock. Suppose the two
pulses overlap. That is, [t2, t2 +W )∩ τ ji ([t3, t3 +W )) 6= ∅. Then there exists
a pulse at tw := t2 +kT
(j)
0 with respect to node j’s clock that does not overlap
with any pulse of M
(i)
1 (τ
i
j(t)), where k :=
⌊
1
aij
(
i
j
)
− W
T
(j)
0
− W
aijT
(j)
0
− cj
⌋
.
Proof. We will prove the following in sequence:
(i) k ≥ 1,
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(ii) [tw, tw +W ) ⊂ τ ji
(
[t3 + ciT
(i)
0 +W, t3 + T
(i)
0 )
)
,
(iii) M
(j)
1 (t) = 1 and M
(i)
1 (τ
i
j(t)) = 0 for all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ).
If the primary pulse of node j at time t2 (wrt to node j’s clock) collides (in
other words, the pulses overlap in time) with the primary pulse of node i,
we show that there exists a primary pulse that does not collide with node
i at time tw := t2 + kT
(j)
0 with respect to node j’s clock, where k is an
integer defined above. Clearly our selection of k cannot be zero because
otherwise tw = t2, which points to the same pulse that caused the collision
in the first place. We show that k as defined in the lemma is always strictly
positive. (i) We show that the parameters of the orthogonal MAC code,
selected at the onset, guarantees that k is strictly positive. Now by definition
T0 := 32Wna
2
max. Therefore, we prove that k ≥ 1 due to the following series
of inequalities:
T0 ≥ 8Wna2max,
⇒ 1
4namax
≥ 2Wamax
T0
,
⇒ 1
naij
− cn ≥ 2WaijT0 ,
⇒ [(n−j+1)−(n−i+1)]
jaij
− cj ≥ 2WjaijT0 ,
⇒ [(n−j+1)−(n−i+1)]
jaij
− W
jT0
− W
jaijT0
− cj ≥ 0,
⇒ 1
aij
+ [(n−j+1)−(n−i+1)]
jaij
− W
jT0
− W
jaijT0
− cj ≥ 1,
⇒
⌊
1
aij
(
i
j
)
− W
T
(j)
0
− W
aijT
(j)
0
− cj
⌋
≥ 1,
⇒ k ≥ 1.
(ii) Now we show that the pulse generated by node j at tw does not overlap
with any pulse generated by node i. That is,
[tw, tw +W ) ⊂ τ ji
(
[t3 + ciT
(i)
0 +W, t3 + T
(i)
0 )
)
.
As before, we show that our choice of parameters for the orthogonal MAC
code guarantee this property. First we show that our choice of T0 := 32Wna
2
max
guarantees that tw ≥ τ ji (t3 + ciT (i)0 + W ) due to the following sequence of
inequalities:
T0 ≥ 8Wamax,
⇒ T0 ≥ 8Wamax2amax−1 ,
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⇒ T0 ≥ 4W1− 2n
4namax
,
⇒ T0 ≥ 4W1−2ncn ,
⇒ T0 ≥ 4W1−ici−jcj ,
⇒ T0 ≥ 4W(i−j)−ci(i−j)−jaij(ci+cj) ,
⇒ 1− ci + (1−ci)(i−j)jaij ≥ 1 + cj + 4WjaijT0 ,
⇒ 1−ci
aij
+ (1−ci)(i−j)
jaij
≥ 1 + cj + 4WjaijT0 ,
⇒ 1−ci
aij
+ (1−ci)(i−j)
jaij
≥ 1 + cj + 2WjT0 + 2WjaijT0 ,
⇒ 1
aij
(
i
j
)
− W
jT0
− W
jaijT0
− cj − 1 ≥ WjT0 + ciaij
(
i
j
)
+ W
jaijT0
,
⇒
⌊
1
aij
(
i
j
)
− W
T
(j)
0
− W
aijT
(j)
0
− cj
⌋
≥ W
T
(j)
0
+ ci
aij
(
i
j
)
+ W
aijT
(j)
0
,
⇒ k ≥ W
T
(j)
0
+ ci
aij
(
i
j
)
+ W
aijT
(j)
0
,
⇒ kT (j)0 ≥ t2 +W − t2 + ciT
(i)
0
aij
+ W
aij
,
⇒ kT (j)0 ≥ τ ji (t3)− t2 + ciT
(i)
0
aij
+ W
aij
,
⇒ t2 + kT (j)0 ≥ τ ji (t3) + ciT
(i)
0
aij
+ W
aij
,
⇒ tw ≥ τ ji (t3 + ciT (i)0 +W ).
Next we show that the choice of parameter cj :=
1
amax(5n−j) guarantees that
tw +W < τ
j
i (t3 + T
(i)
0 ) due to the following sequence of inequalities:
cj > 0,
⇒ 1
aij
(
i
j
)
− W
jT0
− W
jaijT0
− cj < 1aij
(
i
j
)
− W
jT0
− W
jaijT0
,
⇒
⌊
1
aij
(
i
j
)
− W
jT0
− W
jaijT0
− cj
⌋
< 1
aij
(
i
j
)
− W
jT0
− W
jaijT0
,
⇒ k < 1
aij
(
T
(i)
0
T
(j)
0
)
− W
T
(j)
0
− W
aijT
(j)
0
,
⇒ kT (j)0 < τ ji (t3)− τ ji (t3)− Waij +
T
(i)
0
aij
−W,
⇒ kT (j)0 < τ ji (t3)− τ ji (t3 +W ) + T
(i)
aij
−W,
⇒ kT (j)0 < τ ji (t3)− t2 + T
(i)
0
aij
−W,
⇒ t2 + kT (j)0 +W < τ ji (t3) + T
(i)
0
aij
,
⇒ tw +W < τ ji (t3 + T (i)0 ).
It follows that [tw, tw + W ) ⊂ τ ji
(
[t3 + ciT
(i)
0 +W, t3 + T
(i)
0 )
)
. (iii) Now
we use part (ii) to show that node j transmits and node i is silent during
the interval [tw, tw +W ) with respect to node j’s clock. Let t ∈ [tw, tw +W ).
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From the fact that k is a positive integer and the definitions of t2, tw we have:
0 = tw mod T
(j)
0
≤ tw mod T (j)0 + (t− tw) mod T (j)0
= tw mod T
(j)
0 +W
= W.
Therefore 0 ≤ tw mod T (j)0 + (t − tw) mod T (j)0 ≤ W . Since by definition
W < T
(j)
0 , it follows that:
0 ≤ tw mod T (j)0 + (t− tw) mod T (j)0
= [tw mod T
(j)
0 + (t− tw) mod T (j)0 ] mod T (j)0
= t mod T
(j)
0
< W.
By the inequality 0 ≤ t mod T (j)0 < W for all t ∈ [tw, tw + W ) shown above,
and the definition of M
(j)
1 (t), it follows that M
(j)
1 (t) = 1 for all t ∈ [t2, t2+W ).
So we have proven that node j transmits during the interval [tw, tw + W ).
Now we need to show that node i is silent.
We have t ∈ [τ ji (t3 + ciT (i)0 +W ), τ ji (t3 +T (i)0 )) since[tw, tw +W ) ⊂ [τ ji (t3 +
ciT
(i)
0 +W ), τ
j
i (t3 + T
(i))
0 ). Then τ
i
j(t) ∈ [t3 + ciT (i)0 +W, t3 + T (i)0 ). Therefore
we have:
ciT
(i)
0 +W = (t3 + ciT
(i)
0 +W ) mod T
(i)
0
≤ (t3 + ciT (i)0 +W ) mod T (i)0 + (τ ij(t)− (t3 + ciT (i)0 +W )) mod T (i)0
< (t3 + ciT
(i)
0 +W ) mod T
(i)
0 + (t3 + T
(i)
0 − (t3 + ciT (i)0 +W )) mod T (i)0
= T
(i)
0 .
Therefore
ciT
(i)
0 +W ≤ (t3+ciT (i)0 +W ) mod T (i)0 +(τ ij(t)−(t3+ciT (i)0 +W )) mod T (i)0 < T (i)0 .
It follows that:
ciT
(i)
0 +W
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≤ (t3 + ciT (i)0 +W ) mod T (i)0 + (τ ij(t)− (t3 + ciT (i)0 +W )) mod T (i)0
= [(t3 + ciT
(i)
0 +W ) mod T
(i)
0 + (τ
i
j(t)− (t3 + ciT (i)0 +W )) mod T (i)0 ] mod T (i)0
= τ ij(t) mod T
(i)
0
< T
(i)
0 .
From the inequality ciT
(i)
0 +W ≤ τ ij(t) mod T (i)0 < T (i)0 proven above and the
definition of M
(i)
1 (t), it follows that M
(i)
1 (τ
i
j(t)) = 0 for all t ∈ [t2, t2 + W ).
We have proven that node i is silent during the interval [tw, tw +W ) (wrt to
node j’s clock). Therefore there exists a collision-free pulse from node j to
node i of length W at [tw, tw +W ) all with respect to node j’s clock.
Now consider case two in which the primary pulse generated by node i
collides with a secondary pulse generated by node j. We show that there
exists a pulse of length W generated by node j that does not collide with
node i.
Lemma 3.2.3. Assume i > j and aij ≤ 1. Let I2 := [t2, t2+W ) be a primary
pulse of M
(j)
1 (t) with respect to node j’s clock and let I3 := [t3, t3 + W ) be
a secondary pulse of M
(i)
1 (t) with respect to node i’s clock. Suppose the two
pulses overlap. That is, [t2, t2 + W ) ∩ τ ji ([t3, t3 + W )) 6= ∅. There exists a
pulse at tw := t2 + cjT
(j)
0 with respect to node j’s clock that does not overlap
with any pulse of M
(i)
1 (τ
i
j(t)).
Proof. We will show:
(i) [tw, tw +W ) ⊂ τ ji ([t3 +W, t3 + (1− ci)T (i)0 )),
(ii) M
(j)
1 (t) = 1 and M
(i)
1 (τ
i
j(t)) = 0 for all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ).
If the primary pulse of node j collides with the secondary pulse of node i
at time t2 (wrt to node j’s clock) we show that there exists a secondary
pulse that does not collide with node i at tw := t2 + cjT
(j)
0 with respect to
node j’s clock. To prove this, we only need to show that [tw, tw + W ) ⊂
τ ji
(
[t3 +W, t3 + (1− ci)T (i)0 )
)
. (i) We show that the parameters of the or-
thogonal MAC code guarantee this property. Given the definition of cj we
first show that tw ≥ τ ji (t3 + (1 − ci)T (i)0 ) due to the following sequence of
inequalities:
16n ≥ 5n− j ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n},
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⇒ 1
(5n−j)amax ≥ 116namax ,
⇒ cj ≥ 116namax ,
⇒ cj ≥ 2Wamax32Wna2max ,
⇒ cj ≥ 2WamaxjT0 ,
⇒ cj ≥ W
T
(j)
0
+ W
aijT
(j)
0
,
⇒ cjT (j)0 ≥ W + Waij ,
⇒ cjT (j)0 ≥ t2 +W − t2 + Waij ,
⇒ cjT (j)0 ≥ τ ji (t3)− t2 + Waij ,
⇒ t2 + cjT (j)0 ≥ τ ji (t3) + Waij ,
⇒ tw ≥ τ ji (t3 +W ).
It follows that tw ≥ τ ji (t3 + W ). Next we show that our choice of cj :=
1
amax(5n−j) guarantees that tw +W < τ
j
i (t3 + (1− ci)T (i)0 ) due to the following
sequence of inequalities:
cj =
1
(5n−j)amax ,
⇒ cj < 11n2amax16n2amax ,
⇒ cj < 1 + 1n − 14namax − 14n2amax − 116namax ,
⇒ cj < 1− cn + 1−cnn − 116namax ,
⇒ cj < (1− cn) + 1−cnj − 2Wjaij(32Wna2max) ,
⇒ cj < 1−cnaij + 1−cnjaij − 2WjaijT0 ,
⇒ cj < 1−cnaij +
[(n−j+1)−(n−i+1)](1−cn)
jaij
− 2W
jaijT0
,
⇒ cj < (1−cn)aij
(
i
j
)
− 2W
jaijT0
,
⇒ cj < (1−cn)T
(i)
0
aijT
(j)
0
− 2W
aijT
(j)
0
,
⇒ cj < (1−ci)T
(i)
0
aijT
(j)
0
− W
aijT
(j)
0
− W
T
(j)
0
,
⇒ cjT (j)0 < (1−ci)T
(i)
0
aij
− W
aij
−W,
⇒ cjT (j)0 < τ ji (t3)− τ ji (t3 +W ) + (1−ci)T
(i)
0
aij
−W,
⇒ cjT (j)0 < τ ji (t3)− t2 + (1−ci)T
(i)
0
aij
−W,
⇒ t2 + cjT (j)0 +W < τ ji (t3) + (1−ci)T
(i)
0
aij
,
⇒ tw +W < τ ij(t3 + (1− ci)T (i)0 ).
It follows that [tw, tw +W ) ⊂ [τ ji (t3 +W ), τ ji (t3 + (1− ci)T (i)0 )).
(ii) Now use part (i) to show that node j transmits during the interval
[tw, tw + W ) with respect to node j’s clock while node i is silent. Let t ∈
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[tw, tw +W ). From the definition of T
(j)
0 we have |[tw, tw +W )| < T (j)0 . Now
let t ∈ [tw, tw +W ). From the definition of t2 and tw we have:
cjT
(j)
0 = tw mod T
(j)
0
≤ tw mod T (j)0 + (t− tw) mod T (j)0
< tw mod T
(j)
0 + (tw +W − tw) mod T (j)0
= cjT
(j)
0 +W.
Therefore cjT
(j)
0 ≤ tw mod T (j)0 + (t − tw) mod T (j)0 < cjT (j)0 + W . It follows
from this inequality that:
cjT
(j)
0 ≤ tw mod T (j)0 + (t− tw) mod T (j)0
= [tw mod T
(j)
0 + (t− tw) mod T (j)0 ] mod T (j)0
= t mod T
(j)
0
< cjT
(j)
0 +W.
From the inequality cjT
(j)
0 ≤ t mod T (j)0 < cjT (j)0 +W proven above, and the
definition of M
(j)
1 (t), it follows that M
(j)
1 (t) = 1 for all t ∈ [tw, tw+W ). So we
have proven that node j transmits during the interval [tw, tw +W ). Now we
need to show that node i is silent. We have t ∈ τ ji
(
[t3 +W, t3 + (1− ci)T (i)0 )
)
since [tw, tw + W ) ⊂ τ ji
(
[t3 +W, t3 + (1− ci)T (i)0 )
)
. Therefore τ ij(t) ∈ [t3 +
W, t3 + (1− ci)T (i)0 ). Clearly, |[t3 +W, t3 + (1− ci)T (i)0 )| < T (i)0 . We have:
W + ciT
(i)
0 = (t3 +W ) mod T
(i)
0
≤ (t3 +W ) mod T (i)0 + (τ ij(t)− (t3 +W )) mod T (i)0
< (t3 +W ) mod T
(i)
0 + (t3 + (1− ci)T (i)0 − (t3 +W )) mod T (i)0
= W + ciT
(i)
0 + (1− ci)T (i)0 −W
= T
(i)
0 .
Therefore W+ciT
(i)
0 ≤ (t3 +W ) mod T (i)0 +(τ ij(t)−(t3 +W )) mod T (i)0 < T (i)0 .
It follows that:
W + ciT
(i)
0 ≤ (t3 +W ) mod T (i)0 + (τ ij(t)− (t3 +W )) mod T (i)0
=≤ [(t3 +W ) mod T (i)0 + (τ ij(t)− (t3 +W )) mod T (i)0 ] mod T (i)0
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= τ ij(t) mod T
(i)
0
< T
(i)
0 .
From the inequality ciT
(i)
0 +W ≤ τ ij(t) mod T (i)0 < T (i)0 proven above and the
definition of M
(i)
1 (t), it follows that M
(i)
1 (τ
i
j(t)) = 0 for all t ∈ [t2, t2 + W ).
We have proven that node i is silent during the interval [tw, tw + W ) (wrt
to node j’s clock). Therefore there exists a collision-free pulse from node
j to node i of length W at the interval [tw, tw + W ) measured by node j’s
clock.
Now we prove that node j can successfully transmit a message of length
W to node i. We show, using the previous three lemmas, that within the
interval [tj, tj + Tj−1,2) there exists a pulse of length W generated by node j
that does not collide with a pulse generated by node i.
Lemma 3.2.4. Suppose aij ≤ 1 and i > j. Given t1 such that τ ij(t) ≥ 0,
there exists an interval [tw, tw +W ) that satisfies the following conditions for
all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ):
(i) [tw, tw +W ) ⊂ [t1, t1 + Tn,2),
(ii) [τ ij(tw), τ
i
j(tw +W )) ⊂ [τ ij(t1), τ ij(t1) + Tn,2),
(iii) M
(j)
1 (t)s
(j,i)
1 (t) = 1,
(iv) M
(i)
1 (τ
i
j(t))s
(i,j)
1 (τ
i
j(t))) + s
(i,j)
1 (τ
i
j(t)) = 1.
Proof. From Lemma 3.2.1 there exists an interval [tj, tj+Tj−1,2) that satisfies
(3.10)-(3.13). Now |[tj, tj + Tj−1,2)| < Tj−1,2. Moreover,
Tj−1,2 ≥ T0,2
= 2Tn,1
= 2(dnamaxe+ 2)T (n)0
≥ 2(dnamaxe+ 2)T (j)0 .
It follows from the last inequality that there exists an interval I2 := [t2, t2 +
W ) ⊂ [tj, tj + Tj−1,2) that satisfies the following conditions:
(i) 0 ≤ t mod T (j)0 < W ,
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(ii) 0 ≤ t2 − tj < T (j)0 .
There are three cases that may occur: Case 1: M
(i)
1 (τ
i
j(t)) = 0, for all
[t2, t2 + W ). In this case, set tw := t2. It follows from condition (i) and the
definition of M
(j)
1 (t), that for all t ∈ [t2, t2 +W ) we have,
M
(j)
1 (t) = 1,
M
(i)
1 (τ
i
j(t)) = 0.
In addition, we clearly have [tw, tw+W ) ⊂ [tj, tj+Tj−1,2). Case 2: M (i)1 (τ ij(t)) 6=
0 for all t ∈ [t2, t2 + W ). More specifically, there exists an interval I3 :=
[t3, t3 + W ) such that 0 ≤ t mod T (i)0 < W for all t ∈ I3 and [t2, t2 + W ) ∩
[τ ji (t3), τ
j
i (t3 +W )) 6= ∅.
In this case, let k =
⌊
1
aij
(
i
j
)
− W
T
(j)
0
− W
aijT
(j)
0
− cj
⌋
, and let tw := t2 +kT
(j)
0 .
It follows from Lemma 3.2.2 that for all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ):
M
(j)
1 (t) = 1,
M
(i)
1 (τ
i
j(t)) = 0.
Clearly tw ≥ tj since tw ≥ t2 ≥ tj. We also can show that tw+W < tj+Tj−1,2
due to the following sequence of inequalities:
tw +W ≤ t2 + kT (j)0 +W
≤ tj + T (j)0 + kT (j)0 +W
< tj + T
(j)
0 + kT
(j)
0 + T
(j)
0
= tj + (k + 2)T
(j)
0
< tj + (k + 2)T
(n)
0
≤ tj + (dnamaxe+ 2)T (n)0
= tj + Tn,1
< tj + Tj−1,2.
Therefore [tw, tw + W ) ⊂ [tj, tj + Tj−1,2). Case 3: M (i)1 (τ ij(t)) 6= 0 for all
t ∈ [t2, t2 + W ). More specifically, there exists an interval I3 := [t3, t3 + W )
such that ciT
(i)
0 ≤ t mod T (i)0 < ciT (j)0 + W for all t ∈ I3 and [t2, t2 + W ) ∩
[τ ji (t3), τ
j
i (t3 + W )) 6= ∅. In this case let tw := t2 + cjT (j)0 . It follows from
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Lemma 3.2.3 that for all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ):
M
(j)
1 (t) = 1,
M
(i)
1 (τ
i
j(t)) = 0.
Clearly tw ≥ tj since tw ≥ t2 ≥ tj. We also can show that tw+W < tj+Tj−1,2
due to the following sequence of inequalities:
tw +W = t2 + cjT
(j)
0 +W
≤ tj + T (j)0 +W
< tj + 2T
(j)
0
< tj + 2T
(n)
0
< tj + (dnamaxe+ 2)T (n)0
= tj + Tn,1
< tj + T0,2
≤ tj + Tj−1,2.
Therefore [tw, tw + W ) ⊂ [tj, tj + Tj−1,2). It follows that [tw, tw + W ) ⊂
[tj, tj + Tj−1,2) in all cases and for all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ) we have:
M
(j)
1 (t) = 1,
M
(i)
1 (τ
i
j(t)) = 0,
s
(j,i)
1 (t) = 1,
s
(i,j)
1 (τ
i
j(t)) = 1.
where the latter two equalities follow from Lemma 3.2.1 cited at the onset of
the proof. Therefore for all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ) we have:
M
(j)
1 (t)s
(j,i)
1 (t) = 1,
M
(i)
1 (τ
i
j(t))s
(i,j)
1 (τ
1
j (t)) + s
(i,j)
1 (τ
i
j(t)) = 1.
Now we repeat the process when aij > 1. In the following lemma we
show that for any pair of nodes i and j, there exists an interval of time,
[tj, tj + Tj−1,2) with respect to node j’s clock, in which nodes i and j are
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scheduled to communicate with each other using the signals M
(i)
2 (t) and
M
(j)
2 (t) respectively.
Lemma 3.2.5. Without loss of generality assume i > j. There exists an
interval [tj, tj + Tj−1,2) with respect to node j’s clock in which node i and
j are scheduled to communicate with each other using the signals M
(i)
2 (t)
and M
(j)
2 (t) respectively. That is, given t1 such that τ
i
j(t1) ≥ 0, the interval
[tj, tj + Tj−1,2) satisfies the following conditions:
[tj, tj + Tj−1,2) ⊂ [t1, t1 + Tn,2),
τ ij([tj, tj + Tj−1,2)) ⊂ [τ ij(t1), τ ij(t1) + Tn,2),
s
(i,j)
2 (τ
i
j(t)) = 1, ∀t ∈ [tj, tj + Tj−1,2),
s
(j,i)
2 (t) = 1, ∀t ∈ [tj, tj + Tj−1,2).
Proof. The proof of this lemma is very similar to the proof of Lemma 3.2.1.
First, we consider case one in which a primary pulse generated by node j
collides with a primary pulse generated by node i. We show that there exists
a pulse of length W generated by node j that does not collide with node i.
Lemma 3.2.6. Assume i > j and aij > 1. Let I3 := [t3, t3+W ) be a primary
pulse of M
(i)
2 (t) with respect to node i’s clock and let I2 := [t2, t2 + W ) be
a primary pulse of M
(j)
2 (t) with respect to node j’s clock. Suppose the two
pulses overlap. That is, [t2, t2 + W ) ∩ τ ji ([t3, t3 + W )) 6= ∅. There exists a
pulse at tw := t2 + cn−j+1T
(n−j+1)
0 with respect to node j’s clock that does not
overlap with any pulse of M
(i)
2 (τ
i
j(t)).
Proof. Let i˜ := n − i + 1 and j˜ := n − j + 1. Then I3 is a primary pulse
of M
(˜i)
1 (t) and I2 is a primary pulse of M
(j˜)
1 (t). Set ai˜j˜ := aij. Therefore
aj˜i˜ ≤ 1. We need to show that there exists a pulse at tw := t2 + cj˜T (j˜)0 with
respect to node j˜’s clock that does not overlap with any pulse of M
(˜i)
1 (τ
i˜
j˜
(t)).
This result will be shown in Lemma 3.2.10.
Now we consider case two in which a primary pulse generated by node j
collides with a secondary pulse generated by node i. We show that there
exists a pulse of length W generated by node j that does not collide with
node i.
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Lemma 3.2.7. Assume i > j and aij > 1. Let I3 := [t3, t3 + W ) be a
secondary pulse of M
(i)
2 (t) with respect to node i’s clock, and let I2 := [t2, t2 +
W ) be a primary pulse of M
(j)
2 (t) with respect to node j’s clock. Suppose the
two pulses overlap. That is, [t2, t2 +W ) ∩ τ ji ([t3, t3 +W )) 6= ∅. There exists
a pulse at tw := t2 + cn−j+1T
(n−j+1)
0 with respect to node j’s clock that does
not overlap with any pulse of M
(i)
2 (τ
i
j(t)).
Proof. Let i˜ := n − i + 1 and j˜ := n − j + 1. Then I3 is a secondary pulse
of M
(˜i)
1 (t) and I2 is a primary pulse of M
(j˜)
1 (t). Set ai˜j˜ := aij. Therefore
aj˜i˜ ≤ 1. We need to show that there exists a pulse at tw := t2 + cj˜T (j˜)0 with
respect to node j˜’s clock that does not overlap with any pulse of M
(˜i)
1 (τ
i˜
j˜
(t)).
This result will be shown in Lemma 3.2.11.
Now we prove that node j can successfully transmit a message of length W
to node i when aij > 1. We show, using the previous three lemmas, Lemma
3.2.5, Lemma 3.2.7, and Lemma 3.2.6, that within the interval [tj, tj +Tj−1,2)
there exists a pulse of length W generated by node j that does not collide
with a pulse generated by node i.
Lemma 3.2.8. Suppose aij > 1 and i > j. Given t1 such that τ
i
j(t1) ≥ 0,
there exists an interval [tw, tw +W ) that satisfies the following conditions for
all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ):
(i) [tw, tw +W ) ⊂ [t1, t1 + Tn,2),
(ii) [τ ij(tw), τ
i
j(tw + Tn,2)) ⊂ [τ ij(t1), τ ij(t1) + Tn,2),
(iii) M
(j)
2 (t)s
(j,i)
2 (t) = 1,
(iv) M
(i)
2 (τ
i
j(t))s
(i,j)
2 (τ
i
j(t)) + s
(i,j)
2 (τ
i
j(t)) = 1.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.2.4.
We have proved that node j can transmit a message of length W to node
i if aij ≤ 1 and if aij > 1. Putting both cases together gives us our first
theorem; the orthogonal MAC code enables node j to successfully transmit
a message of length W units to node i within a finite time TMAC(W ) := Tn,2
as long as the relative skew aij ≤ amax.
Theorem 3.2.1. Without loss of generality, assume i > j. Assume there
exists t1 such that τ
i
j(t1) > 0. There exists an interval [tw, tw + W ) that
satisfies the following conditions for all t ∈ [tw, tw+W ) and some k ∈ {1, 2}:
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(i) [tw, tw +W ) ⊂ [t1, t1 + Tn,2),
(ii) [τ ij(tw), τ
i
j(tw +W )) ⊂ [τ ij(t1), τ ij(t1) + Tn,2),
(iii) M
(i)
k (τ
i
j(t))s
(i,j)
k (τ
i
j(t)) + s
(i,j)
k (τ
i
j(t)) = 1,
(iv) M
(j)
k (t)s
(j,i)
k (t) = 1.
Proof. There are two cases to consider: Case 1: aij ≤ 1. It follows from
Lemma 3.2.4 that there exists an interval [tw, tw + W ) that satisfies the
following conditions for all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ):
(i) [tw, tw +W ) ⊂ [t1, t1 + Tn,2),
(ii) [τ ij(tw), τ
i
j(tw +W )) ⊂ [τ ij(t1), τ ij(t1) + Tn,2),
(iii) M
(i)
1 (τ
i
j(t))s
(i,j)
1 (τ
i
j(t)) + s
(i,j)
1 (τ
i
j(t)) = 1,
(iv) M
(j)
1 (t)s
(j,i)
1 (t) = 1.
Case 2: aij > 1. It follows from Lemma 3.2.8 that there exists an interval
[tw, tw +W ) that satisfies the following conditions for all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ):
(i) [tw, tw +W ) ⊂ [t1, t1 + Tn,2),
(ii) [τ ij(tw), τ
i
j(tw +W )) ⊂ [τ ij(t1), τ ij(t1) + Tn,2),
(iii) M
(i)
2 (τ
i
j(t))s
(i,j)
2 (τ
i
j(t)) + s
(i,j)
2 (τ
i
j(t)) = 1,
(iv) M
(j)
2 (t)s
(j,i)
2 (t) = 1.
We now show that node i can transmit a message of size W to node j.
Suppose i > j and aij ≤ 1. Consider two nodes i and j, where i > j and
aij ≤ 1. In the following lemma we show that for any two pairs of nodes i
and j, there exists an interval of time, [ti, ti + Ti), with respect to node i’s
clock, in which nodes i and j are scheduled to communicate with each other
using the signals M
(i)
1 (t) and M
(j)
1 (t) respectively.
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Lemma 3.2.9. Suppose i > j. Given t1 such that τ
j
i (t1) ≥ 0, there exists an
interval [ti, ti+Ti) that satisfies the following conditions for all t ∈ [ti, ti+Ti):
[ti, ti + Ti) ⊂ [t1, t1 + Tn,2), (3.36)
τ ji ([ti, ti + Ti)) ⊂ [τ ji (t1), τ ji (t1) + Tn,2), (3.37)
s
(j,i)
1 (τ
j
i (t)) = 1, (3.38)
s
(i,j)
1 (t) = 1. (3.39)
Proof. Since 0 ≤ t1 mod 2(n− 1)Ti−1,2 < 2(n− 1)Ti−1,2, there exists some ta,
0 ≤ ta < 2(n− 1)Ti−1,2 such that (t1 + ta) mod 2(n− 1)Ti−1,2 = (j − 1)Ti−1,2
if 1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1. Let t˜i := t1 + ta. It follows from the definition of s(i,j)1 (t) in
(3.6) that (3.39) is satisfied for all t ∈ [t˜i, t˜i + Ti−1,2).
Now since 0 ≤ τ ji (t˜i) mod 2(n − 1)Tj−1,2 < 2(n − 1)Tj−1,2, there exists
some tb, 0 ≤ tb < 2(n− 1)Tj−1,2 such that (τ ji (t˜i) + tb) mod 2(n− 1)Tj−1,2 =
(i− 2)Tj−1,2, if 2 ≤ i ≤ n. Set tj := τ ji (t˜i) + tb. It follows from the definition
of s
(j,i)
1 (t) that (3.38) is satisfied for all t ∈ [τ ij(tj), τ ij(tj + Tj−1,2)). We will
prove (3.36) and show that [ti, ti + Ti) ⊂ [t1, t1 + Tn,2). Now set ti := τ ij(tj),
and let Ti := τ
i
j(tj + Tj−1,2)− τ ij(tj) = aijTj−1,2. First we show that ti ≥ t1:
ti := τ
i
j(tj)
= τ ij(τ
j
i (t˜i) + tb)
= τ ij(τ
j
i (t1 + ta) + tb)
= t1 + ta + aijtb
≥ t1.
Next we show that ti + Ti < t1 + Tn,2:
ti + Ti = t1 + ta + aijtb + Ti
< t1 + 2(n− 1)Ti−1,2 + aij2(n− 1)Tj−1,2 + aijTj−1,2
= t1 + 2(n− 1)Ti−1,2 + aij2nTj−1,2
= t1 + 2(n− 1)Ti−1,2 + Tj,2
≤ t1 + 2(n− 1)Ti−1,2 + Ti−1,2
≤ t1 + 2nTi−1,2
≤ t1 + Ti,2
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≤ t1 + Tn,2.
It follows from both inequalities that [ti, ti+Ti) ⊂ [t1, t1 +Tn,2). Therefore
(3.36) is proved. Now we prove (3.37) and show that [τ ji (ti), τ
j
i (ti + Ti)) ⊂
[τ ji (t1), τ
j
i (t1) + Tn,2). First we show that τ
j
i (ti) ≥ τ ji (t1) due to the following
series of inequalities:
τ ji (ti) = τ
j
i (τ
i
j(tj))
= tj
= τ ji (t˜i) + tb
= τ ji (t1 + ta) + tb
= τ ji (t1) + ajita + tb
≥ τ ji (t1).
Next we show that τ ji (ti + Ti) < τ
j
i (t1) + Tn,2 due to the following series of
inequalities:
τ ji (ti + Ti) = τ
j
i (ti) + ajiTi
= τ ji (t1) + ajita + tb + aji(aijTj−1,2)
< τ ji (t1) + amax2(n− 1)Ti−1,2 + 2(n− 1)Tj−1,2 + Tj−1,2
= τ ji (t1) + amax2(n− 1)Ti−1,2 + 2nTj−1,2
≤ τ ji (t1) + amax2(n− 1)Ti−1,2 + Tj,2
≤ τ ji (t1) + amax2(n− 1)Ti−1,2 + Ti−1,2
≤ τ ji (t1) + amax2nTi−1,2
= τ ji (t1) + Ti,2
≤ τ ji (t1) + Tn,2.
It follows that [τ ji (ti), τ
j
i (ti +Ti)) ⊂ [τ ji (t1), τ ji (t1) +Tn,2). Therefore (3.37)
is satisfied.
Now we again consider two separate cases. First, we consider case one
in which a primary pulse generated by node i collides with a primary pulse
generated by node j. We show that there exists a pulse of length W generated
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by node i that does not collide with node j.
Lemma 3.2.10. Assume i > j and aij ≤ 1. Let I2 := [t2, t2 + W ) be a
primary pulse of M
(j)
1 (t) with respect to node j’s clock and let I3 := [t3, t3+W )
be a primary pulse of M
(i)
1 (t) with respect to node i’s clock. Suppose the two
pulses overlap. That is, [t3, t3 + W ) ∩ τ ij([t2, t2 + W )) 6= ∅. There exists a
pulse at tw := t3 + ciT
(i)
0 with respect to node i’s clock that does not overlap
with any pulse of M
(j)
1 (τ
j
i (t)).
Proof. We will show:
(i) [tw, tw +W ) ⊂ τ ij([t2 + cjT (j)0 +W, t2 + T (j)0 )),
(ii) M
(i)
1 (t) = 1 and M
(j)
1 (τ
j
i (t)) = 0 for all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ).
If the primary pulse of node i collides with the primary pulse of node j at
time t3 (wrt to node i’s clock) we show that there exists a secondary pulse
that does not collide with node i at time tw := t3 + ciT
(i)
0 . We will first show
that [tw, tw + W ) ⊂ τ ij
(
[t2 + cjT
(j)
0 +W ), t2 + T
(j)
0 )
)
and then show in (ii)
that this condition proves existence of a collision-free secondary pulse.
(i) We show that the parameters of the orthogonal MAC code selected
at the onset guarantee that [tw, tw + W ) ⊂ τ ij
(
[t2 + cjT
(j)
0 +W, t2 + T
(j)
0 )
)
.
First we show that our selection of T0 := 32Wna
2
max guarantees that tw ≥
τ ij(t2 + cjT
(j)
0 +W ) due to the following sequence of inequalities:
T0 ≥ 10nWamax,
⇒ T0
5n
≥ 2Wamax,
⇒ T0
5n
≥ W
aij
+W,
⇒
(
5n
(5n)(5n)
)
T0 ≥ Waij +W,
⇒
(
5n
(5n−i)(5n−j)
)
T0 ≥ Waij +W,
⇒
(
5n(i−j)
(5n−i)(5n−j)
)
T0 ≥ Waij +W,
⇒
(
5ni−ij−5nj+ij
(5n−i)(5n−j)
)
T0 ≥ Waij +W,
⇒
(
i(5n−j)−j(5n−i)
(5n−i)(5n−j)
)
T0 ≥ Waij +W,
⇒
(
i
5n−i − j5n−j
)
T0 ≥ Waij +W,
⇒ (ici − jcj)T0 ≥ Waij +W,
⇒ ciiT0 − cjjT0 ≥ Waij +W,
⇒ ciT (i)0 − cjT (j)0 ≥ Waij +W,
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⇒ ciT
(i)
0
aij
− cjT (j)0 ≥ Waij +W,
⇒ ciT (i)0 − aijcjT (j)0 ≥ W + aijW,
⇒ ciT (i)0 − aijcjT (j)0 ≥ τ ij(t2)− t3 + aijW,
⇒ t3 + ciT (i)0 ≥ τ ij(t2) + aijcjT (j)0 + aijW,
⇒ tw ≥ τ ij(t2) + aijcjT (j)0 + aijW,
⇒ tw ≥ τ ij(t2 + cjT (j)0 +W ).
Next we show that our choice cj and T
(j)
0 guarantees that τ
j
i (tw + W ) <
t2 + T
(j)
0 due to the following sequence of inequalities:
1 < i4amax
⇒ 2Wamax < i8Wa2max,
⇒ 2Wamax < i(32Wna2max)
(
1
4n
)
,
⇒ 2Wamax < T (i)0
(
4n−1
4n
)
,
⇒ 2W
aij
< T
(i)
0
(
1− amax
4namax
)
,
⇒ 2W
aij
< T
(i)
0
(
1− 1
4namax
(
1
aij
))
,
⇒ 2W
aij
< T
(i)
0
(
1− cn
aij
)
,
⇒ W + W
aij
< T
(i)
0
(
1− ci
aij
)
,
⇒ W + W
aij
< T
(i)
0 − ciT
(i)
0
aij
,
⇒ W + W
aij
< T
(j)
0 − ciT
(i)
0
aij
,
⇒ aijW +W < aijT (j)0 − ciT (i)0 ,
⇒ τ ij(t2 +W )− τ ij(t2) +W < aijT (j)0 − ciT (i)0 ,
⇒ t3 − τ ij(t2) +W < aijT (j)0 − ciT (i)0 ,
⇒ t3 + ciT (i)0 +W < τ ij(t2) + aijT (i)0 ,
⇒ tw +W < τ ij(t2) + aijT (j)0 ),
⇒ tw +W < τ ij(t2 + T (i)0 ).
It follows from both series of inequalities that
[tw, tw +W ) ⊂ τ ij
(
[t2 + cjT
(j)
0 +W, t2 + T
(j)
0 )
)
.
(ii) Now use part (i) to show that node i transmits during the interval
[tw, tw + W ) with respect to node i’s clock while node j is silent. Let t ∈
[tw, tw +W ). From the definition of t3 and tw we have:
ciT
(i)
0 = tw mod T
(i)
0
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≤ tw mod T (i)0 + (t− tw) mod T (i)0
< ciT
(i)
0 + (t3 + ciT
(i)
0 +W − (t3 + ciT (i)0 )) mod T (i)0
= ciT
(i)
0 +W.
Therefore ciT
(i)
0 ≤ tw mod T (i)0 + (t − tw) mod T (i)0 < ciT (i)0 + W . It follows
from this inequality that:
ciT
(i)
0 ≤ tw mod T (i)0 + (t− tw) mod T (i)0
= [tw mod T
(i)
0 + (t− tw) mod T (i)0 ] mod T (i)0
= t mod T
(i)
0
< ciT
(i)
0 +W.
Therefore ciT
(i)
0 ≤ t mod T (i)0 < ciT (i)0 +W for all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ). It follows
from this inequality and the definition of M
(i)
1 (t), that M
(i)
1 (t) = 1 for all
t ∈ [tw, tw +W ). So we have shown that node i transmits during the interval
[tw, tw +W ). It now remains to show that node j is silent.
We have τ ji (t) ∈ [t2 + cjT (j)0 +W, t2 + T (j)0 ) since τ ji ([tw, tw +W )) ⊂ [t2 +
cjT
(j)
0 +W, t2 + T
(j)
0 ). It follows from the definition of t2 that:
cjT
(j)
0 +W = (t2 + cjT
(j)
0 +W ) mod T
(j)
0
≤ (t2 + cjT (j)0 +W ) mod T (j)0 + (τ ji (t)− (t2 + cjT (j)0 +W )) mod T (j)0
< cjT
(j)
0 +W + (t2 + T
(j)
0 − (t2 + cjT (j)0 +W ))
= T
(j)
0 .
Therefore
cjT
(j)
0 +W ≤ (t2+cjT (j)0 +W ) mod T (j)0 +(τ ji (t)−(t2+cjT (j)0 +W )) mod T (j)0 < T (j)0 .
It follows from this inequality that:
cjT
(j)
0 +W
≤ (t2 + cjT (j)0 +W ) mod T (j)0 + (τ ji (t)− (t2 + cjT (j)0 +W )) mod T (j)0
= [(t2 + cjT
(j)
0 +W ) mod T
(j)
0 + (τ
j
i (t)− (t2 + cjT (j)0 +W )) mod T (j)0 ] mod T (j)0
= τ ji (t) mod T
(j)
0
< T
(j)
0 .
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Therefore cjT
(j)
0 + W ≤ τ ji (t) < T (j)0 for all t ∈ [tw, tw + W ). It follows
from this fact, and the definition of M
(j)
1 (t), that M
(j)
1 (τ
j
i (t)) = 0 for all
t ∈ [tw, tw +W ).
Next we consider case two in which a primary pulse generated by node i
collides with a secondary pulse generated by node j. We show that there
exists a pulse of length W that does not collide with node j.
Lemma 3.2.11. Assume i > j and aij ≤ 1. Let I2 := [t2, t2 + W ) be a
primary pulse of M
(j)
1 (t) with respect to node j’s clock and let I3 := [t3, t3+W )
be a secondary pulse of M
(i)
1 (t) with respect to node i’s clock. Suppose the
two pulses overlap. That is, [t3, t3 + W ) ∩ τ ij([t2, t2 + W )) 6= ∅. Then there
exists a pulse at tw := t3 + ciT
(i)
0 with respect to node i’s clock that does not
overlap with any pulse of M
(j)
1 (τ
j
i (t)).
Proof. We will show that:
(i) [tw, tw +W ) ⊂ τ ij([t2 +W, t2 + (1− cj)T (j)0 )),
(ii) M
(i)
1 (t) = 1 and M
(j)
1 (τ
j
i (t)) = 0 for all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ).
If the primary pulse of node i collides with the secondary pulse of node j at
time t3 (wrt to node i’s clock) we show that there exists a secondary pulse
that does not collide with node j at time tw := t3 + ciT
(i)
0 . We will first show
that [tw, tw + W ) ⊂ [τ ij(t2 + W ), τ ij(t2 + (1− cj)T (j)0 )), and then show in (ii)
that this condition proves the existence of a collision-free secondary pulse.
(i) We show that the parameters of the orthogonal MAC code selected at
the onset guarantee that [tw, tw + W ) ⊂ [τ ij(t2 + W ), τ ij(t2 + (1 − cj)T (j)0 )).
First we show that our selection of ci and T
(i)
0 guarantees tw ≥ τ ij(t2 + W )
due to the following sequence of inequalities:
2a2max ≥ 1,
⇒ 4Wa2max ≥ 2W,
⇒ ( 1
8n
)
(32Wna2max) ≥ 2W,
⇒ ( i
5n−i
)
T0 ≥ 2W,
⇒ ciT (i)0 ≥ 2W,
⇒ ciT
(i)
0
aij
≥ 2W
aij
,
⇒ ciT
(i)
0
aij
≥ W
aij
+W,
⇒ ciT (i)0 ≥ W + aijW,
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⇒ τ ji (t3) + ciT
(i)
0
aij
≥ t2 +W,
⇒ ciT (i)0 ≥ t3 +W − t3 + aijW,
⇒ ciT (i)0 ≥ τ ij(t2)− t3 + aijW,
⇒ t3 + ciT (i)0 ≥ τ ij(t2) + aijW,
⇒ tw ≥ τ ij(t2 +W ).
Therefore tw ≥ τ ij(t2 +W ). Next, we show that our selection of cj and T (j)0
guarantees that tw +W < τ
i
j(t2 + (1− ci)T (j)0 ) due to the following sequence
of inequalities:
1 < 8namax
⇒ 2Wamax < 16Wna2max
⇒ 2Wamax < T02
⇒ 2Wamax <
(
1− 2namax
4namax
)
T0
⇒ 2W
aij
< (1− 2ncnamax)T0
⇒ 2W
aij
<
(
j − jcj+ici
aij
)
T0
⇒ 2W
aij
<
(
j(1− cj)− iciaij
)
T0
⇒ 2W
aij
< j(1− cj)T0 − iciT0aij
⇒ 2W
aij
< (1− cj)T (j)0 − ciT
(i)
0
aij
⇒ W + W
aij
< (1− cj)T (j)0 − ciT
(i)
0
aij
⇒ aijW +W < aij(1− cj)T (j)0 − ciT (i)0
⇒ τ ij(t2) + aijW − τ ij(t2) +W < aij(1− cj)T (j)0 − ciT (i)0
⇒ τ ij(t2 +W )− τ ij(t2) +W < aij(1− cj)T (j)0 − ciT (i)0
⇒ t3 − τ ij(t2) +W < aij(1− cj)T (j)0 − ciT (i)0
⇒ τ ji (t3) + ciT
(i)
0 +W
aij
< t2 + (1− cj)T (j)0
⇒ t3 + ciT (i)0 +W < τ ij(t2) + aij(1− cj)T (j)0
⇒ tw +W < τ ij(t2 + (1− cj)T (j)0 ).
It follows from the previous two series of inequalities that [tw, tw + W ) ⊂
[τ ij(t2 + W ), τ
i
j(t2 + (1 − ci)T (j)0 )). (ii) Now use part (i) to show that node
i transmits during the interval [tw, tw + W ) while node j is silent. Let t ∈
[tw, tw +W ). From the definition of t3 and tw we have:
ciT
(i)
0 = tw mod T
(i)
0
≤ tw mod T (i)0 + (t− tw) mod T (i)0
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< tw mod T
(i)
0 + (tw +W − tw) mod T (i)0
= tw mod T
(i)
0 +W mod T
(i)
0
= tw mod T
(i)
0 +W
= ciT
(i)
0 +W.
Therefore ciT
(i)
0 ≤ tw mod T (i)0 +(t−tw) mod T (i)0 < ciT (i)0 +W for all [tw, tw+
W ). It follows from this inequality that:
ciT
(i)
0 ≤ tw mod T (i)0 + (t− tw) mod T (i)0
= [tw mod T
(i)
0 + (t− tw) mod T (i)0 ] mod T (i)0
= t mod T
(i)
0
< ciT
(i)
0 +W.
Therefore ciT
(i)
0 ≤ t mod T (i)0 < ciT (i)0 +W for all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ). It follows
from this inequality and the definition of M
(i)
1 (t) that M
(i)
1 (t) = 1 for all
t ∈ [t3 + ciT (i)0 , t3 + ciT (i)0 + W ). So we have shown that node i transmits
during the interval [tw, tw + W ). It now remains to show that node j is
silent. We have τ ji (t) ∈ [t2 + W, t2 + (1 − ci)T (j)0 ) since τ ji ([tw, tw +W )) ⊂
[t2 + w, t2 + (1− cj)T (j)0 ). It follows from the definition of t2 that:
cjT
(j)
0 +W = (t2 +W ) mod T
(j)
0
≤ (t2 +W ) mod T (j)0 + (τ ji (t)− (t2 +W )) mod T (j)0
< (t2 +W ) mod T
(j)
0 + (t2 + (1− cj)T (j)0 − (t2 +W )) mod T (j)0
= cjT
(j)
0 +W + (1− cj)T (j)0 −W
= T
(j)
0 .
Therefore cjT
(j)
0 +W ≤ (t2+W ) mod T (j)0 +(τ ji (t)−(t2+W )) mod T (j)0 < T (j)0
for all [tw, tw +W ). It follows from this fact that:
cjT
(j)
0 +W ≤ (t2 +W ) mod T (j)0 + (τ ji (t)− (t2 +W )) mod T (j)0
= [(t2 +W ) mod T
(j)
0 + (τ
j
i (t)− (t2 +W )) mod T (j)0 ] mod T (j)0
= τ ji (t) mod T
(j)
0
< T
(j)
0 .
Therefore cjT
(j)
0 +W ≤ τ ji (t) mod T (j)0 < T (j)0 for all [tw, tw +W ). It follows
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from this fact and the definition of M
(j)
1 (t) that M
(j)
1 (τ
j
i (t)) = 0 for all
t ∈ [tw, tw +W ).
Now we prove that node i can successfully transmit a message of length
W to node j when aij ≤ 1. We show, using the previous three lemmas that
within the interval [ti, ti + Ti) there exists a pulse of length W generated by
node i that does not collide with a pulse generated by node j.
Lemma 3.2.12. Suppose aij ≤ 1 and i > j. Given t1 such that τ ij(t1) ≥ 0,
there exists an interval [tw, tw +W ) that satisfies the following conditions for
all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ):
(i) [tw, tw +W ) ⊂ [t1, t1 + Tn,2),
(ii) [τ ji (tw), τ
j
i (tw +W )) ⊂ [τ ij(t1), τ ij(t1) + Tn,2),
(iii) M
(i)
1 (t)s
(i,j)
1 (t) = 1,
(iv) M
(j)
1 (τ
j
i (t))s
(j,i)
1 (τ
j
i (t)) + s
(j,i)
1 (τ
j
i (t)) = 1.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 3.2.9 that there exists an interval [ti, ti + Ti)
that satisfies the following:
(i) [ti, ti + Ti) ⊂ [t1, t1 + Tn,2),
(ii) [τ ji (ti), τ
j
i (ti + Ti)) ⊂ [τ ji (t1), τ ji (t1) + Tn,2),
(iii) s
(i,j)
1 (t) = 1,
(iv) s
(j,i)
1 (τ
j
i (t)) = 1.
Moreover,
|[ti, ti + Ti)| = Ti
= aijTj−1,2
≥ aijT0,2
= aij2Tn,1
= aij2(dnamaxe+ 2)T (n)0
≥ 2
(dnamaxe+ 2
amax
)
T
(i)
0
≥ 2nT (i)0 .
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It follows from the inequality |[ti, ti + Ti)| ≥ 2nT (i)0 that there exists an
interval I3 := [t3, t3 +W ) ⊂ [ti, ti+Ti) that satisfies the following conditions:
(i) 0 ≤ t mod T (i)0 < W ,
(ii) 0 ≤ t3 − ti < T (i)0 .
There are three cases that may occur: Case 1: M
(j)
1 (τ
j
i (t)) = 0, for all
[t3, t3 + W ). In this case, set tw := t3. It follows from condition (i) that for
all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ) we have,
M
(j)
1 (τ
j
i (t)) = 0,
M
(i)
1 (t) = 1.
In addition, we clearly have [tw, tw+W ) ⊂ [ti, ti+Ti). Case 2: M (j)1 (τ ji (t)) 6=
0 for some t ∈ [t3, t3 + W ). More specifically, there exists an interval I2 :=
[t2, t2 + W ) such that 0 ≤ t mod T (j)0 < W for all t ∈ I2 and [t2, t2 + W ) ∩
[τ ji (t3), τ
j
i (t3 +W )) 6= ∅.
In this case, let tw := t3 + ciT
(i)
0 . It follows from Lemma 3.2.10 that for all
t ∈ [τ ji (tw), τ ji (tw +W ):
M
(i)
1 (t) = 1,
M
(j)
1 (τ
j
i (t)) = 0.
Clearly tw ≥ t3 ≥ ti. We also can show that tw + W < ti + Ti due to the
following sequence of inequalities:
tw +W = t3 + ciT
(i)
0 +W
= ti + T
(i)
0 + ciT
(i)
0 +W
< ti + T
(i)
0 + T
(i)
0
= ti + 2T
(i)
0
< ti + 2T
(n)
0
< ti + 2
dnamaxe+ 2
amax
T
(n)
0
= ti +
2Tn,1
amax
= ti +
T0,2
amax
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≤ ti + aijT0,2
≤ ti + aijTj−1,2
≤ ti + Ti.
Therefore [tw, tw + W ) ⊂ [ti, ti + Ti). Case 3: M (j)1 (τ ji (t)) 6= 0 for all
t ∈ [t3, t3 + W ). More specifically, there exists an interval I2 := [t2, t2 + W )
such that cjT
(j)
0 ≤ t mod T (j)0 < cjT (j)0 + W for all t ∈ I2 and [τ ij(t2), τ ij(t2 +
W )) ∩ [t3, t3 +W ) 6= ∅.
In this case let tw := t3 + ciT
(i)
0 . It follows from Lemma 3.2.11 that for all
t ∈ [tw, tw +W ):
M
(i)
1 (t) = 1,
M
(j)
1 (τ
j
i (t)) = 0.
Clearly tw ≥ t3 ≥ ti. We also can show that tw + W < ti + Ti due to the
following sequence of inequalities:
tw +W = t3 + ciT
(i)
0 +W
≤ ti + T (i)0 + ciT (i)0 +W
< ti + 2T
(i)
0
= ti + 2T
(n)
0
= ti + 2
dnamaxe+ 2
amax
T
(n)
0
= ti +
2Tn,1
amax
= ti +
T0,2
amax
≤ ti + aijT0,2
≤ ti + aijTj−1,2
= ti + Ti.
Therefore [tw, tw +W ) ⊂ [ti, ti+Ti). It follows that [tw, tw +W ) ⊂ [ti, ti+Ti)
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in all cases and for all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ) we have:
M
(i)
1 (t) = 1,
M
(j)
1 (τ
j
i (t)) = 0,
s
(i,j)
1 (t) = 1,
s
(j,i)
1 (τ
j
i (t)) = 1.
Therefore for all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ) we have:
M
(i)
1 (t)s
(i,j)
1 (t) = 1,
M
(j)
1 (τ
j
i (t))s
(j,i)
1 (τ
j
i (t)) + s
(j,i)
1 (τ
j
i (t)) = 1.
Now we repeat the process when aij > 1. In the following lemma we
show that for any two pairs of nodes i and j, there exists an interval of
time, [ti, ti + Ti) with respect to node i’s clock, in which nodes i and j
are scheduled to communicate with each other using the signals M
(i)
2 (t) and
M
(j)
2 (t) respectively.
Lemma 3.2.13. Suppose i > j. Given t1 such that τ
j
i (t1) ≥ 0, there exists an
interval [ti, ti+Ti) that satisfies the following conditions for all t ∈ [ti, ti+Ti):
[ti, ti + Ti) ⊂ [t1, t1 + Tn,2),
[τ ji (ti), τ
j
i (ti + Ti)) ⊂ [τ ji (t1), τ ji (t1) + Tn,2),
s
(j,i)
2 (τ
j
i (t)) = 1,
s
(i,j)
2 (t) = 1.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is very similar to the proof of Lemma 3.2.9.
First, we consider case one in which a primary pulse generated by node i
collides with a primary pulse generated by node j. We show that there exists
a pulse of length W generated by node i that does not collide with node i.
Lemma 3.2.14. Assume i > j and aij > 1. Let I3 := [t3, t3 + W ) be a
primary pulse of M
(i)
2 (t) with respect to node i’s clock and let I2 := [t2, t2+W )
be a primary pulse of M
(j)
2 (t) with respect to node j’s clock. Suppose the two
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pulses overlap. That is, [t3, t3 + W ) ∩ τ ij([t2, t2 + W )) 6= ∅. Then there
exists a pulse at tw := t3 + kT
(n−i+1)
0 with respect to node i’s clock, where
k =
⌊
1
aji
(
n−j+1
n−i+1
)− W
T
(n−i+1)
0
− W
ajiT
(n−i+1)
0
− cn−i+1
⌋
, that does not overlap with
any pulse of M
(j)
2 (τ
j
i (t)).
Proof. Let i˜ := n − i + 1 and j˜ := n − j + 1. Then I3 is a primary pulse
of M
(˜i)
1 (t) and I2 is a primary pulse of M
(j˜)
1 (t). Set ai˜j˜ := aij. Therefore
aj˜i˜ ≤ 1. We need to show that there exists a pulse at tw := t3 + kT (˜i)0 with
respect to node i˜’s clock that does not overlap with any pulse of M
(j˜)
1 (τ
j˜
i˜
(t)).
This result was already shown in Lemma 3.2.2.
Next we consider case two in which a primary pulse generated by node i
collides with a secondary pulse generated by node j. We show that there
exists a pulse of length W generated by node i that does not collide with
node j.
Lemma 3.2.15. Assume i > j and aij > 1. Let I3 := [t3, t3 + W ) be
a secondary pulse of M
(i)
2 (t) with respect to node i’s clock and let I2 :=
[t2, t2 + W ) be a primary pulse of M
(j)
2 (t) with respect to node j’s clock.
Suppose the two pulses overlap. That is, [t2, t2 + W ) ∩ τ ji ([t3, t3 + W )) 6= ∅.
Then there exists a pulse at tw := t3 + cn−i+1T
(n−i+1)
0 with respect to node i’s
clock that does not overlap with any pulse of M
(j)
2 (τ
j
i (t)).
Proof. Let i˜ := n − i + 1 and j˜ := n − j + 1. Then I3 is a primary pulse
of M
(˜i)
1 (t) and I2 is a primary pulse of M
(j˜)
1 (t). Set ai˜j˜ := aij. Therefore
aj˜i˜ ≤ 1. We need to show that there exists a pulse at tw := t3 + ci˜T (˜i)0 with
respect to node i˜’s clock that does not overlap with any pulse of M
(j˜)
1 (τ
j˜
i˜
(t)).
This result was already shown in Lemma 3.2.3.
Now we prove that node i can successfully transmit a message of length
W to node i when aij < 1. We show, using the previous three lemmas, that
within the interval [ti, ti + Ti) there exists a pulse of length W generated by
node i that does not collide with a pulse generated by node j.
Lemma 3.2.16. Suppose aij > 1 and i > j. Given t1 such that τ
j
i (t1) ≥ 0,
there exists an interval [tw, tw +W ) that satisfies the following conditions for
all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ):
(i) [tw, tw +W ) ⊂ [t1, t1 + Tn,2),
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(ii) [τ ji (tw), τ
j
i (tw + Tn,2)) ⊂ [τ ji (t1) + Tn,2),
(iii) M
(i)
2 (t)s
(i,j)
2 (t) = 1,
(iv) M
(j)
2 (τ
j
i (t))s
(j,i)
2 (τ
j
i (t)) + s
(j,i)
2 (τ
j
i (t)) = 1.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is similar to the proof of Lemma 3.2.12.
We have proved that node i can communicate with node j if aij ≤ 1 and
if aij > 1. Putting both cases together gives us our second theorem; the
orthogonal MAC code enables node i to successfully transmit a message of
length W units to node j within a finite time TMAC(W ) := Tn,2 as long as
the relative skew aij ≤ amax.
Theorem 3.2.2. Without loss of generality, assume i > j. Assume there
exists t1 such that τ
j
i (t1) > 0. There exists an interval [tw, tw + W ) that
satisfies the following conditions for all t ∈ [tw, tw+W ) and some k ∈ {1, 2}:
(i) [tw, tw +W ) ⊂ [t1, t1 + Tn,2),
(ii) [τ ji (tw), τ
j
i (tw +W )) ⊂ [τ ji (t1), τ ji (t1) + Tn,2),
(iii) M
(i)
k (t)s
(i,j)
k (t) = 1,
(iv) M
(j)
k (τ
j
i (t))s
(j,i)
k (τ
j
i (t)) + s
(j,i)
k (τ
j
i (t)) = 1.
Proof. There are two cases to consider: Case 1: aij ≤ 1. It follows from
Lemma 3.2.12 that there exists an interval [tw, tw + W ) that satisfies the
following conditions for all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ):
(i) [tw, tw +W ) ⊂ [t1, t1 + Tn,2),
(ii) [τ ji (tw), τ
j
i (tw +W )) ⊂ [τ ji (t1), τ ji (t1) + Tn,2),
(iii) M
(i)
1 (t)s
(i,j)
1 (t) = 1,
(iv) M
(j)
1 (τ
j
i (t))s
(j,i)
1 (τ
j
i (t)) + s
(j,i)
1 (τ
j
i (t)) = 1.
Case 2: aij > 1. It follows from Lemma 3.2.16 that there exists an interval
[tw, tw +W ) that satisfies the following conditions for all t ∈ [tw, tw +W ):
(i) [tw, tw +W ) ⊂ [t1, t1 + Tn,2),
(ii) [τ ji (tw), τ
j
i (tw +W )) ⊂ [τ ji (t1), τ ji (t1) + Tn,2),
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(iii) M
(i)
2 (t)s
(i,j)
2 (t) = 1,
(iv) M
(j)
2 (τ
j
i (t))s
(j,i)
2 (τ
j
i (t)) + s
(j,i)
2 (τ
j
i (t)) = 1.
The proof of Theorem 3.1.1 follows from Theorem 3.2.2 and Theorem 3.2.1.
3.3 Analysis of the Orthogonal MAC Code Complexity
In this section we analyze the length of the orthogonal MAC code with re-
spect to the size of the message W , the number of nodes n, and the maximum
relative skew amax. The following lemma determines the length of the orthog-
onal MAC code for message of size W .
Lemma 3.3.1. The length of the orthogonal MAC code for a message of size
W is at most TMAC(W ), where TMAC(W ) := (2namax)
9nW and the length is
measured with respect to the local clock.
Proof. The length of the orthogonal MAC code is Tn,2 where Tn,2 is recur-
sively defined in (3.5) by:
Ti,2 := 2amaxnTi−1,2,
where by (3.4),
T0,2 := 2(dnamaxe+ 2)n(32Wn(amax)2).
It follows that for all i ≤ n:
Ti,2 := (2amaxn)
iT0,2
= (2amaxn)
i2(dnamaxe+ 2)n(32Wn(amax)2)
≤ (2amaxn)i2(3namax)n(32Wn(amax)2)
≤ 192(2amaxn)i(namax)3W
≤ (2namax)8(2namax)iW
≤ (2namax)i+8W
≤ (2namax)9nW.
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Therefore Tn,2 ≤ (2namax)9nW and the lemma is proved.
The length of the orthogonal MAC code is doubly exponential in the num-
ber of nodes n; a property that makes this code infeasible to implement for
large values of n. However, in the context of the larger protocol suite de-
scribed in the introduction, the overhead of the orthogonal MAC code can
be mitigated by choosing a data transfer phase on a much larger time-scale.
Hence the orthogonal MAC code plays a critical role in obtaining a theo-
retical result; the existance of a protocol suite that enables a network of
asynchronous nodes to form a fully functioning network operating at near
optimal utility.
In practice, we cannot rely on arbitrarily large data data transfer phases
to hide the overhead of the orthogonal MAC code, so it is worth examining
ways to reduce the code complexity. The construction of s
(i,j)
k (t), which
determines the intervals in which node i corresponds with node j, is designed
to guarantee that an interval in which s
(i,j)
k (t) = 1 overlaps with an interval
in which s
(j,i)
k (τ
j
i (t)) = 1 for all node pairs i and j. We adopted the obvious
approach and made the pulse of s
(i,j)
k (t) more than namax times larger than
the pulse of s
(j,i)
k (t), where i > j. This approach however, leads to the
recursive definition of Ti,2 that is ultimately doubly exponential in n. Any
reduction in the code complexity requires a new and less obvious design of
s
(i,j)
k (t).
In the next chapter we examine another aspect of network formation; ob-
taining an internally consistent view of the clock parameters of each good
node, in a network infiltrated with bad nodes.
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CHAPTER 4
SECURE CLOCK SYNCHRONIZATION
Distributed systems are becoming increasingly ubiquitous due to advances
in wireless technology. In many applications, including even the basic prob-
lem of medium access, these types of systems are required to operate in a
coordinated and timely manner, with the assumption that some reference
clock exists and can be universally accessed. However, in important classes
of distributed systems such as wireless ad-hoc networks, no such reference
clock exists. Instead, each individual node has an affine local clock that is
subject to skew and offset. Furthermore, these clock parameters are usually
unknown and can only be determined by an exchange of timing packets with
a neighbor. Previous work has shown to what extent relative clock param-
eters of adjacent nodes can be used to estimate the clock of a connected
reference node, thus providing every node in the network with an estimate
of a “virtual” reference clock.
In this paper, we consider the problem of clock synchronization in dis-
tributed wireless ad-hoc networks infiltrated with hostile wireless nodes. An
important feature of such networks is that a source node typically requires
the assistance of intermediate nodes to relay and forward a message to a
destination. This feature is especially pertinent in clock synchronization; a
pair of non-adjacent nodes depend on the integrity of the intermediate nodes
connecting them along a path to obtain their relative clock parameters (such
as skew and offset). As a result, malicious nodes have the opportunity to
sabotage network coordination by generating false timing data and relative
clock parameters. This destructive behavior is difficult to pre-empt, particu-
larly when the bad nodes can fully cooperate with each other while the good
nodes do not even know which nodes are good or bad a priori. For example, a
bad node could distort its relative clock parameters ever so slightly, but still
enough to cause the clock estimates to drift causing eventual loss of network
coordination. Similarly, a group of colluding bad nodes could evade detec-
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tion by falsifying their clock parameters in a manner that causes cumulative
damage to the accuracy of the clock estimate, without betraying themselves.
We develop a protocol called consistency check that allows the good nodes
in wireless type of networks to obtain consistent estimates of their relative
clock skews and offsets to within an arbitrary , regardless of what the ma-
licious nodes conspire to do. The key idea is to wait for a sufficiently large
period of time, during which a clock diverges from its estimate. We then
force each node to timestamp and forward a packet within a fixed number
of clock counts, a task that will turn out to be an impossibility if a node has
manipulated or lied about its clock parameters. In addition, we will show
that no amount of collusion between the malicious nodes will prevent at least
one malicious node from being detected.
There is a significant body of published research work concerning the topic
of clock synchronization in the process of Byzantine faults. Both Lamport
[33] and Lundelius [34] present algorithms that work without authentication,
when the number of faulty processes is less than one third the total. It was
shown by Dolev [35] that it is impossible to achieve synchronization without
authentication when more than one third of the processes are faulty. Halpern
[36] presents a clock synchronization algorithm that only requires the non-
faulty processes to be connected. All of these algorithms assume periodic
clock updates from non-faulty processes. In this paper, the network will
obtain the relative clock parameters of the good nodes, thus avoiding the
overhead of periodic resynchronization.
The consistency check is part of a larger protocol suite (not presented in
this paper due to its considerable scope and length) that enables a distributed
network of wireless unsynchronized nodes to form a fully functioning wireless
network operating at a near optimal rate vector, while under sustained and
coordinated attack by the malicious nodes hidden amongst them. This pa-
per is more narrowly focused on the problem of clock synchronization during
the intial stages of network formation, a critical component of the overall
protocol suite. In the next section we describe the problem framework and
assumptions. Subsequently, we present the main result, namely that consis-
tency check allows the network to obtain a uniform and consistent estimate
of a reference clock, to within an arbitrary .
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4.1 Problem Framework and Assumptions
Consider a collection of n wireless nodes, some good and some bad. Each
good wireless node is equipped with a affine local clock, subject to skew and
offset. The good nodes wish to obtain consistent and accurate estimates of
their relative clock parameters, for the purpose of coordinating future activity
according to a reference clock. The focus of this paper is on obtaining reliable
clock parameter estimates between nodes that are not adjacent, and thus
vulnerable to the manipulations of intermediate malicious nodes.
We impose four sets of assumptions concerning the capabilities of all the
wireless nodes in the network. The first set of assumptions characterizes the
physical model of the network. We assume that there is a base communi-
cation rate at which all good nodes can transmit. This communication is
half-duplex, i.e., a node cannot receive and transmit at the same time. Two
nodes are neighbors by definition, if they can decode each others transmis-
sions at base rate while all other nodes are transmitting. We assume that
the sub-graph of good nodes is connected using this definition.
The next set of assumptions describes the clock model. We assume that
associated with each good node i is a local continuous-time clock τ i(t) that
is affine with respect to some global reference time t. That is, τ i(t) = ait +
bi. The parameters ai and bi are called the clock skew and clock offset
respectively.
We also impose a set of assumptions that govern the identities of the good
nodes and bad nodes. We assume that the good nodes do not know a priori
the identities of the good nodes and bad nodes. By contrast, the bad nodes do
know which nodes are good and bad a priori, and are able to fully coordinate
all of their actions without any half-duplex or rate constraints.
The final set of assumptions characterizes the cryptographic capabilities of
the network. We will assume that each node has a private key and a public
key, and the public keys are known to everyone. An encrypted packet cannot
be forged, altered, or tampered with, even if the attacker can decode the
message with the corresponding public key.
Now let aij and bij denote the relative skew and relative offset respectively
of node i with respect to node j, where aij :=
ai
aj
and bij := bi − aijbj. Let
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τ ij(t) denote node i’s clock with respect to node j’s clock t:
τ ij(t) = aijt+ bij.
The relative clock parameters between any connected pair of nodes can be
computed using the corresponding parameters between neighboring nodes on
the connecting path. More precisely, on a path 1, . . . , n, the relative skew
and relative offset between the endpoints an,1 can be computed:
an,1 =
n∏
i=2
ai,i−1 (4.1)
bn,1 =
n∑
i=2
an,ibi,i−1. (4.2)
Suppose that the good nodes are able to directly measure the relative clock
parameters of their neighbors via an exchange of timing packets. In addition,
suppose that each node is able to disseminate its set of measured relative
clock parameters to the rest of the network. This process also non-trivial, is
described in Chapter 5, and requires a combination of the orthogonal MAC
code and the Byzantine General’s Algorithm. Then we can assume that all
of the good nodes have a common topological view, and the same set of
estimates of relative clock parameters between adjacent nodes. Now given a
path 1, . . . , n and the estimates of the relative clock parameters of adjacent
nodes {aˆi,i−1, bˆi,i−1} we can estimate the relative skew and offset between
the endpoints, aˆn,1 and bˆn,1 respectively, using the equations (4.1) and (4.2)
respectively.
Although each good node is connected to every other good node by a path
of good nodes, and each good node has obtained the same set of relative clock
parameters between adjacent nodes, the good nodes still do not have enough
information to obtain accurate estimates of their clocks. A pair of good nodes
may be connected by several paths, of which some may contain bad nodes.
Moreover, bad nodes can generate false clock parameters. The good nodes do
not know a priori which nodes are good or bad and cannot distinguish good
paths from bad paths by the relative clock parameters alone. As a result,
the clock parameter estimates computed along each path connecting a pair
of nodes may differ significantly from one another, without giving any hint
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as to which estimate is correct. We call a clock parameter estimate between
any pair of nodes inconsistent if there exists another path connecting the
same pair of nodes, that gives an estimate that gives a different estimate.
The canonical network that captures this fundamental problem is called an
inconsistent cycle. The two paths of an inconsistent cycle between any pair
of nodes generate clock parameter estimates that differ. As already stated,
it is impossible to determine which path is correct from the set {aˆi,i−1, bˆi,i−1}
alone. The focus of this paper is on resolving this fundamental problem
that prevents a pair of nodes from reliably estimating their relative clock
parameters.
4.2 The Consistency Check
We use a test called the consistency check to remove from the network topol-
ogy at least one link incident to a malicious node in every inconsistent cycle.
Consequently, the paths between any pair of nodes in the new topology will
not generate estimates that differ by more than a. The key idea of the test is
to wait until the false declared clocks and the “actual” clocks have diverged
so extensively, that a malicious node cannot satisfy a delay bound condition
without contradicting a neighbor. We can expect that two good neighbors
will not contradict each other since their relative clock parameters have been
accurately measured and declared. The test is constructed as follows:
Step 1. Each node in the network orders the inconsistent cycles by size
and by node ID (malicious nodes can use any order they choose to, and more
generally a similar exception applies in all the steps below).
Step 2. The network waits for a sufficiently long period of time during
which the gap between the “false” clocks and actual clocks diverge.
Step 3. Without loss of generality, suppose the first cycle in the ordering
consists of the ordered set of nodes 1, . . . , n. Then the leader of the first cycle
designated as the node with the smallest ID, in this case node 1, initiates a
timing packet that traverses the cycle once.
Step 4. Each node i is required to append receive and send timestamps,
ri−1,i and si,i+1 respectively, to the packet before forwarding it to the next
node in the cycle, node i+ 1.
Step 5. Repeat steps 3 and 4 for each inconsistent cycle.
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Step 6. After all inconsistent cycles have been tested, each node broad-
casts to the rest of the network, using the Byzantine General’s algorithm,
the complete set of timing packets that it has forwarded.
Step 7. Each node verifies that every timestamp satisfies two conditions.
The first condition, skew consistency, is that the timestamps {si,i+1, ri−1,i}
satisfy the following for i = 2, . . . , n:
ri−1,i = aˆi,i−1si−1,i + bˆi,i−1.
This condition ensures that the timestamps generated by each pair of neigh-
bors are consistent with their declared relative clock skews and offsets. The
second condition, a delay bound, is that K and the timestamps {si,i+1, ri−1,i}
satisfy the following for i = 2, . . . , n:
si,i+1 − ri−1,i ≤ K. (4.3)
This condition guarantees that each node forwards the timing packet within
K clock counts of receiving it. Any link that does not satisfy both conditions
is removed from the topology.
We will show that given a suitably large enough consistency check start
time, at least one of the two previous conditions will be violated in every
inconsistent cycle. Given a cycle of nodes i1, . . . , im, let a denote the error
of the cycle skew product, and b denote the error of the cycle offset. That
is,
a :=
∣∣∣∣∣aˆ1,im
(
m∏
j=2
aˆij ,ij−1
)
− 1
∣∣∣∣∣
b :=
∣∣∣∣∣
m∑
j=2
aˆi1,ij bˆij ,ij−1
∣∣∣∣∣
We will prove the following theorem:
Theorem 4.2.1. Let Tj be the start-time of the consistency check for the
jth inconsistent cycle, consisting of nodes i1, . . . , im. At least one malicious
node in cycle j will violate a consistency check condition, if Tj satisfies the
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following inequality:
Tj >
aˆim,i∗(m+ 1)K + b
a
, (4.4)
where i∗ is the node with the smallest skew product aˆi∗,i1.
The inequality (4.4) in Theorem 4.2.1 shows that to obtain a small maxi-
mum skew error a induced by malicious nodes, the network must wait pro-
portionally longer. It is impossible to completely eliminate the induced skew
error within a finite time. An unbounded maximum offset error b is also
similarly impossible to eliminate. We begin by first proving Theorem 4.2.1
for a chain network with two good endpoint nodes.
4.3 The Chain Network
Consider a chain network of n nodes 1, . . . , n, where the endpoints of the
chain, node 1 and node n are good, and the intermediate nodes 2, . . . , n− 1
are bad. Note that this network can also be reduced to a cycle of size n− 1
by making both endpoints the same node. We will assume that the two good
endpoints do not know whether or not any of the intermediate nodes are bad.
Now suppose that each pair of adjacent nodes (i, i − 1) for i = 2, . . . , n
has declared a set of relative skews and offsets {aˆi,i−1, bˆi,i−1}, and that each
node in the chain knows this set. The two good nodes wish to determine
whether the declared skews are accurate, that is whether an,1 =
n∏
i=2
aˆi,i−1.
Unfortunately, the good nodes have no way of directly measuring an,1. The
estimate of an,1 is obtained from the skew product itself, which is the very
thing that needs to be verified. So, instead, the good nodes carry out the
consistency check described earlier. After waiting a sufficiently long time,
node 1 initiates a timing packet that traverses the chain from left to right.
Each node in the chain is obligated to forward the packet after appending
receive and timestamps that satisfy the skew consistency and delay bound
conditions.
In order to defeat this test, the bad nodes, having collectively declared
a false set of relative skews and offsets, must support two sets of clocks for
each node i ∈ {2, . . . , n}: a “left” clock τ i,l(t) to generate receive timestamps,
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and a “right” clock τ i,r(t) to generate send-time stamps. Unlike the clocks
of the good nodes, the left and right clocks of the bad nodes need not be
affine with respect to the global reference clock. In fact, the bad nodes are
free to jointly select any set of clocks {τ i,l(t), τ i,r(t), ∀i = 2, . . . , n − 1} that
are arbitrary functions of t, a much larger set than the affine clocks being
emulated. However, we will show that if node 1 waits sufficiently long enough,
there is no set of clocks {τ i,l(t), τ i,r(t), i = 2, . . . , n − 1} that can generate
timestamps which satisfy both conditions of the consistency check.
We will prove the following theorem:
Theorem 4.3.1. Let Ts be the start-time of the consistency check for the
chain network, consisting of nodes 1, . . . , n. At least one malicious node
in the chain will violate a consistency check condition, if Ts satisfies the
following inequality:
Ts >
aˆ1,i∗nK + |bˆn,1 − bn,1|
an,1 − aˆn,1 , (4.5)
where i∗ is the node with the smallest skew product aˆi∗,1.
Note the similarity between Theorem 4.2.1 and Theorem 4.3.1. In both
theorems a smaller desired skew error requires a proportionally longer wait
time in the consistency check.
4.3.1 Proof of the Consistency Check for the Chain Network
Let ri,i−1 and si,i+1 denote the receive and send timestamps generated by a
bad node i with respect to the left and right clocks τ i,l(t) and τ i,r(t) respec-
tively. Let ti,l and ti,r denote the time with respect to the global reference
clock at which the receive and send timestamps respectively are generated
at node i. We have:
ri−1,i := τ i,l(ti,l),
si,i+1 := τ
i,r(ti,r).
Let t1 and tn denote the time with respect to the global reference clock at
which the timing packet was transmitted by node 1 and received by node n
78
respectively. We have:
s1,2 := τ
1(t1),
rn−1,n := τn(tn).
To simplify notation we will define left and right clocks at the endpoints so
that:
t1,r := t1,
tn,l := tn,
and,
τ 1,r(t1,r) := τ
1(t1),
τn,l(tn,l) := τ
n(tn).
In order to prove that both conditions of the consistency check cannot be
satisifed by any set of clocks {τ i,l(t), τ i,r(t), i = 2, . . . , n− 1}, we will assume
that the first condition is satisfied, and show that second must fail. Therefore,
the clocks must satisfy the following for all i = 2, . . . , n:
τ i,l(ti,l) = ai,i−1τ i−1,r(ti−1,r) + bi,i−1. (4.6)
In addition, by virtue of causality, we also have:
τ i,l(ti,l) ≤ τ i,r(ti,r). (4.7)
We will prove that the delay bound condition must be violated if node 1
waits for a sufficiently large period of time before before initiating the tim-
ing packet. That is if τ 1(t1) is sufficiently large, then for some i, we have
τ i,r(ti,r)− τ i,l(ti,l) > K. More precisely, we will show that
n−1∑
i=2
(
τ i,r(ti,r)− τ i,l(ti,l)
)
> nK, (4.8)
which implies that at least one node has violated the delay bound condition.
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The sum
n−1∑
i=2
(
τ i,r(ti,r)− τ i,l(ti,l)
)
cannot be directly evaluated because the
left and right clocks {τ i,l(t), τ i,r(t)} are arbitrary functions of t. However, we
have the following equality by repeated addition and subtraction:
τn,l(tn,l) = τ
1,r(t1,r) +
n∑
i=2
(
τ i,l(ti,l)− τ i−1,r(ti−1,r)
)
+
n−1∑
i=2
(
τ i,l(ti,l)− τ i−1,r(ti−1,r)
)
= τ 1,r(t1,r) + S1 + S2, (4.9)
where
S1 :=
n∑
i=2
(
τ i,l(ti,l)− τ i−1,r(ti−1,r)
)
,
S2 :=
n−1∑
i=2
(
τ i,l(ti,l)− τ i−1,r(ti−1,r)
)
.
The value S2 is the sum of the forwarding delays. We will use (4.6) and (4.7)
to obtain an upper bound on S1. Inserting this upper bound in (4.9) and
using the fact that τn,l(t) and τ 1,r(t) are both affine functions of t, will allow
us to obtain a lower bound on S2. The proof will then follow easily. In the
following lemma, we obtain an upper bound on S1 in the special case where
the forward skew product
j∏
i=2
aˆi,i−1, is greater than 1 for all j ≥ 2.
Lemma 4.3.1. Suppose
j∏
i=2
ai,i−1 ≥ 1 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n. Then the following
inequality holds:
n∑
i=2
(τ i,l(ti,l)− τ i−1,r(ti−1,r)) ≤
(
aˆn,1 − 1
aˆn,1
)
τn,l(tn,l) +
n∑
i=2
bˆi,i−1
aˆi,1
. (4.10)
Proof. We have by definition τn+1,l(tn,l) := aˆn+1,nτ
n,r(tn,r) + bˆn+1,n. For
n = 2, we have:
τ 2,l(t2,l)− τ 1,r(t1,r) =
(
a2,1 − 1
a2,1
)
τ 2,l(t2,l) +
b2,1
a2,1
. (4.11)
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Now assume the lemma is true for n. We will show that it also holds for
n+ 1:
n+1∑
i=2
(τ i,l(ti,l)− τ i−1,r(ti−1,r))
=
n∑
i=2
(τ i,l(ti,l)− τ i−1,r(ti−1,r)) + τn+1,l(tn+1,l)− τn,r(tn,r)
≤
(
aˆn,1 − 1
aˆn,1
)
τn,l(tn,l) +
n∑
i=2
bˆi,i−1
aˆi,1
+ τn+1,l(tn+1,l)− τn,r(tn,r) (4.12)
≤
(
aˆn,1 − 1
aˆn,1
)
τn,r(tn,r) +
n∑
i=2
bˆi,i−1
aˆi,1
+ τn+1,l(tn+1,l)− τn,r(tn,r) (4.13)
=
(
aˆn,1 − 1
aˆn,1
)(
τn+1,l(tn+1,l)− bˆn+1,n
aˆn+1,n
)
+
n∑
i=2
bˆi,i−1
aˆi,1
+
(
aˆn+1,n − 1
aˆn+1,n
)
τˆn+1,l(tn+1,l) +
bˆn+1,n
aˆn+1,n
(4.14)
=
(
aˆn+1,1 − 1
aˆn+1,1
)
τn+1,l(tn+1,l) +
n+1∑
i=2
bˆi,i−1
aˆi,1
, (4.15)
where (4.12) follows from the induction hypothesis in (4.10), (4.13) follows
from the fact that τn,r(tn,r) ≥ τn,l(tn,l) and ai,1 ≥ 1 for all 2 ≤ i ≤ n + 1
(that is, the coefficient aˆi,1− 1 is negative), (4.14) follows by straightforward
substitution, and (4.15) follows by simplification.
We now obtain an upperbound on S1 in the special case where the reverse
skew product
j∏
i=1
aˆn−(i−1),n−i is less than 1 for all j ≥ 1.
Lemma 4.3.2. Suppose
j∏
i=1
an−(i−1),n−i ≤ 1 for all 2 ≤ j ≤ n− 1. Then the
following inequality holds:
j∑
i=1
(τn−(i−1),l(tn−(i−1),l)− τn−i,r(tn−i,r)) ≤ (aˆn,n−j − 1) τn−j,r(tn−j,r) + bˆn,n−1
+
n−1∑
i=n−j+1
aˆn,ibˆi,i−1. (4.16)
Proof. We have by definition τn−(k−1),l(tn−(k−1),l) := aˆn−(k−1),n−kτn−k,r(tn−k,r)+
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bˆn−(k−1),n−k. For j = 1, we have:
τn,l(tn,l)− τn−1,r(tn−1,r) = (an,n−1 − 1)τn−1,r(tn−1,r) + bˆn,n−1.
Now assume the lemma holds for j. We will show that it must hold for j+ 1:
j+1∑
k=1
(τn−(k−1),l(tn−(k−1),l)− τn−k,r(tn−k,r))
=
j∑
k=1
(τn−(k−1),l(tn−(k−1),l)− τn−k,r(tn−k,r)) + τn−j,l(tn−j,l)
− τn−(j+1),r(tn−(j+1),r)
≤ (aˆn,n−j − 1)τn−j,r(tn−j,r) + bˆn,n−1 +
n−1∑
k=n−j+1
aˆn,kbˆk,k−1 + τn−j,l(tn−j,l)
− τn−(j+1),r(tn−(j+1),r) (4.17)
≤ (aˆn,n−j − 1)τn−j,l(tn−j,l) + bˆn,n−1 +
n−1∑
k=n−j+1
aˆn,kbˆk,k−1 + τn−j,l(tn−j,l)
− τn−(j+1),r(tn−(j+1),r) (4.18)
= (aˆn,n−j − 1)
(
aˆn−j,n−(j+1)τn−(j+1),r(tn−(j+1),r) + bˆn−j,n−(j+1)
)
+ bˆn,n−1
+
n−1∑
k=n−j
aˆn,n−kbˆk,k−1 + (aˆn−j,n−(j+1) − 1)τn−(j+1),r(tn−(j+1),r)
+ bn−j,n−(j+1) (4.19)
≤ (aˆn,n−(j+1) − 1)τn−(j+1),r(tn−(j+1),r) + bˆn,n−1 +
n−1∑
k=n−j
aˆn,kbˆk,k−1, (4.20)
where (4.17) follows from the induction hypothesis (4.16), (4.18) follows from
the fact that τ i,l(ti,l) ≤ τ i,r(ti,r) and aˆn,n−j ≤ 1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n − 1
(that is, the coefficient aˆn,n−j − 1 is negative), (4.19) from substitution into
τn−j,l(tn−j,l), and (4.20) from simplification.
We will combine both special cases in Lemma 4.3.1 and Lemma 4.3.2 to
obtain an upper bound on S1. First we define i
∗ as the node with the smallest
skew product aˆi∗,1 in the chain network, that is less than one. That is,
aˆi∗,1 = min
k
aˆk,1 and aˆi∗,1 ≤ 1. If no such node exists, set i∗ = 1.
Now we consider an arbitrary set of skews {aˆi,i−1, i = 2, . . . , n}. In the
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following lemma, we show that if i∗ ≥ 2 then the forward skew product
starting from node i∗ is always greater than 1, and the reverse skew product
starting from node i∗ − 1 is always less than one.
Lemma 4.3.3. If i∗ ≥ 2 then aˆj,i∗ ≥ 1 for all i∗+1 ≤ j ≤ n and aˆi∗,i∗−k+1 ≤ 1
for all 1 ≤ k ≤ i∗. Otherwise, aˆj,1 ≥ 1 for all 2 ≤ j ≤ n.
Proof. Consider the case when i∗ ≥ 2, and suppose the first part of the
assertion is false. That is, for some j′ we have aˆj′i∗ < 1. It follows that
aˆj′1 = aˆj′i∗ aˆi∗1 ≤ aˆi∗1. But then j′ is a node with a smaller skew product aˆj1
than node i∗, which contradicts the definition of i∗. Now suppose that the
second part of the assertion is false. That is, for some j′ we have aˆi∗j′ > 1.
It follows that aˆi∗1 = aˆi∗j′ aˆj′1 ≥ aˆj′1. But then j′ is a node with a smaller
skew product than node i∗, which again contradicts the definition of i∗. Now
consider the case when i∗ = 1. Then by definition of i∗ it follows that aˆj1 ≥ 1
for all 2 ≤ j ≤ n.
We are now ready to obtain an upper bound on S1 for an arbitrary set of
skews.
Lemma 4.3.4. Suppose i∗ ≥ 2. We have the following inequality:
n∑
j=2
τ j,l(tj,l)− τ j−1,r(tj−1,r) ≤ (aˆi∗,1 − 1)τ 1,r(t1,r) +
(
aˆn,i∗ − 1
aˆn,i∗
)
τn,l(tn,l) +
bˆn,1
aˆn,i∗
.
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Proof.
n∑
j=2
τ j,l(tj,l)− τ j−1,r(tj−1,r)
=
i∗∑
j=2
τ j,l(tj,l)− τ j−1,r(tj−1,r) +
n∑
j=i∗+1
τ j,l(tj,l)− τ j−1,r(tj−1,r) (4.21)
= (aˆi∗,1 − 1)τ 1,r(t1,r) + bˆi∗,i∗−1 +
i∗∑
j=2
aˆi∗,j bˆj,j−1 +
(
aˆn,i∗ − 1
aˆn,i∗
)
τn,l(tn,l)
+
n∑
i=i∗+1
bˆi,i−1
aˆi,i∗
(4.22)
= (aˆi∗,1 − 1)τ 1,r(t1,r) +
(
aˆn,i∗ − 1
aˆn,i∗
)
τn,l(tn,l) +
n∑
j=2
aˆn,j bˆj,j−1
aˆn,i∗
(4.23)
= (aˆi∗,1 − 1)τ 1,r(t1,r) +
(
aˆn,i∗ − 1
aˆn,i∗
)
τn,l(tn,l) +
bˆn,1
aˆn,i∗
, (4.24)
where (4.22) follows by applying Lemma 4.3.2 and Lemma 4.3.1 to the first
and second sums respectively in the right-hand side of (4.21), (4.23) follows
by multiplying the terms in each summation by
aˆn,i∗
aˆn,i∗
and simplifying, and
(4.24) follows from the definitions of bˆij and dˆ
(i)
ji .
Now that we have an upper bound on S1, we can use (4.9) to obtain a
lower bound on S2, the sum of the forwarding delays. The following lemma
gives the lower bound on S2:
Lemma 4.3.5. The sum of the forwarding delays in the chain network sat-
isfies the following inequality:
n−1∑
j=2
(
τ j,l(tj,l)− τ j,r(tj,r)
) ≥ (an,1 − aˆn,1)
aˆn,i∗
τ 1,r(t1,r) +
(bn,1 − bˆn,1)
aˆn,i∗
.
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Proof.
n−1∑
j=2
(
τ j,l(tj,l)− τ j,r(tj,r)
)
= τn,l(tn,l)− τn,r(tn,r)−
n∑
j=2
τ j,l(tj,l)− τ j−1,r(tj−1,r) (4.25)
≥ τn,l(tn,l)− τn,r(tn,r)− (aˆi∗,1 − 1)τ 1,r(t1,r)−
(
aˆn,i∗ − 1
aˆn,i∗
)
τn,l(tn,l)
− bˆn,1
aˆn,i∗
(4.26)
=
τn,l(tn,l)
aˆn,i∗
− aˆi∗,1τ 1,r(t1,r)− bˆn,1
aˆn,i∗
(4.27)
≥ τ
n,l(t1,r)
aˆn,i∗
− aˆi∗,1τ 1,r(t1,r)− bˆn,1
aˆn,i∗
(4.28)
=
an,1τ
1,r(t1,r) + bn,1
aˆn,i∗
− aˆi∗,1τ 1,r(t1,r)− bˆn,1
aˆn,i∗
(4.29)
=
(an,1 − aˆn,1)
aˆn,i∗
τ 1,r(t1,r) +
(bn,1 − bˆn,1)
aˆn,i∗
, (4.30)
where (4.25) follows by noting from repeated addition and subtraction that
τn,l(tn,l) = τ
1,r(t1,r)+
n∑
j=2
(
τ j,l(tj,l)− τ j−1,r(tj−1,r)
)
+
n−1∑
j=2
(
τ j,l(tj,l)− τ j,r(tj,r)
)
,
(4.26) follows by applying Lemma 4.3.4 to the sum on the right-hand side
of (4.25), (4.27) follows from simplification, (4.28) follows from the fact that
tn,l ≥ t1,r since node n could not have received the timing packet before
node 1 transmitted it, (4.29) follows from the assumption that node n’s
clock is relatively affine with respect to node 1’s clock, and (4.30) follows by
simplification.
We are now ready to complete the proof of the consistency check for a
chain network. We show that if the start time of the consistency check is
sufficiently large, and the set of left and right clocks {τ i,l(ti,l), τ i,r(ti,r)} satisfy
the parameter consistency condition, then at least one node will violate the
delay bound condition. Hence there is no set of left and right clocks that can
pass both conditions of the consistency check if the start time is large.
Proof. We will assume that node 1 is a good node. Now it follows directly
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from rearranging (4.5) that:
(an,1 − aˆn,1)
aˆn,i∗
τ 1,r(t1,r) +
(bn,1 − bˆn,1)
aˆn,i∗
> nK. (4.31)
But by Lemma 4.3.5 the LHS of the inequality above is the lower bound
of the sum of the delays in the chain,
n∑
j=2
(
τ j,l(tj,l)− τ j,r(tj,r)
)
. By direct
substitution into (4.31), it follows that:
n∑
j=2
(
τ j,l(tj,l)− τ j,r(tj,r)
)
> nK. (4.32)
It follows from (4.32) that for some malicious node j ∈ {2, . . . , n} we have
τ j,l(tj,l)− τ j,r(tj,r) > K which violates the delay bound condition.
4.4 The General Network and Other Extensions
We now extend the proof of Theorem 4.3.1 for the chain network to Theorem
4.2.1 for the cycle. By assumption, the subgraph of good nodes in the network
is connected, so that every pair of good nodes is connected by a path of good
nodes. Any pair of nodes with two inconsistent paths corresponds directly
to an inconsistent cycle. Moreover, a cycle is just a special case of a chain
network with the same node for both endpoints. As a result, the proof of
Theorem 4.2.1 follows naturally from Theorem 4.3.1 by setting node 1 equal
to node n and noting that bn,1 = 0 (the relative offset of a clock with respect
to itself is zero) and an,1 = 1 (the relative skew of a clock with respect
to itself is one). If we remove a link incident to a malicious node from
every inconsistent cycle, then the resulting topology will only contain paths
that generate unique or consistent estimates of the relative clock parameters
between any pair of good nodes. Since each pair of good nodes is connected
by a path of good nodes, these parameter estimates will be correct, which
is the desired result. In this broader context, it is also unnecessary to make
any assumptions about the integrity of the cycle leader; a consistency check
that fails to detect a malicious node in an inconsistent cycle, by reverse
implication, exposes the leader of the cycle as a malicious node.
There are several other generalizations that could be made. In our analysis
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we neglected to account for the effect of transmission and processing delays
on the packet arrival times. Fortunately, this delay can be easily included in
the model with an additional term. If d
(i)
ji is the packet delay from node j to
node i with respect to node i’s clock, then we have:
rji = aijsji + bij + d
(i)
ji ,
where rji and sji are the receive and send times respectively of a packet
transmitted from node j to node i. It is clear that the packet delay behaves
like an offset. Carrying through with the computations in the consistency
check proof adds an extra term in the numerator of (4.4).
Another topic that deserves clarification is the computation of the rela-
tive clock parameters {aˆij, bˆij} between adjacent nodes i and j. We have so
far assumed that these parameters could be measured by exchanging times-
tamps. However, a fundamental result of clock synchronization dictates that
the relative offset bˆij cannot always be measured precisely in this manner.
We can avoid having to deal with this problem if the relative skew and offset
between adjacent nodes is uniformly bounded. Under these circumstances,
the expression b in theorem 4.2.1 is also bounded. The proof of the consis-
tency check continues to hold with a slight modification; we simply check the
parameter consistency condition with the declared skew aˆij and any relative
offset bˆij that satisfies the bound.
We did not address the issue of packet size in our analysis. The clock
parameters {ai, bi} and the global reference clock t, are all assumed to be
continuous-valued quantities. In practice though, timestamps and timing
packets are of finite size, and clocks produce discrete quantized readings. As
a result, the measured relative skew and offset will be subject to quantization
error. Fortunately, this error does not disturb the consistency check, which
in any case can only verify relative skews to within an . We can reduce the
quantization error to within , by expanding the period of time over which
the relative clock parameters are measured. As a result, the consistency
check can be sucessfully implemented with packets of finite size.
Finally, there remains the problem of implementing the consistency check
prior to clock synchronization. To carry out the test, each node in an incon-
sistent cycle must forward a timing packet in coordination with its neighbors,
but without access to a common reference time. The only way to complete
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this task is by assigning increasingly larger intervals to each stage of the
test. If the maximum relative skew and offset between any pair of nodes are
bounded, then an appropriate choice of interval will ensure that enough time
has been allocated to complete a given stage of the consistency check. We
use such a schedule in Chapter 5, to enable a collection of unsynchronized,
half-duplex nodes infiltrated by attackers to establish a common reference
clock.
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CHAPTER 5
THE PROTOCOL FOR BOUNDED BIRTH
TIMES
In this chapter we provide a framework for a comprehensive approach to
security. One of the goals in this chapter is to develop protocols for wireless
networks that are secure in a model describing the capabilities of the hostile
adversary nodes. In fact one would like to aim even higher and additionally
achieve optimal performance in this guaranteed security context. By doing
so, one can take into consideration a throughput-based utility function for
the conforming source-destination pairs, and consider a zero-sum game where
the hostile nodes attempt to minimize the utility accruing to the conforming
nodes, while the good nodes attempt to maximize it. Another goal of this
chapter is to obtain an -optimal performance in this setting.
We recall that we start with a set of nodes, some good and some bad, where
the good nodes do not know which are the bad nodes, while the bad nodes
know everything. We describe the complete suite of protocols required for
the entire lifetime of the network, beginning with the primordial birth of the
nodes, and ending with a fully functioning network carrying data and thereby
providing utility. The good nodes follow the specified protocols, while the
bad nodes can attempt to disrupt anything and everything, including both
the network formation process as well as its functioning, by taking any ac-
tions within their capabilities. The bad nodes can, for example, refrain from
relaying a packet, advertise a wrong hop count, advertise a wrong logical
topology, cause packet collisions, behave uncooperatively vis-a-vis medium
access, disrupt attempts at cooperative scheduling, drop an ACK refuse to
acknowledge a neighbor’s handshake, behave inconsistently, or jam, by which
we mean use their transmit power to emit noise, etc. We further assume that
the bad nodes are capable of perfect collaboration. Thus one can view the
problem as a zero-sum game, where the maximization of the utility function
takes place over the suite of protocols that are followed by the good nodes,
while the bad nodes attempt to minimize the utility over all, what may be
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called, Byzantine behaviors. In such games, since the protocol announce-
ment takes place first, one seeks the“Max-Min” of the utility function. We
will show the stronger result that we can nearly achieve the “Min-Max” util-
ity, i.e., there is a saddle-point. In fact, we show an even stronger result,
that the bad nodes may just as well restrict their actions to jamming and/or
conforming to the protocol on each concurrent transmission set, and other
Byzantine behaviors do not further reduce the accrued utility. By implica-
tion, our protocol is immune to the wormhole attack, the rushing attack,
the “partial deafness” attack, the routing loop attack, the routing black hole
attack, the network partition attack, and the blacklist attack mentioned at
the onset of thie section, as well as any other attacks that conform to our
model but have yet to be discovered.
Our approach is based on the model formally laid out in Chapter 2, describ-
ing the capabilities of good and bad nodes, and the wireless communication
system. Within this framework, we develop the security and performance
optimality results described above. The results are therefore only valid if
the assumptions underlying the model are valid. By introducing capabilities
outside the model, one can attack our protocols. However, the arms race
process would have shifted from specific attacks and patches to models and
capabilities, which is a sounder and more comprehensive and satisfactory
approach to security. Nevertheless, the modeling assumptions can indeed be
attacked, and in the Chapter 6 we specifically bring attention to assumptions
that we would like to generalize. We now describe the main results.
5.1 The Main Result
Denote by xsi,di the throughput obtained by an apparently “good” source-
destination pair (si, di). Suppose that when there are N such pairs, the
derived utility to the network is U(xs1,d1 , . . . , xsN ,dN ), where U is a continuous
function. This utility is only evaluated over the source-destination pairs that
are not detected by any good node as not conforming to the protocol. The
objective of the protocol is to maximize the utility over the feasible rate
vectors (xs1,d1 , xs2,d2 , . . . , xsn,dn) that the network can sustain.
We now consider the game where the bad nodes wish to minimize this util-
ity over all the Byzantine behaviors, while the good nodes wish to maximize
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it over all the protocols. Suppose that the bad nodes decide to “disable” one
or more concurrent transmission sets in order to reduce the set of feasible
throughput vectors. A concurrent transmission set is disabled by definition,
if any destination node in the set does not receive a scheduled packet. There
are many reasons why such a packet failed to arrive: the bad nodes could
have jammed, refused to transmit, or deployed more sophisticated attacks.
We will lump all these possibilities under the rubric of Byzantine attacks.
We assign a label “non-functional” to each disabled concurrent transmission
set. Let N denote the set of concurrent transmission sets labeled “non-
functional.” For each rate vector of a concurrent transmission set pii, let γi
denote the proportion of time allocated to pii, where γi ≥ 0 and
∑
i 6∈N
γi = 1.
The vector γ represents a time-share of the concurrent transmission sets.
Therefore the vector of link level rates z can be determined using the formula∑
i 6∈N
γipii = z. Let yp denote the throughput carried by a source-destination
path. For each link (n,m), {yp} must satisfy
∑
p:(n,m)∈p
yp = zn,m. That is, the
sum of throughput rates that use link (n,m) cannot exceed the capacity of
the link. The total throughput xsi,di for the source-destination pair (si, di)
is xsi,di =
∑
p:p∈(si,di)
yp. Now the utility function U(x) can be rewritten as
U(N, γ); a function of the labeling of concurrent transmission sets N , and
the time-share vector γ.
We will show that the protocol suite achieves to within a factor (1− ):
min
bad nodes labeling of
concurrent transmission sets
N
max
good nodes time-sharing
of concurrent transmission sets
γ
U(N, γ). (5.1)
Our main result, elaborated on in Theorem 5.3.2, is:
Theorem 5.1.1. Consider a network that satisfies the assumptions (P), (N),
(CL) and (CR). Given an arbitrary , where 0 <  < 1, the protocol described
in Section 5.2 achieves, to within a factor (1− ), the utility (5.1).
The reader may wonder: Why do we even need a notion of “time”? The
answer is twofold. First, without a notion of time, we cannot even speak of
throughput, and the utility functions we consider are based on the through-
puts of source-destination pairs. Second, the strategy we adopt uses local
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clocks to schedule transmissions and coordinate activity. Even in current
protocols, the usage of time-cum-event driven scheduling is quite common,
e.g., time-outs in MAC and transport protocols.
On the other hand, the dependence on distributed synchronized clocks for
coordinated activity opens yet another avenue for bad nodes to sabotage
the protocol; by interfering with the very clock synchronization algorithm
that enables coordination in the first place. It follows that the results above
require an approach to security that is both comprehensive and holistic, in
order to prevent cross-layer attacks. For example, a large divergence between
two nodes’ estimates of a common reference clock may cause their scheduled
time-slots to overlap, a phenomenon that can only be avoided by separating
the time-slots with appropriately large dead-times. However this solution
inflicts a loss on the effective data throughput, which in turn diminishes the
network utility. Consequently, any attack that undermines clock synchroniza-
tion also affects the network utility and the network security. Conversely, a
loss of network security may also impact clock synchronization and network
utility. Therefore topics like scheduling, clock synchronization, utility max-
imization, and security are all deeply interrelated, especially in the context
of security, since an attack on one area may reverberate elsewhere. As a
result, we need a holistic approach that instead of patching against identified
attacks in a reactionary manner, jointly addresses all these issues at every
stage of the operating lifetime from startup to completion and guarantees
overall security.
5.2 The Phases of the Protocol Suite
The overall protocol is designed to take the network from startup to near
utility optimal functioning. It consists of six phases: neighbor discovery,
network discovery, scheduling, data transfer, and verification.
The first phase governs the network behavior immediately after birth, when
each node needs to discover its neighbors. Such a process calls for a two-way
handshake. But in this environment, the nodes are unsynchronized, and so all
two-way transmissions between nodes are liable to suffer from the limitations
of half-duplex capability, or mutual collision. To resolve the problem, we use
the orthogonal MAC protocol in Chapter 2 that works even when the local
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clocks tick at different and unknown rates.
After the two-way handshake, the nodes attempt to learn their relative
clock parameters. However, here we encounter fundamental limitations to
clock synchronization [28], [37], [29], namely that the nodes cannot distin-
guish clock offsets from delays. Our protocol will work within this restrictive
environment.
In the next phase, the nodes attempt to form a network in the presence of
malicious nodes with Byzantine behavior. We develop a protocol that enables
the good nodes to form a common topological view, regardless of whether
the bad nodes lie about their neighborhood or otherwise attempt to sabotage
the process. The good nodes are also able to decide on a common view of
the reference time, again in the face of coordinated attacks and inconsistent
or false timing data generated by the malicious nodes.
Having synchronized to a common reference time, and decided on a com-
mon topology, the nodes then determine a schedule for data transmission.
A schedule simply specifies which set of nodes should concurrently transmit,
or more precisely which set of links should be simultaneously active, at any
given time, i.e., time-indexed concurrent transmission sets. At this point,
some of the attackers who seemingly cooperated in the initial phases, may
choose to stop cooperating and/or actively undermine the transfer of data.
To counter this behavior the protocol enables the good nodes to reliably
broadcast any recorded failures to the rest of the network. The schedule is
then modified appropriately and the network begins data transfer anew.
We design the protocol to ensure that the loss of failed data transfer phases
can be amortized over the entire finite network operating lifetime and made
arbitrarily small. As the network repeatedly iterates through the scheduling-
data-verification phases, the clock estimates begin to drift. This drift poses
problems of its own and must be taken into account when determining the
schedule and computing the achieved utility. We choose tolerance bands
around each scheduled action of sufficient length to prevent collisions but
ensure  optimality.
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5.2.1 The Orthogonal MAC Code
For convenience, we summarize here the relevant conclusions from Chapter 3
concerning the orthogonal MAC code. The network consists of asynchronous,
half-duplex wireless nodes. Given any pair of nodes, the orthogonal MAC
code specifies the time intervals with respect to their local clocks, in which
each node should transmit or listen to the other node. It guarantees that
within a fixed-time time interval the condition for successful communication
between half-duplex nodes is satisfied.
The orthogonal MAC code for each node i is composed of two funda-
mental two-pulse waveforms, a “primary” pulse M
(i)
1 (t) and a “secondary”
pulse M
(i)
2 (t) which, given another node j, are designed to guarantee non-
overlapping transmit slots for both nodes when node i’s clock is relatively
slower (aij ≤ 1) or faster (aij > 1) than node j’s clock respectively. The
period of each waveform M
(i)
1 (t) and M
(i)
2 (t) is denoted by T
(i)
0 and T
(n−i+1)
0
respectively, where T
(i)
0 are defined by T0 := 32Wna
2
max, and T
(i)
0 := iT0.
The waveforms M
(i)
1 (t) and M
(i)
2 (t) contain two pulses of width W that are
separated by a distance unique to node i. We use the parameter ci to define
the position of the secondary pulse in the waveform, where ci :=
1
amax(5n−i) .
They are defined by
M
(i)
1 (t) :=

1 0 ≤ t mod T (i)0 < W
0 W ≤ t mod T (i)0 < ciT (i)0
1 ciT
(i)
0 ≤ t mod T (i)0 < ciT (i)0 +W
0 ciT
(i)
0 +W ≤ t mod T (i)0 < T (i)0 ,
M
(i)
2 (t) := M
(n−i+1)
1 (t).
In addition, the orthogonal MAC code partitions time (as measured by
each node’s local clock), into communication slots, two of which are assigned
to every other node in the network. The length of the communication slots
created by node i is denoted by Ti−1,2, where T0,2 := 2(dnamaxe+ 2)T (n)0 , and
Ti,2 := 2amaxnTi−1,2. In each communication slot, node i uses one of the two
square-pulse waveforms M
(i)
1 (t) or M
(i)
2 (t) to determine the mode (transmit
or receive) at time t. The square-pulse function s
(i,j)
k (t), k = 1, 2, indicates
to node i whether at local time t it is currently in the communication slot
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assigned to node j and M
(i)
k (t). The function s
(i,j)
k (t), k = 1, 2, is defined as
s
(i,j)
k (t) :=

1 Tsk − Ti−1,2 ≤ t mod Ts < Tsk , i < j
1 Tsk ≤ t mod Ts < Tsk + Ti−1,2, i > j
0 else,
where Ts1 := (j − 1)Ti−1,2, Ts2 := (n − 1)Ti−1,2 + (j − 1)Ti−1,2, and Ts :=
2(n− 1)Ti−1,2.
If node i wishes to transmit a message of size W to node j then it transmits
its message during every time interval in which s
(i,j)
k (t) = 1 and M
(i)
k (t) = 1.
Whether M
(i)
k (t) is equal to 1 or 0 determines if node i is in transmit or
receive mode; see Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The Orthogonal MAC Code for Node i
procedure TxRxMAC(SN ,RN )
for j ∈ N do
for k = 1, 2 do
if s
(i,j)
k (t) = 1 and M
(i)
k (t) = 1 then
Transmit(Sj)
else if s
(i,j)
k (t) = 1 and M
(i)
k (t) = 0 then
Receive(Rj)
end if
end for
end for
end procedure
Theorem 5.2.1. Suppose node i transmits a message of size W to j using
the orthogonal MAC code TxRxMAC(·). Node j is guaranteed to successfully
receive the message if both nodes simultaneously engage the algorithm for an
interval of at least TMAC(W ) := Tn,2 units with respect to their local clocks.
5.2.2 The Neighbor Discovery Phase
As noted earlier, without loss of generality we assume that the first good
node turns on at time t = 0, and all other good nodes follow within U0 time
units. Each node enters neighbor discovery phase immediately upon start-
up. This is the initial phase in a longer process of discovering the identities
and clock parameters of all the nodes in the network. Each node uses the
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orthogonal MAC code TxRxMAC(·) to reliably exchange messages of size W
with other nodes within a fixed time TMAC(W ).
In the first two steps, each node i attempts a handshake with a neighbor
node j by broadcasting a probe packet PRBij and waiting for an acknowl-
edgment ACKji. The probe packet contains an identity certificate signed by
a central authority. Given Ni := {1, . . . , n}\i, we use
TxRxMAC(PRBi→Ni ,PRBNi→i) to indicate that node i transmits PRBi to
each node j ∈ Ni via the orthogonal MAC code, and receives PRBj from
each node j ∈ Ni. If a probe packet is not received from some node j, then
j is removed from Ni using the procedure Update(Ni).
Next, node i transmits an acknowledgment ACKij to node j containing a
signed confirmation of the received probe packet PRBj. Node i also listens
for an acknowledgment ACKji from node j. Node i removes from Ni any
nodes that failed to return acknowledgments.
Then node i transmits to each node j ∈ N a pair of timing packets TIM (1)i,j
and TIM
(2)
j,i that contain the send-times s
(1)
ij and s
(2)
ij respectively as recorded
by its local clock τ j(t). Node i also receives a corresponding pair of timing
packets TIM
(1)
i,j and TIM
(2)
j,i from node j, and records the corresponding
receive-times r
(1)
ji and r
(2)
ji respectively, as measured by the local clock τ
i(t).
Any node that fails to deliver timing packets to node i is removed from Ni.
The timing packets are used to estimate the relative skew aji by aˆji =
r
(2)
ji −r(1)ji
s
(2)
ji −s(1)ji
.
The relative skew is used at the end of the network discovery phase, to
estimate a reference clock with respect to the local continuous-time clock.
In the last two steps node i creates a link certificate LNK
(1)
ij containing the
computed relative clock skew with respect to node j, and transmits this link
to node j using the orthogonal MAC code. Node i also listens for a similar
link certificate LNK
(2)
ji from node j.
Finally, node i verifies and signs the received link certificate, and trans-
mits the authenticated version LNK
(2)
ij back to node j. Node i listens for a
similar authenticated link certificate LNK
(2)
ji from node j. Any nodes that
fail to return link certificates are removed from the set Ni. This set now
represents the nodes in the neighborhood of node i with whom node i has
established mutually authenticated link certificates. The neighbor discovery
phase’s pseudocode is shown in Algorithm 2.
One problem is that the algorithm must be completed in a partially co-
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ordinated manner even the nodes are asynchronous; the completion of any
stage depends on the successful completion of the previous stages by all
other good nodes. Consequently, we assign increasingly larger intervals
Sk := [tk, tk+1), k = 1, . . . 6 to each successive protocol stage; see Section 5.3.
At the conclusion of the neighbor discovery phase, node i has determined
the identity and relative clock parameters of each node in Ni, and included
this data in a mutually authenticated link certificate.
Algorithm 2 The Neighbor Discovery Phase
procedure NeighborDiscovery
Ni := {1, . . . , n} \ i
while t ∈ S1 do
TxRxMAC(PRBi→Ni ,PRBNi→i)
Update(Ni)
end while
while t ∈ S2 do
TxRxMAC(ACKi→Ni ,ACKNi→i)
end while
while t ∈ S3 do
TxRxMAC(TIM
(1)
i→Ni ,TIM
(1)
Ni→i)
Update(Ni)
end while
while t ∈ S4 do
TxRxMAC(TIM
(2)
i→Ni ,TIM
(2)
Ni→i)
Update(Ni)
end while
while t ∈ S5 do
TxRxMAC(LNK
(1)
i→Ni ,LNK
(1)
Ni→i)
Update(Ni)
end while
while t ∈ S6 do
TxRxMAC(LNK
(2)
i→Ni ,LNK
(2)
Ni→i)
Update(Ni)
end while
end procedure
5.2.3 The Network Discovery Phase
The purpose of this next phase is to allow the good nodes to obtain a common
view of the network topology and consistent estimates of all the other clock
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parameters. To accomplish this, the good nodes must broadcast their lists
of neighbors to the rest of the network, and decide on the same view of
the topology. The difficulty of this endeavor is that the good nodes do not
know a priori which of the other nodes are good or bad. Consequently, bad
nodes have the opportunity to selectively drop lists or introduce false lists
with the aim of preventing consensus. We resolve this problem by using a
version of the Byzantine General’s algorithm of [38]. This requires an EIG
tree data structure. Let Ti denote node i’s EIG tree, which by construction
has depth n. The root of Ti is labeled with node i’s neighborhood, that is,
the nodes in Ni and the corresponding collection of link certificates. First
node i transmits to every node j ∈ Nj in its neighborhood, the list of nodes
in Ni and corresponding link certificates, while receiving similar lists from
each node in Nj. Node i updates its EIG tree with the newly received lists
from its neighbors, by assigning each received list to a unique child vertex
of the root of Ti. Node i then transmits the set of level 1 vertices of Ti to
every node in its neighborhood, receiving a set of level 1 vertcies from each
neighbor in turn. The EIG tree Ti is updated again. This process continues
through all n levels of the EIG tree. All communication is via the orthogonal
MAC code.
The notation T
(k)
i in Algorithm 3 indicates the k-level vertices of the EIG
tree Ti. The notation TxRxMAC(T
(k)
i→Ni , T
(k)
Ni→i) indicates that, using the
orthogonal MAC code, node i transmits T
(k)
i to each node j ∈ Ni, and
receives T
(k)
j from each node j ∈ Ni.
We use the procedure UPDATE(Ti), to update the EIG tree Ti after the
arrival of new information, and the procedure DECIDE(Ti) to infer the net-
work topology based on the EIG tree. The n-stage EIG algorithm guarantees
that if the subgraph of good nodes is connected, then each good node will
decide on the same topological view.
5.2.4 The Consistency Check Phase
For convenience, we summarize here the results of Chapter 4 concerning
the consistency check protocol. We recall that the fundamental difficulty
is that any malicious nodes along the path 1, . . . , n may have generated
false timestamps in the neighbor discovery phase, and thus corrupted the
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Algorithm 3 The EIG Byzantine General’s Algorithm
procedure EIGByzMAC(Ni)
T
(0)
i := Ni
for k = 1, . . . n do
while t ∈ S6+k do
TxRxMAC(T
(k)
i→Ni , T
(k)
Ni→i)
Update(Ti)
end while
end for
Decide(Ti)
end procedure
measured relative skews between adjacent nodes. Although, by assumption,
every pair of good nodes (i, j) in the network is connected by at least one
path of good nodes, there may be other connecting paths infiltrated by bad
nodes that generate different values for the relative skew. It is impossible to
determine the correct path from the relative skews alone. A pair of paths that
generate different relative skews between the same pair of nodes corresponds
to an inconsistent cycle; a cycle in which the skew product is not equal to
one. We use the Consistency Check algorithm to identify the path that has
generated the correct relative skew.
The consistency check works by circling a timing packet around every cycle
in which the skew product differs from one by more than a, where a is the
desired maximum skew error caused by malicious nodes. At the conclusion of
the test, at least one link with a malicious endpoint will be removed from the
cycle, thereby eliminating a connecting path. During the test, each node in
such a cycle is obliged to append a receive timestamp and a send timestamp
generated by the local clock before forwarding the packet to the next node.
These timestamps must satisfy a delay bound condition; the send time and
receive time cannot differ by more than 1 clock count. A node fails the
consistency check if its send and receive timestamps differ by more than one
clock count, or if its timestamps do not agree with its declared relative skew.
The key idea is that if the test starts after a sufficiently large amount of time
has elapsed, the clock estimates based on the faulty relative skews will have
diverged so extensively from the actual clocks that at least one malicious
node in the cycle will find it impossible to generate timestamps that are
consistent with its declared relative clock skew, and satisfy the delay bound
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condition.
Theorem 5.2.2. Let Tj be the start-time of the consistency check for the j
th
inconsistent cycle, consisting of nodes i1, . . . , im. At least one malicious node
in cycle j will violate a consistency check condition, if Tj >
aˆim,i∗ (m+1)K+b
a
where i∗ is the node with the smallest skew product aˆi∗,i1.
Algorithm 4 depicts the consistency check. Given a cycle j, k and m denote
nodes that follow and precede node i respectively in the cycle. If node i is the
leader of the cycle, i.e., the node with smallest ID, then node i initiates the
timing packet that traverses the cycle and transmits it to node k. Otherwise,
node i waits for the timing packet to arrive from node m before forwarding
it to node k.
Algorithm 4 Consistency Check Algorithm at Node i
procedure ConsistencyCheck
START := (n+1)(amax)
n+1+(n+1)(amax)n+1U0
a
for each cycle Cj do
k =Next(Cj)
m =Prev(Cj)
if i=Leader(Cj) and t ≥ START then
Transmit(TIMi→k)
else if i ∈ Cj then
Receive(TIMm→i)
Transmit(TIMi→k)
end if
end for
end procedure
After all inconsistent cycles have been tested, each node i broadcasts the
set of all timing packets Ti it received to other nodes in the network. The
network uses the EIG algorithm to ensure a common view of the timing
packets generated. Each node removes from the topology any link whose
endpoints generate timestamps inconsistent with its declared relative skew
or violated the delay bound. The complete phase is shown in Algorithm 5.
At the conclusion of the network discovery phase node i shares a common
view of the network topology with all of the other good nodes. As a result,
the network can designate the node with the smallest ID in the topology as
the reference clock. Furthermore, each node i has an estimate of the reference
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Algorithm 5 The Network Discovery Phase at Node i
procedure NetworkDiscovery
EIGByzMAC(Ni)
ConsistencyCheck
EIGByzMAC(Ti)
end procedure
clock τ ri (t) with respect to its local clock t using the formula τˆ
r
i (t) := aˆrit,
where the estimated relative skew aˆri and the actual relative skew ari differ
by at most a.
5.2.5 The Scheduling Phase
In the scheduling phase the good nodes in the network obtain a common
schedule governing the transmission and reception of data packets. Funda-
mental to our scheduling is the notion of “concurrent transmission set.” This
is a set of nodes that transmit at the same time, each using a certain power
level and modulation schedule, akin to an “independent set” or “conflict-free
set.” A “schedule” is a sequence of such concurrent transmission sets, each
with specified start and end times. Each node i divides the data transfer
phase into time-slots, and assigns a concurrent transmission slot and corre-
sponding rate vector to each time-slot so that the effective rate vector over
all time-slots is optimal over an allowed set of concurrent transmission sets C,
i.e., it achieves max
P(C)
U where P(C) denotes the set of protocols using concur-
rent transmission sets in C. All the good nodes independently arrive at the
same schedule since they independently optimize the same utility function
over the same C (ties broken lexicographically).
The good nodes must conform to a common schedule even though they
do not share the same clock. To resolve this, each node i generates a local
estimate of the reference clock τˆ ri (t) with respect to its local clock t as de-
scribed in the network discovery phase. However, this estimate may not be
perfectly accurate; the computed relative skew between the local clock and
the reference clock depends on the declared skews between adjacent nodes
on the connecting path. As described in Section 5.2.4, some of the nodes
on this path may be malicious and can introduce an error of at most a into
the computed relative skew. To address this, the time-slots are separated
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by a dead-time of size D, where given any pair of nodes (i, j), D is cho-
sen to be larger than difference in their reference clock estimates. That is
|τˆ ri (t)− τˆ rj (τ ji (t))| ≤ D.
Finally, we choose enough time-slots to guarantee that every pair of nodes
can communicate once in either direction, via multi-hop routing, during the
data transfer phase. There are n(n − 1) ordered pairs, with connecting
paths of at most n nodes, so we use n2(n − 1) time-slots. The algorithm
UtilityMaximization(C) for the scheduling phase is depicted in Algorithm 6.
At the end of the scheduling phase, node i shares a common utility maxi-
mizing schedule with other good nodes.
Algorithm 6 The Scheduling Phase at Node i
procedure Scheduling
UtilityMaximization(C)
end procedure
5.2.6 The Data Transfer Phase
In this phase the nodes exchange data packets using the generated schedule.
It is divided into time-slots with each time-slot assigned a concurrent trans-
mission set, a rate vector, and set of packets for each transmitter in the set.
To prevent collisions resulting from two nodes assigning themselves to differ-
ent time-slots due to timing error, node i begins transmission D time-units
after the start of the time-slot. The transmitted packet is then guaranteed
to arrive at the receiver in the same time slot, for appropriate choice of D
and time-slot size Bslot.
Algorithm 7 defines this phase, with mk denoting a message to be transmit-
ted or received by node i in the kth slot, Tstart the start time of the phase mea-
sured by the local estimate of the reference clock τˆ ri (t)), Sk = [tk, tk+1), k =
1, . . . , N the time-slots of the phase with N = n2(n − 1), t1 = Tstart, and
tk+1 := tk +Bslot + 2D, and TX(k) and RX(k) the concurrent transmission
set, and receiving nodes during slot k.
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Algorithm 7 The Data Transfer Phase at Node i
procedure DataTransfer(Tstart)
for k=1,. . . ,N do
if t ∈ Sk and t ≥ tk +D and i ∈ TX(k) then
Transmit(mk)
else if t ∈ Sk and i ∈ RX(k) then
Receive(mk)
end if
end for
end procedure
5.2.7 The Verification Phase
However, malicious nodes may not cooperate in data transfer phase, and so
some packets may not be received successfully. Whenever such a scheduled
packet fails to arrive at node j, it adds the offending concurrent transmission
set and associated packet number to a list, and distributes the list to the rest
of the network in the verification phase using the EIG Byzantine General’s
algorithm. These sets are then permanently removed from the collection
of feasible concurrent transmission sets C. With Lk denoting the list of
concurrent transmission sets that failed during the kth iteration of the data
transfer phase, the set Ck of feasible concurrent transmission sets during the
kth iteration of the scheduling phase is updated by intersecting it with Lck in
Algorithm 8.
We note that the nodes need not use the orthogonal MAC code, since they
have an estimate of the reference clock; all communication can be scheduled
into slots separated by a dead-time of 2D. Within each of the n stages of
EIG Byzantine General’s algorithm, there are n(n − 1) pairs of nodes that
may communicate, and at most n nodes on the connecting path. Therefore,
the total number of time-slots required is n3(n− 1).
At the conclusion of the phase, the good nodes share a common view of
the set of feasible concurrent transmission sets for the next iteration of the
scheduling phase.
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Algorithm 8 The Verification Phase at Node i
procedure Verification
EIGByz(Lk)
Update(Ck+1)
end procedure
5.2.8 The Steady State
The network cycles through the scheduling, data transfer, and verification
phases for niter iterations. Eventually the network converges to a set of
concurrent transmission sets, and a utility-maximizing schedule over that
set, because there is only a finite number of concurrent transmission sets
that can be disabled.
The overall protocol is depicted in Algorithm 9.
Algorithm 9 The Complete Protocol
NeighborDiscovery
NetworkDiscovery
for k = 1, . . . , niter do
Scheduling(Ck)
DataTransfer(t)
Verification
end for
5.3 Feasibility of Protocol and Its Optimality
One challenge, particularly in the neighbor and network discovery phases, is
that the protocol is composed of stages that must be completed sequentially
by all the nodes in the network, even prior to clock synchronization. Sup-
pose that [tk, tk+1) is the interval allocated to the k
th stage. Any messages
transmitted between adjacent good nodes must arrive in the same interval
they were transmitted. Since send-times are measured with respect to the
source clock, and receive-times with respect to the destination clock, the in-
tervals must be chosen large enough to compensate for the maximum clock
divergence caused by skew aij ≤ amax and offset bij ≤ amaxU0.
Lemma 5.3.1. There exists a sequence of adjacent time-intervals [tk, tk+1)
and corresponding schedule that guarantees any message of size W transmit-
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ted (via the orthogonal MAC code) by node i in the interval [tk, tk+1) (as
measured by node i’s clock) will be received by node j in the same interval as
measured by node j’s clock.
Proof. Set tk+1 := (amax)
2tk + 2(amax)
3U0 + (amax)
3TMAC(W ). Suppose that
a message from node i to node j during the interval [tk, tk+1) is transmitted
(via the orthogonal MAC code) at ts := amaxtk + (amax)
2U0 with respect to
node i’s clock. By substitution and simplification it follows that τ ji (ts) ≥ tk
and τ ji (ts + TMAC(W )) < tk+1. Hence τ
j
i ([ts, ts + TMAC(W ))) ⊂ [tk, tk+1),
and so node j receives this message during the same interval with respect to
node j’s clock.
Consequently, we have:
Theorem 5.3.1. At the conclusion of the network discovery phase the good
nodes will have a common view of the topology and consistent estimates (to
within a) of the skew of the reference clock.
Proof. From Lemma 5.3.1 all good nodes will proceed through each stage of
the Neighbor and network discovery phases together, and therefore establish
link certificates with their good neighbors. Since they form a connected
component, the good nodes obtain a common view of their link certificates
using the EIGByzMAC algorithm and the schedule in Lemma 5.3.1. The
good nodes can therefore infer the network topology and the relative skews
of all adjacent nodes based upon the collection of link certificates. Using
the consistency check, the good nodes can eliminate paths along which bad
nodes have provided false skew data. The good nodes can disseminate this
information to each other using the EIGByzMAC algorithm and Lemma 5.3.1
and thus obtain consistent estimates of the reference clock to within a.
We have the following corollary to Lemma 5.3.1:
Lemma 5.3.2. The sequence of adjacent intervals [tj, tj+1), j = 0, . . . , k is
contained in [t0, c1t0 + c2W ) where constants c1 and c2 depend on amax, k,
U0, and n.
Proof. It is straightforward that the duration of the orthogonal MAC code
TMAC(W ) ≤ cW , where constant c depends on amax, and n. The result for
k = 1 follows from definition of tk, and substitution of cW into TMAC(W ),
and for general k by induction and definition of tk.
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Therefore, we have:
Lemma 5.3.3. The time to complete neighbor and network discovery phases
Tnei+Tnet is less than c1 log Tlife+
c2
a
where c1, c2 depend only on n, amax, U0.
Proof. From Algorithms 2, 3, 4 and 5 there are at most 6 + n + n|C| + n
protocol stages in the neighbor and network discovery phases. Hence the
time required is at most c1t0 + c2W , where W is the size of a message to be
transmitted, and c1, c2 are constants depending on the number of protocol
stages amax, U0, n. The maximum size of a message is proportional to the
timing packet size log Tlife. To account for the effect of the minimum start-
time Ts for the consistency check, we can assume the worst case that the
Ts comes into effect during the first protocol stage (instead of later in the
network discovery phase). From Theorem 5.2.2 the consistency check start-
time is at most c
a
, where constant c depends on U0, amax, n. Substitution
into t0 proves the lemma.
From the above, we have the following two lemmas:
Lemma 5.3.4. The time required for the data transfer phase is at most
c3B+ c4D where B is the time spent transmitting data packets, D is the size
of the dead-time separating time-slots, and c3, c4 depend on n alone.
Proof. The total number of time-slots for data transfer between all source-
destination pairs is n2(n− 1), each supporting data transfer of size Bs and a
dead-time D.
Lemma 5.3.5. The time required for the verification phase is at most c5D
where c5 depends on n alone.
Proof. In each stage of the EIG Byzantine General’s algorithm, there are
at most n! vertex values that must be transmitted with each node in the
neighborhood. The value of a vertex is a list of concurrent transmission
sets. There are at most 2n concurrent transmission sets and at most n nodes
in a concurrent transmission set. Therefore the size of any message to be
transmitted by a node during the EIG algorithm is at most cD, where c is a
constant dependent on n. Since there are n(n−1) possible source-destination
pairs, there are at most n(n − 1) time-slots in each stage, separated at the
beginning and end by a dead-time D. Therefore the duration of each stage
is at most cD + n(n− 1)2D. There are at most n stages.
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We now prove the main theorem of this chapter:
Theorem 5.3.2. The protocol ensures that a network of n nodes proceeds
from startup to a functioning network carrying data. There exists a selection
of parameters niter, D, B, a and Tlife that achieves a utility equal to min-
max U(x) to within a factor , where the min is over all policies of the bad
nodes that can only adopt one of two actions in each concurrent transmission
set: conform to the protocol, or jam. Since no protocol can prevent a bad node
from doing so, the achieved utility is -optimal.
Proof. We begin by choosing parameters so that the protocol overhead, which
includes neighbor discovery, network discovery, verification phases, all dead-
times, and the iterations converging to the final rate vector, is an arbitrarily
small fraction of the total operating lifetime. With τˆ ri (t) := aˆrit the estimate
of reference clock r with respect to the local clock at node i, the maxi-
mum difference in nodal estimates is bounded as |τˆ ri (τ i(t))− τˆ rk (τ ki (τ i(t)))| ≤
2(amax)
2aTlife + (amax)
2U0. Given the number of rate vectors in the rate re-
gion, kr, we can choose niter, D, B, a and Tlife to satisfy:
niter
niter+2nkr
≥ 1− l,
B
c1 log Tlife+
c2
a
+B+c3D+c4D
≥ 1−d, niter((c1 log Tlife+ c2a +B+c3D+c4D) ≤ Tlife,
2(amax)
2aTlife + (amax)
2U0 ≤ D. These ensure, successively, that the rate
loss due to failed concurrent transmission sets is arbitrarily small, the time
spent transmitting data is an arbitrarily large fraction of the duration of
that iteration, the operating lifetime is large enough to support niter proto-
col iterations, and the dead-time D is large enough to tolerate the maximum
divergence in clock estimates caused by skew error a.
Let {Θ(t)} be the non-increasing sequence of disabled concurrent trans-
mission sets, with limit θ¯ attained at some finite time T , and C the set of
all concurrent transmission sets. Suppose rate vector x achieves max
P(C/θ¯)
U(x).
Our protocol obtains an effective data rate x(1 − d)(1 − l). Given a col-
lection of concurrent transmission sets C ′ ⊂ C, let P(C) denote the set of
protocols whose schedules map to C ′. The result follows, since for fixed Θ′,
any collection of disabled concurrent transmission sets, no protocol can do
better than maxP(C\Θ′) U .
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CHAPTER 6
THE PROTOCOL FOR UNBOUNDED
BIRTH TIMES
The Unbounded Birth Time Model (UBTM) does not impose a bound
on the birth-times of the participating nodes. As a result, separate sub-
networks independently form, where the nodes in each subnetwork share
near-simultaneous birth-times. These subnetworks though operating inde-
pendently of each other might be adjacent. The UBTM protocol described
in this chapter enables adjacent subnetworks to detect each other and merge.
There are three major obstacles to overcome for the protocol to succeed.
First, the two subnetworks have to detect each other. Since both are initially
operating independently, there is no guarantee that a node in one subnet-
work will pick up the transmissions of a node in the other subnetwork; both
nodes could be transmitting simultaneously or listening to someone else. So
each subnetwork must set aside a dedicated period of time to listen for adja-
cent subnetworks in the area. Second, the two subnetworks have to merge.
Once a subnetwork has detected a neighbor, it must interrupt its “normal”
steady-state operation, change its reference clock, predict when the detected
subnetwork will be entering a neighbor discovery phase, and schedule a co-
inciding neighbor discovery phase. Of course, this procedure itself can be
hijacked by bad nodes seeking to repeatedly drive the subnetwork into spu-
rious merges. The entire process, both the sentinel phase and the merge is
temporally expensive, requiring at least two protocol cycles to carry out. As
a result, the sentinel phase can only be carried out infrequently, which im-
plies that an adjacent subnetwork might remain undetected for a long period
of time before a merge occurs. During this time, the entire network be-
ing unnecessarily partitioned is operating suboptimally. The corresponding
throughput loss, to be rendered negligible, must be suitably amortized over
a long enough operating period. This entire process applies on a per merge
basis. Over the course of the total operating lifetime, the subnetwork might
have to carry out numerous merges. Our goal is to obtain optimal operation
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over the protocol lifetime from the instant the last good node was born. But
good nodes can be born at any time. Therefore, to operate optimally from
the instant the last good node was born, each subnetwork must at a minimum
be able to reset its clocks after a new node joins and continue operating for
a protocol lifetime. However, a clock reset implies the reuse of timestamps,
a potentially hazardous scenario that opens the door to “replay attacks.”
These attacks, in which bad nodes retransmit “stale” packets timestamped
from an earlier era, are impossible to detect. Hence, a subnetwork must also
change encryption before its clocks are reset in order to prevent stale packets
from corrupting the operation.
The third obstacle is that this clock reset procedure only works if every
good node is born within an operating lifetime of the last good node, an out-
come which need not be the case in the UBTM. Hence, a subnetwork might
run out the clock before another node joins. To avoid this, the subnetwork
enters a coma phase before the clock runs out, and executes a clock freeze.
The subnetwork stays in the coma phase until the broadcasts of an adjacent
subnetwork are detected, subsequently leaving the coma phase and restarting
the clock to attempt a merge.
The key idea underwriting much of the proof is that there are only a
finite number of times bad nodes can instigate a spurious merge or prevent
a merge from occurring. Whenever a merge is attempted, each node keeps
a record of both subnetworks and the connecting link that instigated the
merge. This merge “triple” is only allowed to fail a finite number of times
before it is deposited into the used-up collection and never used again. There
are also a finite number of these “merge triples.” We need to choose a large
enough operating lifetime to amortize the rate loss from all failed merges over
all merge triples. In addition, the protocol must provide functionality that
allows subnetworks to recognize when a merge has failed and guarantees a
consistent view of the failed merge triples among the affected good nodes.
In the next section we give a more detailed run-through of the protocol
operation.
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6.1 Overview of the UBTM Protocol
For the moment let us adopt the perspective of an individual node i. Imme-
diately after its primordial birth, node i enters the initial neighbor discovery
phase followed by the initial network discovery phase. Both phases are iden-
tical to those in the BBTM protocol. Node i emerges from the initial network
discovery phase as part of a subnetwork Si of nodes that were all born simul-
taneously. The good nodes in this subnetwork have a common topological
view, and a consistent view of a common reference clock. Let us assume for
now that Si is a unified entity that behaves in a consistent manner.
As in the BBTM, Si cycles through the scheduling phase, the data transfer
phase, and the verification phase, successively pruning concurrent transmis-
sion sets that are either infeasible or have been disabled by malicious nodes.
However, Si also cycles through a recurrent neighbor discovery phase and
network discovery phase to “pick-up” adjacent subnetworks that are seeking
to merge. We will now describe this process in more detail.
Every nsent cycles, Si enters a “sentinel” phase. We use the word sentinel
to describe a node that refrains from transmitting for the express purpose
of receiving unscheduled transmissions from nodes in the neighborhood. In
general, a sentinel attempts to detect nodes that have not been previously
detected. These undetected nodes obviously do not share a common schedule
with the sentinel, and as a result their transmissions, from the perspective of
the sentinel, are completely unpredictable. Hence, in order to avoid primary
conflicts, the sentinel stays silent during this period of its duty.
The purpose of the sentinel phase is to detect adjacent subnetworks that
may have formed after Si left the initial neighbor and network discovery
phase. After initially broadcasting probe packets to advertise its presence,
Si quiets down to listen for any probe packets broadcasted by adjacent sub-
networks. The sentinel phase stretches over 2damaxe protocol cycles to ensure
complete overlap with the recurrent neighbor discovery phase of an adjacent
subnetwork.
Now suppose Si detects an adjacent subnetwork Sj. Being the subnetwork
initiating the merge, Si must change its reference clock to Sj, and predict
when Sj next enters the recurrent neighbor discovery phase. In the mean-
time, Si stays idle. Associated with each merge attempt is a merge “pair,”
consisting of the initiating subnetwork and the detected subnetwork. Fur-
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thermore, there are rules in place to ensure that Sj does not initiate a merge
with Si, thereby causing both Si and Sj to “miss” each other. However, Sj
might initiate a merge with some other subnetwork in the interm, causing Sis
merge attempt to fail. The rules are designed to ensure that merge attempts
fail a finite number of times.
Returning to the original scenario, Si enters the recurrent neighbor dis-
covery phase at the time Sj was predicted to do the same. After proceeding
through the recurrent neighbor and network discovery phase, node i finally
has the opportunity to evaluate whether the attempted merge was success-
ful. Each node in the new post-merge subnetwork, call it S˜i, does the same
evaluation. Node i declares the merge successful if Sj ∪ Si ⊂ S˜i, that is,
S˜i contains the detected subnetwork Sj, the initiating subnetwork Si, and
possibly other nodes as well. If the merge succeeds, the node i adds the as-
sociated merge triple to the “used-up collection.” The merge triple is never
used again. However if the merge fails, the situation becomes more complex.
There are two reasons why a merge between Si and Sj could fail. The
first is that Si and/or Sj are infiltrated with bad nodes. The second is that
Sj attempted a merge with another subnetwork before Si could execute the
one it was planning. How many times could this happen? Let m be the
order of Si. There are at most 2
m possible chains of ordered subnetworks
in which each subnetwork in the chain attempts to merge with its higher-
ordered neighbor. Therefore the total number of failures granted to the merge
pair (Si, Sj) is 2
m where m is the order of Si. If the merge pair exceeds this
number, then it too is added to the used-up collection and never used again.
Hence failed merges will only happen a finite number of times.
Suppose the merge between Si and Sj is successful. Then the new sub-
network S˜i changes its encryption, resets its clocks, and proceeds to the
scheduling phase. In the scheduling phase, S˜i chooses a schedule that maxi-
mizes the utility function over the space of feasible concurrent transmission
sets. In the aftermath of a successful merge, this space is the entire space
of concurrent transmission sets for S˜i. The schedule is executed in the data
transfer phase, and failed concurrent transmission sets are pruned in the ver-
ification phase, resulting in a new feasible set. Next S˜i cycles through the
recurrent neighbor discovery phase and network discovery phase, the schedul-
ing phase, the data transfer phase, and the verification phase. The first two
phases allow S˜i to advertise its presence to adjacent subnetworks in a regular
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Figure 6.1: The state diagram of the UBTM protocol.
and predictable way. Some of these subnetworks may initiate merges with
S˜i, which if successful, will be picked up in the recurrent neighbor and net-
work discovery phases. The new subnetwork will then change its encryption,
reset its clocks and start the scheduling phase with a new space of feasible
concurrent transmission sets.
Eventually after repeatedly cycling through the protocol phases, S˜i will
arrive at a schedule that is utility optimal over the space of feasible concurrent
transmission sets for its topology. Moreover, S˜i will be operating at an
effective throughput vector that is utility optimal. After niter cycles have
expired, S˜i checks whether there are still nodes that have yet to join. If
so, then S˜i enters the coma phase and executes a clock freeze. During the
coma phase S˜i listens for any broadcasts from adjacent subnetworks, and if
received, will initiate a merge with the detected subnetwork. A successful
merge results in a change of encryption and clock reset, but a failed merge
will return S˜i to the coma phase.
The protocol state diagram is shown in Figure 6.1.
In the following sections we will describe some of the phases in more detail.
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Algorithm 10 The Complete Protocol
InitialNeighborDiscovery
InitialNetworkDiscovery
while coma or exit trigger not activated do
if k mod nsentinel = 0 then
SentinelPhase
k := k + d3amaxe
if new component is detected in the sentinel phase then
ChangeReferenceClock(SKEW,OFFSET)
while the neighbor discovery phase of the detected component
has yet to occur do
Idle
end while
end if
else
RecurrentNeighborDiscoveryPhase
RecurrentNetworkDiscoveryPhase
UpdateUsedTriples
if a successful merge has occurred then
ChangeEncryption
ResetClocks k=1;
end if
if k ≥ niter and there are undetected nodes then ActivateCom-
maTrigger
else if k ≥ niter then ActivateExitTrigger
else
SchedulingPhase
DataTransferPhase
VerificationPhase
k := k + 1
end if
end if
end while
while coma trigger is activated do
ComaPhase
if new component is detected in the coma phase then
ChangeReferenceClock(SKEW,OFFSET)
while the neighbor discovery phase of the detected component has
yet to occur do
Idle
end while
DeActivateComaTrigger
end if
end while
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6.2 The Initial Neighbor Discovery Phase
The initial neighbor discovery (INeiD) phase is similar to the neighbor dis-
covery phase for the BBT model, with the exception that in the former, node
i also computes an estimate of the relative offset between each neighbor, and
includes the relative offset in the corresponding link certificate. A fundamen-
tal result of clock synchronization is that the relative clock offset between
a pair of nodes cannot be exactly computed from any exchange of timing
packets. Therefore, the estimated relative offset between adjacent pairs of
nodes can only be accurate to within amaxdmax clock counts, where dmax is
the maximum packet delay. At the conclusion of the post-birth neighbor
discovery phase, node i has generated a collection of link certificates for the
subset of its neighboring nodes that were born within a bounded time of
itself.
6.3 The Initial Network Discovery Phase
The initial network discovery (INetD) phase is also similar to the network dis-
covery phase for the BBT model. The difference again lies in the treatment of
the clock offset parameters. Whereas in the BBT model the clock offset was
ignored, the INetD phase verifies the consistency of the relative offsets in ad-
dition to the relative skews. An inconsistent cycle occurs when the computed
skew around the cycle differs from unity by more than a, or the relative off-
set around the cycle differs from zero by more than b. Since the computed
relative skew between adjacent nodes has an accuracy of amaxdmax, the com-
puted relative skew around a cycle is accurate to within (n+1)(amax)
n+1dmax.
Therefore b ≥ (n + 1)(amax)n+1dmax, and the start time of the consistency
check must satisfy Ts ≥ (n+1)(amax)n+1+(n+1)(amax)n+1dmaxa . At the conclusion of
the PBnetD phase, node i belongs to a subcomponent that has a consistent
view of a reference clock and a common view of the network topology.
6.4 The Recurrent Neighbor Discovery Phase
The recurrent neighbor discovery (RNeiD) phase repeats itself indefinitely
after the primordial formation of a subnetwork. Hence, Si, the subnetwork
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that contains node i, already has a common view of the network topology and
a consistent view of a reference clock. As a result, the time intervals allocated
to each stage need not get progressively larger as in the initial neighbor
discovery phase. Instead, each interval is of fixed length and separated by a
band of length 2B, and the constituent nodes use the reference clock estimate
to schedule their transmissions and receptions. The purpose of the RNeiD
phase is fourfold. First, it allows Si to broadcast its presence to an adjacent
subnetwork that can subsequently estimate the reference clock of Si and
schedule a neighbor discovery phase that coincides with that of Si. Secondly,
it enables the nodes in Si to create link certificates with neighbors belonging
to an adjacent subnetwork that is attempting to merge with Si. Third, it
allows the nodes in Si to create link certificates with neighbors in an adjacent
subnetwork that was detected in preceding sentinel or coma phases. Finally,
it allows Si to recalculate the relative clock skew and offset after a successful
merge and clock reset.
In order to support all four goals, the RNeiD phase differs from the IN-
eiD phase in some important ways. First, all transmitted packets are time-
stamped with respect to the reference clock of Si. In addition, the probe
packets contain an ID that uniquely identifies the subnetwork Si. Hence,
any external sentinel nodes, i.e., the nodes acting as sentinels for the adjacent
subnetworks, which receive these probe packets can estimate the reference
clock of Si and infer the constituent nodes in Si. The external sentinel nodes
then use this information to predict when the next neighbor discovery of Si
will occur, and generate a merge triple containing the ID and reference clock
parameters of Si, and the unique ID of their own subnetwork. The merge
triple is then disseminated to the other nodes in that subnetwork. Second,
if Si is attempting to merge with another subnetwork by scheduling a coin-
ciding RNeiD phase, it includes the corresponding merge triple in its probe
packets so that that other subnetwork is alerted to the attempted merge.
This feature is important, because the nodes in the merged subnetwork must
be able to evaluate whether or not the merge was successful before triggering
a clock reset.
The component Si can only attempt a merge by scheduling a coinciding
RNeiD phase after detecting another component in a preceding sentinel or
coma phase. These latter two phases differ in a key area of consequence.
In the sentinel phase, the activity is always coordinated according to the
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estimate of the reference clock of Si. In the coma phase, the nodes in Si
execute a coordinated clock freeze to begin the coma phase, but end the
coma phase with a cascading clock restart that increases the spread of the
estimates of the reference clock. The band size B that separates each phase
of the RNeiD phase must account for this increased spread.
At the conclusion of the RNeiD phase, node i will have generated link
certificates with all the adjacent nodes containing updated relative clock
parameters. Node i will also know if some of these adjacent nodes belong to
another component that is attempting a merge.
6.5 The Recurrent Network Discovery Phase
The recurrent network discovery (RNetD) phase follows the recurrent neigh-
bor discovery phase and its purpose, like the INetD phase, is to confer a
common view of the network topology of Si to all its constituent nodes, and
consistent estimates of the reference clock of Si. Moreover, in the event of a
successful merge between two components, an event that will be evident by
the inclusion of the corresponding merge triple, the INetD phase will trigger
a clock reset and change of encryption in order to prevent the clock from
running out.
The RNetD phase differs from the INetD phase in that the component is
already assumed to have a consistent view of a reference clock and common
view of the network topology. As in the RNeiD phase, the time intervals
allocated to each stage are of fixed size and separated by a band of length
2B. In addition, the RNetD phase evaluates whether or not an attempted
merge was successful. A merge is labeled successful if all the nodes in both
components are present in the unified network at the conclusion of the RNetD
phase. A merge triple is added to the used-up collection maintained by each
node if the corresponding merge is successful or if the merge has failed an
excessive number of times.
At the conclusion of the RNetD phase: node i is part of a subnetwork
at that stage that has a common view of the network topology, consistent
estimates of a reference clock, and awareness of whether it is the product of
a successful merge.
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6.6 The Scheduling, Data Transfer, and Verification
Phases
These phases are similar to their counterparts in the BBT model.
6.7 The Coma Phase
The purpose of the coma phase is to tentatively end the system if no fu-
ture nodes are detected. (Note that a set of nodes never knows that it has
definitely reached the end unless all nodes are part of the network). This
tentative end must therefore have two properties. If no new nodes are ever
detected in the future, then the accrued utility must be nearly optimal. How-
ever, if new nodes are detected in the future, then the network needs to grow.
In the coma phase, the nodes in subnetwork Si freeze their clocks after
niter protocol cycles have expired and there are still nodes that have yet to
be encountered. The clocks stay frozen until some node, say node i, receives
a probe packet from a previously undiscovered subnetwork. First node i
estimates the skew and offset of the reference clock of the newly detected
subnetwork. The offset can only be accurate to within dmax. Then node i
generates a merge triple Mi containing the ID of the detected subnetwork,
the estimated skew and offset of the detected subnetwork, and the ID of Si.
If the merge triple has not already been added to the used-up collection of
triples, node i restarts its clock and broadcasts the merge triple to the rest
of the subnetwork Si using the Byzantine General’s algorithm.
An alternative scenario occurs if other nodes in Si generate merge triples
and broadcast the triples using the Byzantine General’s algorithm. When
node i receives these messages, it first verifies that each of them have not been
previously added to the used-up collection. If so, node i restarts its clock and
forwards the messages as per the Byzantine General’s algorithm. Otherwise
the messages are discarded. In addition, if the messages are received before
node i generates its own merge triple Mi, then node i discards Mi.
Since the clocks of each node in Si have been frozen, the nodes will have
to restart their clocks as they receive the message packets and re-estimate
the offsets. In addition, the transmission slots for the EIG algorithm are
separated by buffers large enough to accommodate the delay induced by the
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cascading clock restarts.
Next the subnetwork Si obtains a common view of the re-estimated rel-
ative clock offsets between adjacent nodes, using the Byzantine General’s
algorithm.
By this stage the subnetwork Si has a common view of a collection of merge
triples that have been generated by its constituent nodes. The subnetwork
Si chooses to merge with the subnetwork that has the largest ID by ordering.
Algorithm 11 The Coma Phase
ClockFreeze
while no legitimate component detected do
ReceiveProbePackets
if probe packets from legitimate merge candidates are received then
RestartClock
EIGByz(Mi)
EIGByz(Offsets)
ChooseMergeComponent
end if
end while
6.8 The Sentinel Phase
Unless all nodes have joined the network, the subnetwork does not know if
there will be new nodes joining the network in the future. Therefore the
network must always remain alert to the possibility that more nodes join.
The sentinel phase is intended to satisfy this requirement. The only way
new nodes are detected is if some node in an adjacent subnetwork hears it.
However, nodes that are transmitting according to the agreed schedule may
not hear a transmission. To avoid this problem, a small fraction of protocol
cycles are designated as sentinel phases in which all nodes in the subnetwork
must listen for external adjacent nodes.
In the sentinel phase, the subnetwork Si attempts to detect adjacent sub-
network that may have formed after Si left the preceding neighbor and net-
work discovery phases. The sentinel phase must be long enough to guarantee
a full overlap with the neighbor discovery phase of an adjacent component.
Hence the phase duration is chosen to be d2amaxeTcycle clock counts with
respect to the reference clock of Si. Moreover, it may be the case that an
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adjacent component concurrently enters the sentinel phase with Si. There-
fore, the sentinel phase must include a period of broadcasting probe packets
to ensure that two adjacent components do not stay mutually unaware of the
other’s presence. During the remaining time in the sentinel phase Si listens
for probe packets.
If node i detects the probe packets of an adjacent subnetwork it first es-
timates the relative skew and offset of the node that generated the probe
packets. The offset can only be estimated up to an accuracy of dmax. The
skew and offset are included in a corresponding merge candidate Mi contain-
ing the ID of the detected subnetwork, the received probe packets, and the
ID of the current subnetwork Si. Once the sentinel phase expires, node i
distributes the entire collection of generated merge candidates Mi to other
nodes in Si using the Byzantine General’s algorithm. At this stage, Si has a
common view of all the merge candidates generated by the constituent nodes.
Next Si chooses which subnetwork to merge with (if any) using the following
decision rules. First it eliminates any merge candidates that have already
been assigned to the used-up collection, since these merge candidates have
already been successfully used or have failed an excessive number of times.
Then it considers the collection of merge candidates corresponding to de-
tected subnetworks not in their sentinel phases. Choose the merge candidate
with the highest (by ordering) detected subnetwork ID. If no such merge can-
didates exist then consider the collection of merge candidates corresponding
to detected subnetworks in the sentinel phase and whose IDs are larger (by
ordering) then Si. Choose the subnetwork with the largest ID. If no such
subnetwork exists, then Si does not attempt any merges.
The reason that subnetwork Si does not attempt to schedule a merge
with lower-ordered subnetworks that are detected in their sentinel phases is
because those subnetworks may have also detected Si and may attempt to
schedule a merge of their own. We need to avoid the scenario where two
adjacent subnetworks attempt to schedule merges with each other, since if
each subnetwork reschedules its neighbor discovery phase to overlap with the
other, the attempted merge will fail.
119
Algorithm 12 The Sentinel Phase
ts := τˆ
r
i (τ
i(t))
for k = 1, . . . , d2amaxe do
RecurrentNeighborDiscoveryPhase
while τˆ ri (τ
i(t)) ≤ ts + kTcycle do
ReceiveProbePackets
end while
end for
EIGByz(Mi)
ChooseMergeSubnetwork
6.9 Feasibility of the Protocol and Its Optimality
In this section we will prove that there exists a choice of protocol parameters
that enables the network to obtain the utility in the BBT model, over the
network operating lifetime starting from the time the last good node was
born. The relevant parameters are the number of protocol cycles niter, the
time allocated to data transfer B, the dead-time between transmission inter-
vals D, and the operating lifetime Tlife. First, we obtain an upper bound on
the difference between the estimates of a reference clock by a pair of good
nodes.
Lemma 6.9.1. Given a skew error a and an offset error b, the maximum
difference between the estimate of the reference clock made by node i and
node j is at most 2aamaxTlife + 2b.
Proof.
|τˆ ri (τ i(t))− τˆ rj (τ j(t))| = |τˆ ri (τ i(t))− τˆ rj (τ ji (τ i(t)))|
= |aˆriτ i(t)− bˆri − aˆrj(ajiτ i(t) + bji)a− bˆrj|
≤ |aˆriτ i(t) + bˆri − (arj − a)(ajiτ i(t) + bji)− bˆrj|
= |aˆriτ i(t) + bˆri − arjbji − bˆrj + aτ j(t)|
≤ |aτ i(t) + aτ j(t) + bri + b − arjbji − brj + b|
= |aτ i(t) + aτ j(t) + 2b|
≤ 2aamaxTlife + 2b
We now show that a subnetwork of good nodes can form after a primordial
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birth, if they are born within a bounded time b0 of the first node with respect
to the clock of the first node. The nodes in a subnetwork by definition have
the same topological view and consistent estimates of their relative skews
and offsets. Therefore the good nodes must be able to obtain both without
without initially having either. First we show that newly born good nodes
can sequentially exchange messages of finite size with each other a finite
number of times, within a bounded time frame. This exchange occurs prior
to any clock synchronization, under half-duplex constraints.
Lemma 6.9.2. There exists a sequence of adjacent time-intervals [tk, tk+1)
and corresponding schedule that guarantees any message of size W transmit-
ted (via the Orthogonal MAC Code) by node i in the interval [tk, tk+1) (as
measured by node i’s clock) will be received by node j in the same interval as
measured by node j’s clock.
Proof. Set tk+1 := (amax)
2tk + 2(amax)
3b0 + (amax)
3TMAC(W ). Suppose that
a message from node i to node j during the interval [tk, tk+1) is transmitted
(via the Orthogonal MAC Code) at ts := amaxtk + (amax)
2b0 with respect to
node i’s clock. Then,
τ ji (ts) = τ
j
i (amaxtk + (amax)
2b0)
= aji(amaxtk + (amax)
2b0) + bji
≥ tk + amaxb0 + bji
≥ tk.
The inequalities above follow from substitution and simplification, and the
fact that 0 ≥ b0 ≥ −amaxb0. Similarly, we can show that τ ji (ts+TMAC(W )) <
tk+1:
τ ji (ts + TMAC(W )) ≤ aji(amaxtk + (amax)2b0 + TMAC(W )) + bji
≤ (amax)2tk + 2(amax)3b0 + amaxTMAC(W ).
Hence τ ji ([ts, ts+TMAC(W ))) ⊂ [tk, tk+1), and so node j receives this message
during the same interval with respect to node j’s clock.
Consequently, we have:
Theorem 6.9.1. At the conclusion of the network discovery phase the good
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nodes will have a common view of the topology and consistent estimates (to
within a) of the skew of the reference clock.
Proof. From Lemma 6.9.2 all good nodes will proceed through each stage of
the Neighbor and Network Discovery Phases together, and therefore establish
link certificates with their good neighbors. Since they form a connected
component, the good nodes obtain a common view of their link certificates
using the EIGByzMAC algorithm and the schedule in Lemma 6.9.2. The
good nodes can therefore infer the network topology and the relative skews
of all adjacent nodes based upon the collection of link certificates. Using
Consistency Check, the good nodes can eliminate paths along which bad
nodes have provided false skew data. The good nodes can disseminate this
information to each other using the EIGByzMAC algorithm and Lemma 6.9.2
and thus obtain consistent estimates of the reference clock to within a.
We have the following corollary to Lemma 6.9.2:
Lemma 6.9.3. The sequence of adjacent intervals [tj, tj+1), j = 0, . . . , k is
contained in [t0, c1t0 + c2W ), where constants c1 and c2 depend on amax, k,
b0, and n.
Proof. It is straightforward that the duration of the Orthogonal MAC Code
TMAC(W ) ≤ cW , where constant c depends on amax, and n. The result for
k = 1 follows from the definition of tk, and substitution of cW into TMAC(W ).
The result for general k follows by induction and definition of tk.
Therefore, we have:
Lemma 6.9.4. The time to complete Neighbor and Network Discovery Phases
Tnei+Tnet is less than c1 log Tlife+
c2
a
where c1, c2 depend only on n, amax, U0.
Proof. There are at most 6+n+n|C|+n protocol stages in the Neighbor and
Network Discovery Phases. Hence the time required is at most c1t0 + c2W ,
where W is the size of a message to be transmitted, and c1, c2 are constants
depending on the number of protocol stages amax, U0, n. The maximum size
of a message is proportional to the timing packet size log Tlife. To account
for the effect of the minimum start-time Ts for the consistency check, we
can assume the worst case that the Ts comes into effect during the first
protocol stage (instead of later in the Network Discovery Phase). Moreover,
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the consistency check start-time is at most c
a
, where constant c depends on
amax, n. Substitution into t0 proves the lemma.
We can now show that:
Lemma 6.9.5. The time to complete initial neighbor and initial network
discovery Phases TINeiD + TINetD is less than cT,IND log Tlife,+
c,IND
a
where
cT,IND and c,IND depend only on n, amax, U0.
Proof. In each stage of the EIG Byzantine General’s algorithm, there are
at most n! vertex values that must be transmitted with each node in the
neighborhood. The value of a vertex is a list of concurrent transmission
sets. There are at most 2n concurrent transmission sets and at most n nodes
in a concurrent transmission set. Therefore the size of any message to be
transmitted by a node during the EIG algorithm is at most cD, where c is a
constant dependent on n. Since there are n(n−1) possible source-destination
pairs, there are at most n(n − 1) time-slots in each stage, separated at the
beginning and end by a dead-time D. Therefore the duration of each stage
is at most cD + n(n− 1)2D. There are at most n such stages.
We can also show that:
Lemma 6.9.6. The time required for the data transfer phase is at most
cB,dataB + cD,dataD + cdata,T log Tlife, where B is the time spent transmit-
ting data packets, D is the size of the dead-time separating time-slots, and
cB,data, cD,data, andcT,data depend on n alone.
Proof. The total number of time-slots for data transfer between all source-
destination pairs is n2(n− 1), each supporting data transfer of size Bs and a
dead-time D.
Lemma 6.9.7. The time required for the verification phase is at most cD,verD+
cT,ver log Tlife where cD,ver and cT,ver depend on n alone.
Proof. The verification phase requires the network to exchange packets con-
taining timestamps of size log Tlife. Therefore the maximum packet size can
be expressed as a constant multiple of the time stamp size c log Tlife, where
c is dependent on the network size n alone. The packets are exchanged over
a fixed number of intervals that are separated by a dead-time D.
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The proof of the next three lemmas are similar to the preceding proof.
The non-data transfer phases are all proportional in duration to the size of
the timing packets log Tlife, the dead-times separating transmission intervals,
and in the case of the network discovery phase, a to carry out the consistency
check.
Lemma 6.9.8. The time required to complete the initial neighbor discovery
phase is at most cT,INeiD log Tlife + cD,INeiDD.
Lemma 6.9.9. The time required to complete the initial network discovery
phase is at most cINetD,T log Tlife + cINetD,DD +
cSNetD,
a
.
Lemma 6.9.10. The time required to complete the coma phase is at most
cT,coma log Tlife.
We can now determine an upperbound on the duration of a protocol cycle.
Lemma 6.9.11. The time required to complete one cycle of the protocol
phase is at most cT,cycle log Tlife +
c,cycle
a
+ cD,cycleD + cB,cycleB, where the
constants cT,cycle, c,cycle, cD,cycle, and cB,cycle depend only on n and amax.
Proof.
Tcycle ≤ TRNeiD + TRNetD + TRNeiD + TRNetD + Tdata + Tver
≤ (cT,IND + cT,INeiD + cT,INetD + cT,data + cT,ver + cT,coma) log Tlife
+
c,IND + c,INetD
a
+ cB,dataB + (cD,INeiD + cD,INetD + cD,data + cD,ver)D
≤ cT,cycle log Tlife + c,cycle
a
+ cD,cycleD + cB,cycleB.
We are now ready to prove the main theorem concerning unbounded birth
times. We note that optimality can only be measured since the last time
that a node was born.
Theorem 6.9.2. The protocol ensures that a network of n nodes proceeds
from startup to a functioning network carrying data. There exists a selection
of parameters niter, D, B, a, and Tlife that achieves a utility equal to Min-
max U(x) to within a factor (1− ) from the instant the last good node was
born, where the “Min” is over all policies of the bad nodes that can only jam
and/or cooperate during a concurrent transmission set.
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Proof. We show that the protocol achieves an effective rate vector x that is
near utility-optimal over the protocol lifetime from the instant that the last
good node was born. Let l be the fraction of the operating lifetime that
the network spends pruning concurrent transmission sets and transitioning
from separate adjacent components to a merge. The operating lifetime is
evaluated from the time the last good node was born. Consider the case in
which two adjacent components are both in normal protocol operation, that
is, out of the coma phase. Since at most 22
n−1 sentinel phases will pass be-
fore any two adjacent components will merge, there are nsent cycles between
sentinel phases, and each sentinel phase lasts for at most d3amaxe cycles, it
follows that at most d3amaxe22n−1nsent cycles are required for two adjacent
good components to merge after primordial birth. Now consider the case in
which one of the components is in the coma phase. Then at most 22
n−1 pro-
tocol cycles will be required for the two components to merge, since a node
in the coma phase is effectively on sentinel duty, the other component will
be cycling through the neighbor discovery phase, and there are at most 22
n−1
possible failed merges between two adjacent good components. In addition,
a component spends at most 2nkr cycles pruning infeasible concurrent trans-
mission sets. Therefore the total number of protocol cycles must satisfy the
following inequality:
1− l ≤ niter
niter + d3amaxe22n−1nsent + 22n−1 + 2nkr , (6.1)
and the total number of sentinel phases nsent satisfies:
nsent ≥ 22n−1.
Let d denote the fraction of time within a cycle that is spent in overhead,
that is, in the neighbor discovery phase, the network discovery phase, the
verification phase, or in the dead time between intervals. The amount of
time spent in data transfer must satisfy the following inequality:
1− d ≤ B
cT,cycle log Tlife + cB,cycleB +
c,cycle
a
+ cD,cycleD
. (6.2)
Let Tlife denote the maximum operating lifetime of the protocol between
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clock resets. The maximum operating lifetime of the protocol satisfies:
Tlife ≤ niter(cT,cycle log Tlife + cB,cycleB + c,cycle
a
+ cD,cycleD)
+ 22
n−1cT,coma log Tlife. (6.3)
Finally, from Lemma 6.9.1 the dead time satisfies the following inequality:
D ≥ 2aamaxTlife + 2b, (6.4)
where the maximum error in the relative offset satisfies:
b ≤ (n+ 1)(amax)n+1dmax.
We need to find a set of parameters D, Tlife, B, niter, and a that satisfies
inequalities (6.1), (6.2), (6.3), and (6.4), for a fixed d, l, cT,cycle, cB,cycleB,
c,cycle, and cD,cycle. Rearranging (6.1) gives:
niter =
(1− l)(d3amaxe22n−1nsent + 22n−1 + 2nkr
l
.
Similarly, rearranging (6.2) gives:
B =
(1− d)(cT,cycle log Tlife +B + c,cyclea + cD,cycleD)
d
.
Now if we substitute the previous two equations and (6.4) into (6.3) we
obtain:
Tlife ≥ c1 log Tlife + c2
a
+ c3aTlife + c4,
where c1, c2, c3, and c4 depend on the fixed parameters d, l, cT,cycle, cB,cycle,
c,cycle, and cD,cycle.
The inequality above can be solved by first choosing an a so that ac3 < 1.
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We can then choose Tlife large enough so that:
Tlife ≥
c1 log Tlife +
c2
a
+ c4
(1− c3a) .
The effective rate vector x satisfies x = (1−d)(1−l)xopt, where xopt is the
vector that is utility optimal over the set of feasible concurrent transmission
sets.
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CHAPTER 7
POSSIBLE FUTURE RESEARCH TOPICS
The axiomatic approach to wireless network security is a principled approach
to combating vulnerabilities in the system. Under this approach, protocols
are designed to completely protect the network from any behavior that satis-
fies axiomatic conditions. Although the protocol is vulnerable to any attack
that exceeds the axiomatic bounds, these vulnerabilities are in some sense
precisely stated and can be addressed in a principled manner by relaxing the
axioms appropriately.
The work in this thesis opens several avenues that can be further explored.
They include relaxing the axioms that set the boundaries on attacker capa-
bility, and reducing the space of attack options by adding extra functionality
to the protocol.
The protocol currently allows bad nodes to jam and/or cooperate in each
concurrent transmission set as long as they behave consistently with respect
to that concurrent transmission set. A bad node may choose to jam in one
concurrent transmission set and cooperate in another, and in some concur-
rent transmission sets it could jam but still claim to be cooperating since it
is not feasible to verify that it is not cooperating. A possible improvement
would be to enable the protocol to detect nodes that participate in the net-
work but periodically jam during concurrent transmission sets that do not
include them. To counter this attack, the protocol could organize random
coordinated surprise tests on nodes to see if they are transmitting when they
should be silent. By preventing nodes that participate in the network from
jamming during other concurrent transmission sets, we can reduce the space
of strategies for an attacker and improve the utility attained.
Also of interest is the choice of utility function that best maximizes net-
work performance in the presence of adversarial nodes. Some measures of
utility, like proportional fairness for instance, appear especially vulnerable to
malicious behavior. An attacker with a weak connection to a good node could
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opt to reduce the utility of the good nodes by participating in the network
and consuming a large share of the available time-slots. In a proportionally
fair scheme, the damage to the utility might be larger than that caused by
jamming, particularly, if the attacker is located far away. A possible research
topic is to investigate utility functions that are inherently more robust to
attacks of this type than others.
Another problem of interest is how to improve the transient behavior of
the protocols. Our approach and result on optimality is over a long time
horizon. We will examine how to make the protocols more efficient in the
transient phase without sacrificing security. In this way, we come full circle:
we approach performance, in this case transient performance, after designing
for security, and with security as a binding constraint. This is the reverse of
the usual approach.
The physical model that was adopted in Chapter 2, can also be extended
to include the probabilistic nature of packet receptions in wireless networks.
Our model of deterministic packet receptions enabled us to unequivocally
guarantee the security and performance of the protocol. However, in a net-
work where packet receptions are probabilistic, these guarantees no longer
apply. Instead, we could explore whether our claims hold with high proba-
bility if not with certainty.
This thesis might also extend to networks with mobile nodes. The oper-
ational challenge in such networks is that the topology undergoes constant
change while the nodes are moving. To address this challenge we could adopt
a quasi-static approach whereby the network is able to reach steady-state
within a short enough time period to assume a stable topology. Clearly, such
an approach depends on the efficiency of the transient behavior, an area of
future work that has already been mentioned.
Finally, there is also the issue of whether the rates supported by our proto-
col can eventually include the information theoretic capacity region. On this
point, there is far less clarity. First of all, it has yet to be determined if the
tactic of “iterative pruning” adopted for concurrent transmission sets, can
work equally well with information theoretic coding schemes and result in a
min-max formulation of utility. Second, the encryption tools that we have
adopted use computational complexity as a method for ensuring authenticity.
This paradigm is explicitly rejected in an information theoretic framework.
So the goal of adopting such a framework still remains a distant dream.
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